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WHERE BLACK LIVES MATTER LESS: UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF BLACK VICTIMS ON SENTENCING OUTCOMES IN TEXAS CAPITAL MURDER CASES FROM 1973 TO 2018

JELANI JEFFERSON EXUM* AND DAVID NIVEN**

ABSTRACT

The systemic disregard for Black lives in America was on full display when footage of a police officer kneeling on the neck of George Floyd went viral. Mr. Floyd’s resultant death set off protests declaring that Black Lives Matter throughout the nation and across the world. While national attention rightfully turned to demanding police accountability for undue violence, the prevailing conversation also incorporated at least a declared concern for addressing institutionalized racism within the criminal justice system and other American institutions. The term of the day became “antiracism.” With regard to police killings, the lesson is that police officers disproportionately kill Black people in this country with impunity because our system of policing encourages such violence, and our legal jurisprudence protects that use of violence. Combining the Black Lives Matter declaration with antiracism ideals requires systemic changes that will directly address the disproportionate and racist outcomes of policing. When combined with the larger antiracist movement—the call for antiracist policies across American institutions—the Black Lives Matter movement provided a powerful model for revealing the historic lack of protection for Black people as they live and work in this country. Declaring that Black Lives Matter is a reminder that Black lives have value, too, and ought to be legally protected. However, even when there is a system that is arguably in place to vindicate the unjust loss of life, Black people still remain unprotected.

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The application of the death penalty in America reveals the troubling truth that Black deaths do not matter.

Scholars and advocates have long acknowledged that the death penalty is disproportionately applied to Black offenders. It is also well known that the race of a victim is a leading factor in a capital defendant’s risk of receiving the death penalty, with those convicted of murdering whites significantly more likely to receive the death penalty than those convicted of murdering Blacks. This Article takes an in-depth look at statistics covering the sentencing outcomes in capital murder cases in Texas from 1973 to 2018, revealing the clear evidence that race matters in the imposition of the death penalty. However, this Article does not simply join the chorus of voices that have recognized the racial disparity in the death penalty. Rather, the authors argue that the lesson from the Black victim effect on the death penalty decision fits into the broader, historic, and present-day context of devaluing Black lives. As the Texas example provides, the devaluing effect of Blackness is apparent. This is not simply a failure to recognize the value of Black lives—as the Black Lives Matter movement exposes—but a reflection of the societal view that Blackness actually reduces the value and importance of all things—from property to community spaces to ultimate humanity. In life, Black people are vastly under-protected by the law, and the same is true for Black people even in a system designed to exact retribution for death. When we accept the fact that the death penalty reveals that Black deaths do not matter, then it becomes apparent that there is not an antiracist fix for the death penalty other than its abolition.

In this Article, the authors present the most comprehensive data ever assembled on capital murder cases in Texas to affirm that the scope of the race of victim difference is jarring. This data shows how pervasive race is in death penalty outcomes. In every single comparison the racial disparity was statistically significant, and harsher punishment was associated with white victims than with African American victims, who clearly mattered less. The truth, of course, is that Black victims matter as much as any, even if the legal system and society haven’t recognized their value. Within a database of thousands of cases there are thousands of tragic stories of lives upended by acts of an almost unspeakable nature. The details differ from case to case, but across all those thousands of cases the race of victim disparity persists. The math is straightforward. Indeed, the odds against the patterns seen here—emerging by chance—are truly astronomical. The race of the victim matters in the Texas criminal justice system.

As a matter of jurisprudence and policy making, however, the meaning of this data is uncertain. When legislators debate the death penalty, racial disparities are among the most frequently cited concerns of opponents of the death penalty. Supporters of the death penalty, however, dispute both the math and the meaning of findings of racial disparities, taking particular offense at the suggestion that race influences sentencing or influences their own views. These
authors argue that abolition is the only corrective approach. We must make the radical choice to uproot systems, like the death penalty, that allow the anti-Black biases in our national consciousness to not only thrive, but to be just. To do otherwise is to perpetuate a system where Black lives matter less.
INTRODUCTION

In the Summer of 2020, the systemic disregard for Black lives in America was on full display when footage of a police officer kneeling on the neck of George Floyd went viral. Mr. Floyd’s resultant death set off protests declaring that Black Lives Matter throughout the nation and across the world. While national attention rightfully turned to demanding police accountability for undue violence, the prevailing conversation also incorporated at least a declared concern for addressing institutionalized racism within the criminal justice system and other American institutions. The term of the day became “antiracism.” With regard to police killings, the lesson is that police officers disproportionately kill Black people in this country with impunity because our system of policing encourages such violence, and our legal jurisprudence protects that use of violence. Combining the Black Lives Matter declaration with antiracism ideals requires systemic changes that will directly address the disproportionate and racist outcomes of policing. When combined with the larger antiracist movement—the call for antiracist policies across American institutions—the Black Lives Matter movement provided a powerful model for revealing the historic lack of protection for Black people as they live and work in this country. Declaring “Black Lives Matter” is a reminder that Black lives have value, too, and ought to be legally protected. However, even when there is a system that is arguably in place to vindicate the unjust loss of life, Black people still remain unprotected. The application of the death penalty in America reveals the troubling truth that Black deaths do not matter.

Scholars and advocates have long acknowledged that the death penalty is disproportionately applied to Black offenders.1 It is also well known that the race of a victim is a leading factor in a capital defendant’s risk of receiving the death penalty, with those convicted of murdering whites significantly more likely to receive the death penalty than those convicted of murdering Blacks.2 This Article takes an in depth look at statistics covering the sentencing outcomes in Texas capital murder cases from 1973 to 2018 to reveal the clear evidence that race matters in the imposition of the death penalty. However, this Article does not simply join the chorus of voices that have recognized the racial

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disparity in the death penalty. Rather, it argues that the lesson from the Black victim effect on the death penalty decision fits into the broader, historic, and present-day context of devaluing Black lives. Through the example that Texas provides, the devaluing effect of Blackness is apparent. This is not simply a failure to recognize the value of Black lives—as the Black Lives Matter movement exposes—but is a reflection of the societal view that Blackness actually reduces the value and importance of all things—from property to community spaces to ultimate humanity. In life, Black people are vastly under-protected by the law, and the same is true for Black people—even in a system designed to exact retribution for death. When we accept the fact that the death penalty reveals that Black deaths do not matter, then it becomes apparent that there is not an antiracist fix for the death penalty other than its abolition.

This Article reports quantitative findings from the authors’ study of Texas capital murder convictions, documenting the consistent disparity in sentencing relating to the race of the victim. Finding that the punishments imposed in cases with Black victims are uniformly lower than in cases with white victims, the authors consider anew the urgency of the assertion that Black Lives Matter. This discussion is situated within the larger death penalty debate and considers how the findings here fit a pattern in which the legal system—in both criminal and civil matters—tolerates racial devaluation.

The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I presents data revealing a stark disparity in death sentence rates in Texas based on the race of the victim. Part II situates the findings within the notion of the death penalty as a tool of retribution. Part III considers how race of victim disparities fit a larger pattern of devaluing Black lives. Part IV suggests disparities are inherent to the death penalty and that the sentence is irredeemable.

I. RACE MATTERS: THE NUMBERS

This Article is based on a comprehensive database of 15,394 capital murder convictions in Texas from 1973 to 2018. Over those four and half decades, Texas leads the nation in the number of executions. Of those 15,394 capital murder cases, death sentences were imposed in 5.2% of all convictions. Based on this outcome, we should expect that the death sentence rate should cluster around 5.2% for variables that should be unrelated to the imposition of the sentence, such as race. If race of the victim, for example, is unrelated to

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3. Portions of these data were collected via the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) through the Offender and Victim Information elements available online and the Public Information Application (“PIA”) systems. Individual offenders were then tracked through Texas District Courts (“TDC”) Court Activity Database. Court records on file in each of the districts provided victim information as well as the weapon(s) used in the crime.

sentencing, then the death sentence rate should be near 5.2% in both white and African American victim cases. This proves not to be the case. Rather than finding roughly proportional results, the data reveals a stark disparity based on race of victim. As shown in Table 1, death sentences occur in 8.5% of cases with white victims and 2.7% of cases with African American victims. Thus, far from clustering near the baseline, cases with white victims were actually three times more likely to result in a death sentence than cases with African American victims. This result comports with studies of capital murder cases in numerous states, including Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania that found a strong relationship between the race of the victim and the resulting sentence. Findings of racial

5. Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Choosing Those Who Will Die: Race and the Death Penalty in Florida, 43 FLA. L. REV. 1 (1991) (finding cases with white victims to be six times more likely to receive a death sentence than those with Black victims).

6. David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661, 708–10 (1973) ("Georgia’s . . . death-sentencing rate . . . is .06 (15/246) for [B]lack victim cases versus (85/348) for white victim cases. . . . [And] as compared to white victim cases, the level of aggravation in [B]lack victim cases must be substantially greater before the prosecutor will even seek a death sentence.").


10. Marian R. Williams & Jefferson E. Holcomb, Racial Disparity and Death Sentences in Ohio, 29 CRIM. JUST. J. 207 (2001) (finding cases with white victims to be more than twice as likely to receive a death sentence than those with Black victims).

11. Glenn L. Pierce et al., Race and Death Sentencing for Oklahoma Homicides Committed Between 1990 and 2012, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 750 (2017) (finding “rather large disparities in the odds of a death sentence that correlate with the gender and the race/ethnicity of the victim. . . . [C]ases with white female victims, cases with white male victims, and cases with minority female victims are significantly more likely to end with a death sentence in Oklahoma than are cases with non-white male victims.”).

imbalance in Connecticut, Maryland, and New Jersey sentencing outcomes contributed to what were ultimately successful efforts to abolish the death penalty in those states.

A. The Startling Effect of the Victim’s Race

As a matter of both math and logic, unbiased processes should produce unremarkable patterns. That is, an unbiased coin flipped hundreds or thousands of times should land on heads roughly half the time and land on tails roughly half the time. Were a coin flipped a thousand times to land on heads twice as often as it lands on tails, the results would defy even the most generous statistical boundaries of what a fair coin could produce. Thus, we would conclude that some element of the process has biased the outcome and led to the pattern observed. If race does not affect the criminal justice system, we should expect the race of the victim to be unrelated to the outcome of the case. That is, an unbiased process examined across hundreds or thousands of cases should produce roughly the same punishment for crimes against white victims as it does for crimes against African American victims. Table 1 suggests this is not the case.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All Cases/All Offenders</th>
<th>Death Sentence Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White Victim</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American Victim</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>p &lt; .00001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n = 11,822</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The scope of that gap—between results that would suggest neutrality and the results actually found here—is conveyed by a measure of statistical

16. Scherzer argues the proportionality review process in New Jersey served to both limit the use of the death penalty in New Jersey and undergird arguments for abolition, see Aaron Scherzer, Note, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in New Jersey and Its Impact on Our Nation’s Evolving Standards of Decency, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 223, 237–40 (2009). Niven and Donnelly find that references to racial disparities were a major theme among legislators in Connecticut who voted to abolish the death penalty, see David Niven & Ellen A. Donnelly, Who Challenges Disparities in Capital Punishment?: An Analysis of State Legislative Floor Debates on Death Penalty Reform, 18 J. ETHNICITY IN CRIM. JUST. 95 (2020).
significance. In brief, statistical significance tells us the odds of a result occurring by chance alone, even if there were no underlying relationship. Hence, a perfectly fair coin flipped one hundred times could land on heads fifty-one times—not because of bias, but by luck alone. Such an outcome would not be statistically significant. Social science research typically employs a statistical significance standard of one in twenty or one in one hundred. That is, when the odds associated with a result are one in twenty or higher against something happening by chance, then the result is considered evidence of something systematic.17 With regards to the data from Texas, the likelihood that a race neutral process could produce the disparity shown in Table 1 across more than 11,000 cases is not one in twenty or one in one hundred, rather it is one in 180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000. By comparison, the odds of winning the Powerball lottery are one in 292,201,338.18 In other words, the odds of selecting the winning Powerball lottery ticket number on one’s first try are quite literally trillions of times better than seeing this disparity in race of victim sentencing in Texas happen by chance.

B. The Effect of the Victim’s Race Across Defendant Demographics

As Table 2 shows, the race of the victim remains consequential even as we consider the race of the defendant. In cases with an African American defendant, 7.4% of cases with a white victim result in a death sentence. That number is 4.8% when both the defendant and victim are African American. Again, this result is statistically significant, falling far outside the boundaries of what we would expect to see if the race of the victim was unrelated to the outcome of the case.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White Defendant</th>
<th>African American Defendant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White Victim</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p &lt; .00001</td>
<td>p &lt; .00001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While cases with African American defendants fail to cluster around the mean, a far larger disparity exists among cases with a white defendant. Again, 5.2% is the baseline across all cases. That is the figure around which nondeterminative variables should cluster. Yet, when a white defendant is accused

17. Baldus, Woodworth, and Grosso, for example, note racial disparities with a 1 in 20 (p = .05) probability in their analysis of New Jersey death sentences. Baldus et al., supra note 15, at 155.

of murdering a white victim, a death sentence is imposed in 15.6% of cases. When a white defendant is accused of murdering an African American victim, death sentences are imposed in 1.2% of the cases. The odds that a race neutral process could produce such a vast disparity is a farcical one in 384,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000.

Imagine officials stepping to midfield before the Super Bowl, about to flip a coin to determine who gets the ball first. If that coin was found to land on heads thirteen times more often than tails, it would be headline news. There would be an investigation and condemnation of the intolerable bias at hand. Fair processes do not result in thirteen-to-one disparities. But the data here are not about the trivial matter of which team gets the ball first in a football game. Rather these data concern the implicit value of lives and the nature of justice. More to the point, the data suggest that Black lives matter less in the Texas criminal justice system. And, the fact that we see these skewed results across the country show that Black lives matter less across the nation. This is not a truth that officials typically welcome. Professor Randall Kennedy asserts that one of the ironic side effects of the triumphant social movement to stigmatize racism in the United States is that it has rendered courts and other government actors hesitant to label any actor or outcome racist.19 “Perhaps their sense of shamefulness of racism is so intense that they find it difficult to burden an official or agency with the moral opprobrium that the ‘racist’ label connotes,” Kennedy writes, “leading courts to dismiss most allegations of bias by applying almost impossibly high standards of proof.”20

Those charged with defending a criminal justice system against charges of racial disparity often suggest that some factor other than race is the source of the disparity.21 For example, the classic defense against racial disparity data is the claim that the nature of the crimes being prosecuted is correlated with the race of victim—and thus, it is the nature of the crime that produces the disparity in case outcomes. However, a closer look at the data reveals the unsoundness of this focus on other factors to explain the racial disparities.

C. The Excuse of “Other Factors”

A desire to explain away racial disparities in the death penalty outcomes as something other than anti-Black bias was evident as early as 1987 in the key

20. Id.
In that case, Warren McCleskey, a Black man, had been convicted of two counts of armed robbery and one count of murder in Fulton County, Georgia. His convictions arose out of the killing of a white police officer during the robbery of a furniture store. A jury convicted McCleskey of murder, and, after a sentencing hearing, the jury recommended a death sentence. The court followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced McCleskey to death. On appeal, McCleskey raised several issues, including claims that the Georgia capital sentencing process was administered in a racially discriminatory manner, violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In support of his claim, McCleskey pointed to a statistical study performed by Professors David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth (“the Baldus study”) that showed “a disparity in the imposition of the death sentence in Georgia based on the race of the murder victim and, to a lesser extent, the race of the defendant.” The Baldus study concluded that, “even after taking account of 39 nonracial variables, defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing Black defendants,” and “[B]lack defendants were 1.1 times as likely to receive a death sentence as other defendants.” Ultimately, the Baldus study indicates that, as a Black defendant convicted of killing a white victim, McCleskey was in the class of individuals with “the greatest likelihood of receiving the death penalty.”

In its arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court, the State of Georgia went to great lengths in order to explain away racial disparities in death sentences.
During oral arguments, Georgia’s deputy attorney general told the Justices that “white victim cases are qualitatively different from [B]lack victim cases,” later elaborating that Black victims were more likely to be murdered in “a barroom quarrel, if you will.” Georgia presented no data on barroom quarrels or any of their other allied assertions. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court’s decision denying McCleskey’s constitutional claims suggests that the racially disparate outcomes are somehow explainable by something other than discrimination by the decisionmakers.

In holding that there was no constitutional violation in McCleskey’s case, the Supreme Court reasoned:

> Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has been abused. The unique nature of the decisions at issue in this case also counsels against adopting such an inference [of discriminatory purpose] from the disparities indicated by the Baldus study.

The Court’s preoccupation with the special nature of discretion suggests that it was leaving open the possibility that there could be many factors—beyond simply race—that informed the decisionmakers’ choice to impose a death sentence. But, of course, that conclusion is exactly what the Baldus study was refuting. However, the Court dismissed the significance of the study’s findings and curtly stated that the Baldus study was “clearly insufficient to support an inference that any of the decisionmakers in McCleskey’s case acted with discriminatory purpose.” In other words, there must be some other perfectly acceptable explanation for the racially disparate outcomes. The history of the death penalty in Georgia belies that assumption, and similar excuses remain faulty with regards to today’s death penalty statistics.

For the moment, leave aside the dicey logic that ungirds the expectation that the details of murder cases vary systematically by race. The more fundamental point here is that even when we pull these capital cases apart by particular details

32. *Id.*
33. Prior to *McCleskey*, the Supreme Court had already established that “[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause” and that “absent a ‘stark’ pattern,” “impact is not determinative” in *Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.*, 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977).
35. *Id.*
36. See Ursula Bentle, *The Death Penalty in Georgia: Still Arbitrary*, 62 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 573, 580–84 (1985) (describing the wide variety of aggravating circumstances that fit into the capital category which “make[] the unbridled discretion of juries . . . particularly dangerous,” because if the defendant “fits into one of the categories eligible for capital punishment, any reason, or no reason, can serve to place him on death row. It does not matter whether the jury chooses to execute him because he was [B]lack, or poor, or psychotic”); Arnold Barnett, *Some Distribution Patterns for the Georgia Death Sentence*, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1327, 1334–41 (1985) (describing the origins of the modern death penalty in Georgia).
of the crime, the race of victim disparity persists. For example, death sentence rates in the Texas data vary by the weapon used in the crime. Across these Texas cases, those accused of murdering by use of their hands are the most likely to be sentenced to death. Meanwhile, murder with a blunt object or a knife is more likely to result in a death sentence than murder by firearm. But even as those details are unquestionably consequential to the outcome of the case, the race of victim disparity persists across every category of weapon. Cases with white victims are more likely to result in death sentences than cases with African American victims if the crime was committed with a gun.\textsuperscript{37} Or if the crime was committed with a knife.\textsuperscript{38} Or with a blunt object.\textsuperscript{39} Or with the assailant’s hands.\textsuperscript{40} Or with another object.\textsuperscript{41}

As an example, Table 3 shows the death sentence rate in firearm cases. Mirroring the overall data, we again see a disparity by race of victim in cases with African American defendants. Moreover, with white defendants we again see a massive race of victim disparity, with white victim cases being ten times more likely to result in a death sentence than African American victim cases.

**Table 3. Death Sentence Rate by Race of Victim & Offender**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firearm Cases Only</th>
<th>White Defendant</th>
<th>African American Defendant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White Victim</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>7.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American Victim</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p &lt; .00001</td>
<td>p &lt; .005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 2367</td>
<td>n = 2943</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even when we remove cases that resulted in death sentences from the analysis, the data still reveals a race of victim disparity. Table 4 shows the average sentence (in years) imposed in cases that did not result in a death sentence. Consistent with the previous data, once again we find a disparity, with harsher punishment imposed on those convicted of murdering a white Texan. With sentencings about four years longer for white victims than African American victims, we once again see a highly statistically significant difference.

\textsuperscript{37} In the authors’ dataset, the death sentence rate is 7.7% in cases where a gun was used against a white victim and 2.7% in African American victim cases.

\textsuperscript{38} In the authors’ dataset, the death sentence rate is 10.7% in cases where a knife was used against a white victim, and 4.7% in African American victim cases.

\textsuperscript{39} In the authors’ dataset, the death sentence rate is 11.2% in cases where a knife was used against a white victim, and 3.8% in African American victim cases.

\textsuperscript{40} In the authors’ dataset, the death sentence rate is 92.7% in cases where a white victim was killed with the assailant’s hands, and 78.9% in African American victim cases.

\textsuperscript{41} In the authors’ dataset, the death sentence rate is 3% percent in cases where something other than a gun, knife, blunt object, or the assailant’s hands were used against a white victim, and 1.3% in African American victim cases.
By eliminating death sentences from consideration, this comparison removes cases that ostensibly represent the worst and most heinous crimes. And yet the disparity in race of victim punishment remains. It cannot be a function of the unique nature of capital sentencing cases since the same dynamic applies to the entire body of cases.

Table 4. Length of Sentence by Race of Victim

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race of Victim</th>
<th>Sentence in Years (mean)</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White Victim</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American Victim</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p < .00001
n = 11,139

II. THE DEATH PENALTY’S RETRIBUTION PROBLEM

The Supreme Court has maintained that the death penalty satisfies the retribution and general deterrence theories of punishment. In Eighth Amendment cases examining claims of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, the Court explains that “capital punishment is excessive when it is grossly out of proportion to the crime or it does not fulfill the two distinct social purposes served by the death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes.” In addressing retribution, which measures an offender’s moral desert, the Supreme Court expounds that “capital punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit a narrow category of the most serious crimes and whose


extreme culpability makes them the most deserving of execution.\textsuperscript{45} The mitigating and aggravating factors that jurors consider in the capital sentencing decision are designed to identify the worst of the worst offenders. In terms of retribution, it stands to reason, then, that juries decide to sentence offenders to death when they are convinced that those aggravating factors indicate a level of moral blameworthiness for which a life sentence would be an insufficient punishment. The decision faced by capital jurors “is the highly-charged moral and emotional issue of whether the defendant, notwithstanding his crimes, is a person who should continue to live.”\textsuperscript{46}

The statistics on the impact of a victim’s race are evidence of the failures of retributivist punishment. Retribution, by its very nature, requires the sentencing decision makers to impose their own view of value upon the defendant. One cannot assess the moral desert of another without assessing the significance of the harm caused by that person weighed against the individual’s redemptive worth. Some scholars argue that the reason for the racially disparate capital punishment decisions is that capital jurors, who are mostly male and mostly white,\textsuperscript{47} may not be able to identify with Black capital defendants and may identify more with the victim when the victim is white.\textsuperscript{48} In other words, “jurors may have a difficult time empathizing with mitigating evidence presented by Black defendants and, conversely, victim impact testimony might disproportionately magnify the loss of White victims compared to non-White victims.”\textsuperscript{49} Said more bluntly, jurors see less loss when the victim is Black, and less redeemability when the defendant is Black.\textsuperscript{50} Additionally, scholars have theorized that retribution is “inextricably tied to race,” and therefore “cannot be

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{45} Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005)).
\item \textsuperscript{47} Justin D. Levinson et al., Devaluing Death: An Empirical Study of Implicit Racial Bias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six Death Penalty States, 89 N.Y.U.L. REV. 513, 544 (2014) (explaining that the process of death qualification leads to capital juries that are mostly comprised of white males).
\item \textsuperscript{48} Id. at 534–44 (discussing how racial stereotypes affect white jurors in capital cases).
\item \textsuperscript{49} Id. at 517.
\end{itemize}
contemplated without also considering the corresponding impact” of racial arbitrariness. Professor Justin Levinson has explained it in this manner:

[T]he tendency to punish crimes against White [sic] Americans more severely should have been reduced by the combination of channeling society’s taste for retribution into the formal justice system and requiring heavy anti-arbitrariness procedural regulation in the administration of capital punishment. This has not been the case.

This view takes issue with the adequacy of the death penalty process, requires room for retribution, yet allows for racial bias to influence that retributive determination, thus leading to arbitrariness. The Supreme Court has plainly held that death may not be imposed in an arbitrary manner. However, the term “arbitrary” makes outcomes sound unpredictable, which the data shows is not the case. As explained previously, the statistics in Texas and throughout the country are not rooted in mere chance. Instead, the data demonstrates that race matters in the capital sentencing context. The racially disparate outcomes that we are witnessing in the death penalty decisions—which exist across relevant case factors—highlight that jurors are expressing [the] retributive sentiments as their community of death qualified jurors see things—that [B]lack capital defendants are more morally blameworthy than white capital defendants; that defendants who have taken the life of a white person are especially deserving of the death penalty; and that [B]lack defendants who take the life of a white person are the worst of the worst capital defendants.

In the death penalty context, the Supreme Court has recognized the importance of the jury as the exactors of retribution. In January 2016, the Supreme Court decided *Hurst v. Florida*, in which it examined Florida’s capital sentencing scheme. Under Florida law, “the maximum sentence a capital felon

51. Levinson et al., supra note 47, at 517, 541.

52. Id. at 541.

53. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (“[T]he death penalty . . . [can]not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.”) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring)). Indeed, Justice Marshall raised concerns about the risk of “arbitrariness” in his *McCleskey* dissent. See *McCleskey v. Kemp*, 481 U.S. 299, 322–23 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall asserted that, since *Furman*, the “Court had been concerned with the risk of the imposition of an arbitrary sentence, rather than the proven fact of one.” Id. at 323. The “emphasis on risk acknowledges the difficulty of divining the jury’s motivation in an individual case,” and “reflects the fact that concern for arbitrariness focuses on the rationality of the system as a whole, and that a system that features a significant probability that sentencing decisions are influenced by impermissible considerations cannot be regarded as rational.” Id.


55. 577 U.S. 92, 94 (2016).
may receive on the basis of the conviction alone [was] life imprisonment." 56

Similar to other states, Florida law only authorized the conviction for a capital offense to carry life imprisonment and required the finding of additional aggravating factors in order for death to be imposed on the defendant. 57 However, Florida’s capital procedure allowed an advisory jury to make a recommendation to a judge, who then would make the final findings needed to impose a death sentence. 58 Death could only be imposed if a separate sentencing hearing “result[ed] in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death.” 59 Because this death penalty sentencing procedure exposed a defendant to a higher punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict, the Supreme Court ultimately held that it violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 60 The Court made clear in its holding that when state law only allows for a death sentence when certain aggravating factors are present, it must be the jury, and not the judge, who finds the existence of those facts that make death appropriate. 61 In other words, in these types of situations, it must be the jury who finds that retribution and/or deterrence requires the imposition of the death penalty in an individual case. In Ring v. Arizona, a 2014 case relied upon by the Hurst Court, Justice Breyer found the jury essential in carrying out the retributive justification for capital punishment. 62 As he explained in his concurrence:

In respect to retribution, jurors possess an important comparative advantage over judges. In principle, they are more attuned to “the community’s moral sensibility,” because they “reflect more accurately the composition and experiences of the community as a whole[,]” Hence they are more likely to “express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death[,]” and better able to determine in the particular case the need for retribution, namely, “an expression of the community’s belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death.” 63

Of course, Justice Breyer’s words are expressing a pristine idea that is sullied by reality. It may be true that juries are more capable than judges of

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56. Id. at 92.
57. Id. at 94.
58. Id. at 95–96.
59. Id. at 92 (citing FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1)).
61. Id. at 102–03 (“Florida’s sentencing scheme, which required the judge alone to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance, is therefore unconstitutional.”).
62. 536 U.S. 584, 614–15 (2014) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“As to the first, I note the continued difficulty of justifying capital punishment in terms of its ability to deter crime, to incapacitate offenders, or to rehabilitate criminals. Studies of deterrence are, at most, inconclusive.”).
reflecting the conscience of the community. But our persistent racial disparities in capital sentencing show us that the “certain crimes”—that “are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response” is the death penalty—are routinely those crimes that take the lives of white people, and not those crimes that result in the death of Black people. And, in that way, juries are actually expressing the true racist sentiments of their communities. A version of this form of “race-based retribution”64 was on display in the 2017 Supreme Court case Buck v. Davis.65 The case, a procedural nightmare, involved questions regarding the proper standard for certificate of availability, as well as what constitutes extraordinary circumstances for a Rule 60(b) motion to reopen a final judgment.66 However, what is most relevant to this discussion was the basis for Defendant Duane Buck’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Buck’s own expert psychologist witness testified at his sentencing hearing that being Black was a “statistical factor” that increased Mr. Buck’s probability of being a danger in the future.67 “Future dangerousness’ [of the defendant] is one of the ‘special issues’ that a Texas jury must find to exist—unanimously . . . before a defendant may be sentenced to death.”68 The purported expert’s reasons for using race in this assessment was nothing regarding the particular defendant, but instead his “expert” opinion was based on the “sad commentary that minorities, Hispanics and [B]lack people[] are over represented in the Criminal Justice System.”69 On cross-examination, the prosecutor sought to clarify this position, asking: “You have determined that the sex factor, that a male is more violent than a female because that’s just the way it is, and that the race factor, Black, increases the future dangerousness for various complicated reasons; is that correct?”70 The “expert” answered, “Yes.”71 In other words, this psychologist explained how Blackness makes someone statistically more likely to be a future danger than a white person. Under Texas law (and the law of many other states), likely future dangerousness is one of the aggravating factors that jurors are required to consider in their capital sentencing decision.72 In short, under this psychologist’s assessment, being Black means being more likely

64. Exum, supra note 54, at 246.
66. Id. at 767.
67. Id. at 768 (“In determining whether Buck was likely to pose a danger in the future, [Buck’s second expert] considered seven ‘statistical factors.’ The fourth factor was ‘race.’ His report read, in relevant part: ‘4. Race. Black: Increased probability. There is an over-representation of Blacks among the violent offenders.’”); Brief for Petitioner, Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2016) (No. 15-8049), 2016 WL 4073689, at *5, *7.
68. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at *5 (citing TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071, § 2).
69. Id. at *7.
70. Id. at *7–8.
71. Id. at *8.
deserving of the death penalty than others. This is race-based retribution. Mr. Buck was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court’s reversal of the decision below and remand for further consideration indicates that the Court agreed that race-based retribution was at play. The Court stated:

Given that the jury had to make a finding of future dangerousness before it could impose a death sentence, [the expert’s] report said, in effect, that the color of Buck’s skin made him more deserving of execution. It would be patently unconstitutional for a state to argue that a defendant is liable to be a future danger because of his race.

Thankfully, the Supreme Court condemned this use of race as a proxy for blameworthiness in Mr. Buck’s case. However, what the Court has failed to do—since the days of McCleskey—is recognize that race-based retribution is what routinely occurs in capital cases. A closer look at the effect that the race of victims plays in the death penalty reveals the unfortunate truth: that Black lives are not valued, and therefore, the act of killing Black people is less worthy of death than killing whites.

III. THE BLACK EFFECT: HOW THE VICTIM DISPARITIES IN THE DEATH PENALTY FIT INTO THE PATTERN OF DEVALUING BLACK LIVES

Something quite illuminating is revealed when capital cases are examined with regard to the number of victims. Unsurprisingly, multiple victim cases are far more likely to result in a death sentence than cases where there is a single victim. But here again, it is found that there is a racial disparity in single victim cases and a racial disparity in multiple victim cases. The results in Table 5 below reveal a meaningful disparity based on race of victim when the defendant is African American. In such instances, cases are about twice as likely to result in a death sentence with a white victim relative to cases with an African American victim. Once again, an even larger disparity applies when the defendant is white, with death sentences occurring eleven times as frequently with white victims relative to African American victims. Multiple victim cases—which are a small subset of the total database—reveal that even in a category of cases in which death sentences are far, far more common, the race of victim disparity nonetheless persists. With white defendants and multiple African American victims, death sentences are imposed in 12.5% of cases. With white defendants, at least one African American victim, and at least one white victim, death sentences are imposed in 18.75% of cases. With white defendants and multiple white victims, death sentences are imposed in 74% of cases. These figures suggest a truly profound scope of difference in the treatment of white victim and African American victim cases. Adding just one Black victim to the pool of

73. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at *8.
victims drastically reduces the likelihood of the death penalty being imposed. A conviction for murdering multiple whites is highly likely to result in a death sentence. A conviction for murdering multiple African Americans in Texas is highly likely to result in avoiding a death sentence.

Table 5. Death Sentence Rate by Race of Victim & Offender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Single Victim Cases</th>
<th>White Defendant</th>
<th>African American Defendant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White Victim</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>5.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American Victim</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p &lt; .00001</td>
<td>p &lt; .00001</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Another way to contemplate that startling data is to consider the roughly equal likelihood of a death sentence for a white defendant convicted of murdering multiple African Americans relative to white defendants convicted of murdering one white victim. Which is to say, in the realm of prosecutions, it takes multiple African American lives to equal the value of one white life. This clear devaluing of Black lives fits within historic and present-day realities for Black Americans.

A. The Explicit Devaluation of Black Lives: “Most likely only a negro”

Scholars have studied the concept of “devaluation” and how it plays out in various legal contexts. Though the Texas death penalty data shows a devaluation of Black lives compared to white lives, it is important to understand that “[d]evaluation affects the way we value activities, institutions, injuries, and other ‘things,’ which, strictly speaking, have no race or gender.”75 As Professor Martha Chamallas explains:

Devaluation does not operate directly at the level of the individual or even the social group; rather, it operates to affix a “gender” or “race” to a neutral activity or category and simultaneously to place it on a hierarchy of value. What is devalued is the entire category at issue, whether it is women’s work, housework, part-time work, emotional harm, “feminine” behavior or [B]lack life.76

It is interesting that, twenty years before the Black Lives Matter movement, Professor Chamallas recognized that Black lives may be a devalued category.77 Her devaluation theory and the Black Lives Matter movement embrace the same understanding. The category—here, life—is neutral, but once race is affixed to it, it is placed in a hierarchical value system, with Black life ranking near or at

76. Id. (citations omitted).
the very bottom. It remains necessary to proclaim that Black Lives Matter because historically and presently our systems have repeatedly devalued the entire category of Black life.78 In Texas—and throughout the nation—the category of “murder victim” is also neutral. But the data shows that when race is added to include Black murder victims, the entire category is devalued. This devaluation has been happening to anything affixed to Blackness throughout American history.

Unlike criminal law, tort law provides disturbing proof of the historical devaluation of Black lives because it requires putting an actual monetary value on those lives. American tort doctrine was shaped through railroad injury cases in the mid to late nineteenth century, a time when railroad companies faced thousands of lawsuits for causing injuries.79 To avoid trials and settle claims, railroad companies organized claims agents to devalue Blacks.80 In her article, Torts, Race, and the Value of Injury, 1900–1949, Professor Jennifer Wriggins explains that “[a]n influential text for railroad claims agents published in 1927 endorsed racial inequality in claims practices”81 and “explain[ed] that juries did not value the life of a [B]lack man equally with that of a white man . . . .”82 The manual addressed the significance of race in determining the settlement value for cases, explaining that “[a] brakeman is not always a brakeman. A white brakeman is a brakeman; but a negro brakeman is most likely only a negro.”83 As a result of this devaluing by claims agents, railway companies and other transportation industries had lessened incentives to prevent injuries to Blacks because their injuries were less costly.84 Devaluation is not confined to simply failing to recognize an abstract value. It can result in physical harm, or at least in a failure to adequately protect from harm.

The legal incentive to offer less protection to Black lives works to further devalue those lives. This is highlighted in more recent tort cases in which race is raised as a meaningful data point for valuation. In McMillan v. City of New York, a 2008 case from the Eastern District of New York, the African American male plaintiff suffered a severe spinal cord injury in a ferryboat crash.85 As evidence related to damage computation at trial, the defendant’s expert relied on

78. Kevin Cokley, We Need Leaders to Affirm that Black Lives Matter, Not Exploit the Phrase to Divide Us, USA TODAY (July 13, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/07/13/black-lives-matter-exploited-for-political-economic-gain-column/5397072002/ [https://perma.cc/HX7V-MTJ3].
80. Id.
81. Id. at 109 (referencing SMITH R. BRITTINGHAM, THE CLAIM AGENT AND HIS WORK: INVESTIGATION AND SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS FOR PERSONAL INJURIES 270–71 (1927)).
82. Id. (quoting BRITTINGHAM, supra note 81).
83. Id. (quoting BRITTINGHAM, supra note 81).
84. Wriggins, supra note 79, at 110.
data showing that African Americans who experience spinal cord injuries were likely to have a shorter life expectancy after such injury “than persons of other ‘races’ with similar injuries.”86 Writing for the District Court, Judge Jack Weinstein held that such race-based statistical evidence was impermissible because it was based on the biological fiction of race and the unreliability of race statistics.87 To Justice Weinstein’s credit, he recognized the dangers of using race to determine value. However, it is often difficult to disentangle the institutional aspect of racism from evidence impacting value in a case.

Lead paint cases are useful examples of how institutional racism, Black devaluation, and legal evidence intertwine. Despite prohibitions on the sale of lead-based paint since 1978, the Environmental Protection Agency has indicated as recently as 2011 that lead poisoning remains the top environmental health threat to children six years of age and younger in the United States.88 Lead paint poisoning disproportionately affects low income areas,89 which means communities of color suffer disproportionately from lead poisoning.90 In 2017, it was reported that the Black population in the United States has the highest rate of poverty—a staggering 24.1% compared to 9.1% for the white population.91 Given the prevalence of lead paint and other lead hazards in poverty-stricken areas, Black children are “nearly three times more likely than white children to have elevated blood-lead levels.”92 In their study, The Racial Ecology of Lead Poisoning: Toxic Inequality in Chicago Neighborhoods, 1995-2013, Harvard Sociologists Robert J. Sampson and Alix S. Winter concluded that there were “extraordinarily high rates of lead toxicity” in Black and Latino neighborhoods, with “prevalence rates topping 90% of the child population.”93 As the authors explained, “lead toxicity is a source of ecological inequity by race and a pathway

86. Id.
87. Id. at 248–53.
91. Id.
92. Id.
through which racial inequality literally gets into the body.”94 This “ecological inequality” plays out as inequality in the court system as well. In calculating damages, courts have traditionally allowed the introduction of evidence of a plaintiff’s “life expectancy, worklife expectancy, and average income values particularized to the plaintiff’s gender and, where available, race.”95 So, when Black and Latino children are injured by lead paint, and their lost future earning capacity is assessed, race-based predictive tables are often used.96 This results in that group—Black and Latino children—systematically receiving considerably lower awards than would other groups, especially whites.97 The devaluation of these young Black and Latino lives results in the defendants—typically public housing authorities and landlords in low-income areas—having a lessened incentive to maintain the health standards of their properties.98 That reduced incentive works to the detriment of Black and Latino children who disproportionately live in low-income or government housing.99 And the cycle continues.

1. The Implicit Devaluation of Black Lives

Tort law outcomes show how the devaluation of Black lives plays out in explicit terms—through damage prediction charts. Perhaps unsurprisingly, tort law is also a vehicle for implicit racial bias to pervade. In their study, Do Black Injuries Matter?: Implicit Bias and Jury Decision Making in Tort Cases, Professors Johnathan Cardi, Valerie Hans, and Gregory Parks found that “the dollar awards for the injuries suffered by [B]lack plaintiffs were lower than awards for the same injuries experienced by white plaintiffs.”100 When award decisions were broken down by the actual decision maker, the study found that participants with higher implicit bias scores101 “attributed significantly more

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94. Id.
97. Id.
99. Chamallas, supra note 96.
101. Id. at 536–37 ("The lower the score, the weaker the negative association with African-American faces and positive association with Caucasian faces; the higher the score, the stronger
legal responsibility to [B]lack defendants than to white defendants and recommended higher awards for plaintiffs who sued [B]lack defendants.”

Implicit racial bias “describes the cognitive processes whereby, despite even the best intentions, people automatically classify information in racially biased ways.” The Race Implicit Association Test (“IAT”) used in the tort damages study measures the reaction time in which individuals associate traits (pleasant meaning words and unpleasant meaning words) with images of Black and white faces. The purpose of the IAT is to assess implicit attitudes toward Blacks versus whites. In the torts study, participants were assigned scenarios in which fictitious plaintiff’s, varied by race (Black and white), were injured. Participants were asked to assess the legal responsibility of the defendants and the level of damages the plaintiffs deserved. After completing the torts exercise, the study participants took the Black-white Race IAT. Though the overall results of the tort study are complex and require further inquiry, the observations do raise interesting connections to the death penalty context.

As previously discussed, capital jurors routinely undervalue Black lives. Interestingly, the torts study found that the plaintiff’s race did not affect the participants’ liability determinations. However, the study did conclude that “[B]lack plaintiffs were awarded lesser damages than white plaintiffs in suits between individuals” though it was unclear whether that difference was actually attributed to race. Race was also not found to be a factor in the amount of damages awarded overall. However, the implicit bias level of the participant did seem to make a difference, though the explanations were complicated. Ultimately, the study concluded that “[t]he higher the participant

the negative association with African-American faces and positive association with Caucasian faces.”

102. Id. at 507.
104. See Frequently Asked Questions, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/faqs.html [https://perma.cc/5GYA-PXKW] (last visited Feb. 21, 2020) (“The Implicit Association Test (IAT) [comes in the form of an online test that] measures the strength of associations between concepts (e.g., black people, gay people) and evaluations (e.g., good, bad) or stereotypes (e.g., athletic, clumsy”).
105. See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1464 (1998); see also IMPLICIT MEASURES OF PERSONALITY 1, 6 (Bernd Wittenbrink & Norbert Schwarz eds., 2007).
106. Cardi et al., supra note 100, at 531.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 532.
109. Id. at 550.
110. Id. at 552.
111. Cardi et al., supra note 100, at 552.
IAT score, the less likely a white defendant was held liable[]. In other words, the more a participant implicitly favored whites over Blacks, the less likely that participant was to hold white defendants liable for a plaintiff’s injuries. Additionally, the study found that “high IAT scorers ordered [B]lack defendants to pay more than white defendants—this was true regardless of the race of the plaintiff.” These results suggest that it matters—to the juror holding an anti-Black implicit bias—that whites are often less responsible for their damaging actions and that, when Blacks are responsible for hurting others, they ought to pay more dearly. These results match perfectly with what our data reveals in the death penalty cases in Texas. Blacks are seen as more deserving of the harshest punishment—the death penalty—when they wrong others. Add to this that whites are seen as generally less liable, then it stands to reason that when there is a white victim in a death penalty case, the perpetrator must pay a significant price—oftentimes with their life. The life or death challenge in the capital context is that researchers using the IAT have discovered that the majority of tested Americans carry implicit negative attitudes toward Blacks and associate Blacks with negative stereotypes. Of course, screening civil jurors for their implicit bias levels is not a part of jury voir dire, so we can expect varying levels of implicit bias among jurors. This is especially significant in the death penalty process where capital jurors are overwhelmingly white and male—a group that has higher levels of implicit bias against Black people. In this way, bias that is implicit is just as deadly as the explicit.

2. Historic Devaluation: The Legal Meaning of Blackness

Whether explicit or implicit, Black lives have been devalued from the moment they were forcibly brought to America. The explicit devaluation has been intertwined with the development of our American understandings of what race means and how one comes to be recognized as Black. The infamous “one-

112. Id. at 551.
113. Id.
114. Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Website, 6 GRP. DYNAMICS 101, 101 (2002) (“[T]he data collected are rich in information regarding the operation of attitudes and stereotypes, most notably the strength of implicit attitudes, the association and dissociation between implicit and explicit attitudes, and the effects of group membership on attitudes and stereotypes.”); see also Laurie A. Rudman & Richard D. Ashmore, Discrimination and the Implicit Association Test, 10 GRP. PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 359, 361 (2007) (discussing studies that show scores on the Implicit Association Test are linked to harmful group behaviors).
drop rule” used in determining who is Black, and thus not entitled to the
privileges of whiteness, is an example of the enduring American tenet of
Nation’s Definition*, Professor F. James Davis describes the one-drop rule in this
manner:

To be considered [B]lack in the United States not even half of one’s ancestry
must be African [B]lack. But will one-fourth do, or one-eighth, or less? The
nations answer to the question “Who is black?” has long been that a [B]lack is
any person with any known African [B]lack ancestry. This definition reflects
the long experience with slavery and later with Jim Crow segregation. In the
South it became known as the “one-drop rule,” meaning that a single drop of
“black blood” makes a person a [B]lack. It is also known as the “one black
ancestor rule,” some courts have called it the “traceable amount rule,” and
anthropologists call it the “hypo-descent rule,” meaning that racially mixed
persons are assigned the status of the subordinate group. This definition emerged
from the American South to become the nation’s definition, generally accepted
by whites and [B]lacks. Blacks had no other choice. As we shall see, this
American cultural definition of [B]lacks is taken for granted as readily by
judges, affirmative action officers, and [B]lack protesters as it is by Ku Klux
Klansmen.117

Thus, any so-called drop of Blackness made a person legally and socially
Black. As Professor Davis explains, the one-drop rule is uniquely American
because “[n]ot only does the one-drop rule apply to no other group than
American [B]lacks, but apparently the rule is unique in that it is found only in
the United States and not in any other nation in the world.”118 And because
American courts used Blackness to uphold slavery,119 deny citizenship to
Blacks,120 and maintain race-based segregation that was oppressive to Black

117. F. JAMES DAVIS, WHO IS BLACK? ONE NATION’S DEFINITION (1991), partially reprinted

118. Id.

119. See, e.g., State v. John Mann, 13 N.C. 263 (1829) (holding that the cruel and unreasonable
battery on a slave by the hirer is not indictable because “[t]he power of the master must be absolute
to render the submission of the slave perfect.”); see also Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 625–
26, 645–46 (1842) (upholding the Fugitive Slave Law because enslaved Blacks were property and
retrieving “this species of property” was vital to slave masters’ interests).

120. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 404, 406 (1856) (denying U.S. citizenships to
Blacks because, at the nation’s founding Blacks were “considered as a subordinate and inferior
class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not,
yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held
the power and the Government might choose to grant them.”).
people,121 this also meant that one drop of Blackness legally depreciated the value of the human.

We see this depreciative Black effect in property law and policy as well. Treating Blackness as a factor that devalues property was done explicitly in the case of redlining. In 1933, the federal government created the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (“HOLC”) to increase home ownership as a response to the housing crisis during the Depression. The detrimental legacy of the redlining approach to mortgage lending is explored in full in Richard Rothstein’s informative book, The Color of Law.122 Rothstein explains that:

The HOLC created color coded maps of every metropolitan area in the nation, with the safest neighborhoods colored green and the riskiest colored red. A neighborhood earned a red color if African Americans lived in it, even if it was a solid middle-class neighborhood of single-family homes.123

While redlining of this sort clearly impeded the creation of wealth among Black families,124 it also illustrates that the presence of Blackness diminished the valuation of white areas as well. Areas where whites lived could get a green rating if, HOLC appraisers determined that “it had ‘not a single foreigner of negro.’”125 It is within this context of devaluation and depreciation that the racial disparities in the death penalty sit—where the presence of even one Black victim devalues the victim pool and lessens the risk that a jury will determine that the defendant owes society their life. Similar to what happens in capital cases, the Black devaluation effect in property law, while once clearly explicit, still exists in an implicit form. Recent reports reveal that, not only are Black neighborhoods still undervalued,126 but that even Black homeowners in affluent areas have their individual homes undervalued by appraisers.127 What all of these examples show

121. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding race-based segregation as not violative of equal protection while at the same time recognizing that a Black man is not lawfully entitled to the reputation of being a white man).
123. Id.
125. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 122, at 64.
is that seeing Black lives as less valuable than white lives is not a new American phenomenon, nor is it one that seems to be nearing an end.

CONCLUSION: THE LACK OF REDEMPTION FOR THE DEATH PENALTY

The racial disparities in the death penalty are not isolated. Instead, they fit into the broader American legacy of racism and anti-Blackness. To ignore the prevalence of Black lives mattering less, or to discount the realness of anti-Blackness, is to completely misconstrue the context of the death penalty statistics. Such misconstruction (whether based on actual misunderstanding or willful blindness) encourages our legal system to develop strategies to deal with racial disparities that will never lead to their eradication. When the death penalty data is put in its proper historic and current context, it becomes clear that present-day America is unable to employ the death penalty in a racially just manner.

In Gregg v. Georgia, in 1976, the Supreme Court breathed life into the death penalty by holding that capital punishment is not automatically unconstitutional. While the Gregg court confirmed the position from the 1972 Furman v. Georgia decision, that the death penalty cannot be applied in an arbitrary manner, the procedural protections against arbitrariness suggested by the Court in Gregg completely ignore the reality of anti-Blackness as a basis for death penalty decisions. The Court said that:

[T]he concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance. As a general proposition these concerns are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of the information.

However, bifurcated jury proceedings and jury guidance have nothing to do with weeding out racial bias. The suggested protections against arbitrariness focus on not letting the legal guilt of the offender infect the jury’s determination of the appropriate punishment. But, that focus ignores what is really at stake in capital cases—that jurors may deem a defendant more deserving of death if he

128. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (“We now hold that the punishment of death does not invariably violate the Constitution.”).
129. Id. at 189. (“Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”)
130. Id. at 195.
kills white people than if he has even one Black victim. How does a bifurcated jury protect against that risk? It simply does not. Race was the arbitrary factor that led the Justices in *Furman* to say that it violates the constitution for the death penalty to be applied in an arbitrary manner.131 But, ever since *Gregg* shifted the solution to process, racial bias has ceased to be recognized as the actual problem.

The Texas death penalty data shows how pervasive race is in death penalty outcomes. Taken in sum, we see: a race of victim disparity in death sentences overall; a race of victim disparity in death sentences sorted by race of defendant; a race of victim disparity in death sentences sorted by weapon used; a race of victim disparity in cases with a single victim; and a race of victim disparity in multiple victim cases. Race is everywhere. Race is so prevalent that we even see a race of victim disparity in non-death sentence cases. In every single comparison, the racial disparity was statistically significant. In every single comparison, harsher punishment was associated with white victims than with African American victims, who clearly mattered less.

The truth, of course, is that Black victims matter as much as any, even if the legal system and society have not recognized their value. And when they are killed, it is not most likely in “a barroom quarrel” as Georgia’s assistant attorney general speculated in *McCleskey*.132 Roderick “Chip” Brownlow had just arrived home from high school with his younger brother.133 A good student and athlete at Waco’s Connally High School, Chip was due to graduate in two weeks and had plans to attend college. Chip’s cousin, Garvin Graves, who grew up with the family and who he considered a brother, had just returned that day to spend the summer at home from college in Pennsylvania.

Chip was not killed in a barroom quarrel. He died in his front yard, amidst the tears and cries of his family. Terry Don Woodward’s family lived next door. Woodward, with his neck decorated with a “white pride” message and gun in hand, came after the Brownlows that day. Witnesses testified that he called out a racial epithet and “I will kill you” before taking aim at Chip and his family. Woodward fired his gun several times and ran across the Woodward property. The family scattered and ducked for cover. But Chip Brownlow tripped and fell. As Woodward loomed over him, Chip pled for his life. “He walked up and stood over Chip,” Garvin Graves testified. “Chip was on the ground with his hands up and was saying, ‘Please don’t shoot me. Don’t shoot me.’” Woodward shot Chip

Brownlow at close range and then ran from the scene. Police located Woodward the next day. A seven-hour standoff against members of five police agencies ensued before Woodward was finally taken into custody.

Woodward was convicted of murder for the death of Chip Brownlow, and aggravated assaulted for shooting at Chip’s younger brother. He was sentenced to life in prison, with a thirty-year minimum. To the consternation and confusion of some of the victim’s family, the death penalty was never sought.

Within a database of cases there are, of course, thousands of tragic stories of lives upended by acts of an almost unspeakable nature. The details differ from case to case. But across all those thousands of cases, the race of victim disparity persists. The math is straightforward. Indeed, the odds against the patterns seen here, emerging by chance, are truly astronomical. Which is to say, the penalties imposed for killing Roderick “Chip” Brownlow and thousands of other African Americans in Texas were less severe than the penalties imposed for killing whites.

The race of the victim matters in the Texas criminal justice system. The results are consistent with previous studies limited to several counties within Texas that also found racial disparities in sentencing. Here, the authors present the most comprehensive data ever assembled on capital murder cases in Texas to affirm that the scope of the race of victim difference is jarring.

As a matter of jurisprudence and policy making, however, the meaning of the data is uncertain. Baldus and colleagues argue that the courts have often shrugged in response to race of victim disparities owing to “remedial uncertainties” and “the potential political fallout” of declaring the system tainted by discrimination. When legislators debate the death penalty, racial disparities are among the most frequently cited concerns of opponents of the death penalty. Findings of racial imbalance in Connecticut, Maryland, and New Jersey sentencing outcomes contributed to what were ultimately successful efforts to abolish the death penalty in those states. Supporters of the death penalty, however, dispute both the math and the meaning of findings of racial disparities, taking particular offense at the suggestion that race influences sentencing or influences their own views.

After studying the matter in several states, Baldus and colleagues conclude that eliminating the race of victim disparity in death sentences requires either

135. Niven & Donnelly, supra note 16.
137. Id.
139. Scherzer, supra note 16, at 223 (arguing the proportionality review process in New Jersey served to both limit the use of the death penalty in New Jersey and undergird arguments for abolition).
140. See Niven & Donnelly, supra note 16.
abolition of the death penalty or a severe narrowing of its application coupled with close judicial scrutiny of racial patterns. These authors argue that abolition is the only corrective approach. While many have focused that the death penalty is unconstitutional because the race of the defendant is unduly relevant, these authors argue that the effect of the victims’ race also warrants abolition of the death penalty. This is not because the authors believe that the death penalty ought to be applied more often to vindicate the loss of Black lives. Rather, the persistent importance of the race of the victim in the death penalty context demonstrates an area of law where Blackness is not seen as equal to whiteness. The goal, then, is not simply to increase the application of the death penalty to avenge more Black victims, but rather to recognize that the racial outcomes in capital punishment teach us about the biases held in our society. The death penalty is a tool for carrying out those biases. In keeping with the momentum of today’s antiracism reckoning, abolishing the death penalty is the only antiracist solution. It would dismantle an area of the law that allows for the unbridled exercise of racial bias. Professor Ibram X. Kendi describes antiracism as “a radical choice in the face of history, requiring a radical reorientation of our consciousness.” History shows us that Blackness has been devalued since the founding of America. We must make the radical choice to uproot systems, like the death penalty, that allow the anti-Black biases in our national consciousness to not only thrive, but to be just. To do otherwise is to perpetuate a system where Black lives matter less.

141. Baldus et al., supra note 15.
142. Dr. Ibram X. Kendi, How To Be An Antiracist (2019).