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PRIVATIZATION—THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACY?

CAROL M. ROSE*

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, many governments around the world have adopted measures that are often described as “privatization.” That label generally refers to governmentally sponsored efforts to move assets and economic decision-making away from the political arena and into the hands of individuals or private corporations.1 Some of these efforts have been part of the package of economic principles—the so-called “Washington Consensus”—urged by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank since the early 1990s, and as such they have drawn criticism on a number of grounds.2 Influential proponents continue to advance privatization schemes over a great range of subjects, both at home and abroad.3

Why have they done so? The primary reasons are economic. The old Soviet Union and its satellites dramatically illustrated the manner in which dirigiste, state-centered economies can lapse into wasteful decrepitude.4

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3. Eric Sylvers, Strong Demand as Italy Sells Utility Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, at W1 (describing privatization of Italian state energy utility and plans for privatization of state telecommunications entity and postal service); cf. Ryan Tyz, Energy Maquiladoras: Integrating the Electricity Markets of the United States and Mexico, 6 OR. REV. INT’L L. 63, 64–65 (2004) (arguing that energy production has been slower to privatize, though the process is beginning).

Drawing a lesson from those bad examples, privatizers have hoped to infuse their respective economic spheres with the efficiency, energy, and innovation that are thought to accompany decentralized individual initiatives. Nevertheless, over the last decade, critics have beaten the drums ever more loudly about the failings and lapses of privatization policies, particularly as represented by the Washington Consensus on international investment, and they have thus lent some intellectual support to the leaders of popular backlash, as well as to the political figures who wish to stage some kind of retreat. Many of these critiques point to the political costs of privatizations—their adverse impact on local sovereignty, their short-changing of less-well-off citizens, and their stirring of intergroup domestic strife. Privatization’s critics have encountered critics of their own, but they have managed to shift some attention away from the economic foundations of


8. AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY 6–7 (2003) (arguing that privatization policies ignore potential backlash against market-dominant minorities); see also Purdy, supra note 2, at 23–24 (arguing that Washington Consensus ignores emotional issues).

privatization, re-directing attention to the political aspects of privatization. Following that lead, this Article will focus primarily on the political intellectual rationales for privatization. Indeed, the arguments for privatization have continually sounded a political note, though it may play a second or third fiddle in the Washington Consensus, somewhere behind the economic case for privatization is the companion idea that privatization promotes democracy.

Recent privatization efforts, taken together with increasing political resistance to privatization, offer an opportunity to reassess this idea in the light of recent experience. The Article will begin by setting out a fairly simplified classification of some different types of measures that are commonly considered “privatization.” Following that, the Article will delve into several controversies surrounding such measures, and into the basic economic arguments that are supposed to support privatization even in the face of controversy. It will then shift the focus to the political rationales for privatization.

Of particular interest is the light that modern privatization efforts cast on the central political claim for privatization. That claim is that private property and contract (as opposed to centrally organized economic direction) fundamentally advance the growth of democratic institutions. A variety of arguments purport to support this central claim—arguments that long predate modern privatization efforts and that have been remarkably persistent over time. At least some aspects of modern privatization do indeed add to their weight. Nevertheless, there are also weighty exceptions, suggesting that privatization alone cannot do all the work of democratization. While in some respects, modern privatization initiatives indicate that individual economic rights—together with the larger economies that grow out of them—sometimes do help to foster accountable institutions, in other respects it is clear that these initiatives toward private ownership depend on a pre-existing accountable institutional infrastructure. The basic argument of this Article is thus that the relationship of privatization and democratic governance cannot be seen simply as ancestor-to-successor, where the one (privatization) precedes the other (democratization). At most (to continue the family analogy) privatization and democratization are siblings, co-existing in a mixed environment of mutual support, dependence, and occasional rivalry.

II. A TYPOLOGY OF PRIVATIZATIONS

BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003), arguing that evidence does not support its thesis of link between privatization and ethnic conflict).

10. See Williamson, supra note 2, at 8 (describing “promotion of democracy and human rights” as a concern, but one far behind economic motivations in the Washington Consensus).

Very roughly, one can classify the last two decades’ privatization initiatives into four types of state-sponsored measures with respect to property, which I will call “recognition,” “deregulation,” “divestment,” and “enablement.”

First, recognition measures are those that provide the administrative means to regularize private property ownership, particularly by formalizing ownership rights in persons who previously enjoyed only informal claims. This is a fairly low-key form of privatization, though it too can be controversial. One major type of recognition measure is the reform of titling procedures. This reform seems quite pedestrian at first glance, but it can have large implications for security of title, and security of title in turn can have large implications for the lives of property owners.12 The Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto in particular has brought these titling reform measures into the public eye, arguing that developing countries can very much enhance their wealth by converting informal land titles—claims held in squatter communities in particular—into formal ones.13 De Soto stresses that with formal title to their property, newly secured owners can use their property as collateral to borrow money and finance small businesses.14 Other scholars point out that with formal title, an owner can enforce her claims through the police, the courts, and other governmental institutions, and as a consequence she need not spend so much effort on guarding her property in person, nor need she rely so heavily on neighborhood bosses to enforce her claims.15 Once freed from those burdens, she might be able to take a job at some distance from her home, knowing that her property is safe from a forceful takeover by others.16 Finally, clearer titles simply loosen up the market for property, allowing resources to flow into the hands of those who are willing to pay most for them. For these reasons and others, Peru, India, and Thailand, among a number of other countries, are currently making major efforts to simplify the registration of land titles.17


14. See id. at 51, 57–58.


16. See, e.g., id.

17. See Joanna Slater, India’s Land Market Impedes Growth, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2002, at B7C (concerning land registration reforms in India and other Asian countries); Field, supra note 15.
Second is deregulation, that is, relaxing governmental control over entrepreneurial activities. India, again, is considering abandoning its elaborate constraints on the size of individual landholdings;\(^\text{18}\) meanwhile Germany debates the welter of labor regulations that may protect currently employed workers but that may also impede businesses’ ability to create new jobs.\(^\text{19}\) The general idea of deregulation is to shed governmental intrusions that simply protect certain groups at the expense of others, or that pursue ideological goals that no longer seem useful. On those grounds, many countries carry regulations that would seem to be candidates. Just to take the example of size limits on landholding: India is by no means alone in these regulations. In order to protect small farmers, the United States until recently imposed sharp restrictions on the size of farms that received irrigation water from federally financed dams, but large-scale agricultural interests evaded these limits by entering into complicated leasing arrangements.\(^\text{20}\) In the end, the constraints seemed to do no one any good because they were so widely evaded, and because they complicated market transactions for no good reason.\(^\text{21}\) A different kind of protectionist regulation is residential rent control, which can keep current tenants’ rents low, but which may make it difficult for outsiders to find a place to rent, since owners may balk at opening up more property at fixed rents.\(^\text{22}\)

Favoritism and inefficiency are nothing new in regulatory regimes, of course; Adam Smith complained about these issues over two hundred years ago.\(^\text{23}\) Nevertheless, most commentators acknowledge that certain types of regulatory controls may be necessary to safeguard public health and safety, along with the environment, matters that are often underprotected by the market transactions of private owners.\(^\text{24}\) The trick, of course, is to figure out

\(^{18}\) Slater, supra note 17.


\(^{21}\) See id. at 661.


\(^{23}\) EMMA ROTHSCHILD, ECONOMIC SENTIMENTS 127–28 (2001) (describing Smith’s low opinion of merchants’ propensity to seek and get political favors).

\(^{24}\) See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1998) (noting that theories of regulation derive from
which regulations are genuinely socially advantageous to overcome market failures, and which are merely protectionist or ideological. For example, a few years ago the United States banned tuna fish imports when the fish had been caught without excluding dolphins from the nets. 25 The United States claimed that this measure was an environmental protection. 26 But Mexico brought a complaint under international trade agreements, claiming that these purported dolphin protections were merely protectionist measures to shield U.S. fishermen from Mexican competition. 27 Mexico’s success in this claim did not close the issue, however, since many still believe that the tuna regulation was an important environmental measure and not merely an example of protectionism. 28

A third privatization initiative I will call divestiture, i.e., removing whole enterprises from governmental administration and placing them instead in the hands of private entrepreneurs. These are probably the best-known kinds of “privatization” measures, and they can be very controversial. Margaret Thatcher’s government in England led the way in the 1980’s, denationalizing all kinds of industries that had been brought into public ownership over the course of the twentieth century, particularly under Labour governments after the Second World War. 29 A decade later, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, Russia and Eastern Europe saw whole arrays of enterprises moving into private hands. 30 Beginning at about the same time, at the urging of international financial institutions, a number of Latin American countries experimented with the privatization of several different industries, for example

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26. Id. at 187.
27. For a brief account, see id. at 186–88 (describing the case, its outcome, and a follow-up case involving the Netherlands).
28. See Belina Anderson, Unilateral Trade Measures and Environmental Protection Policy, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 751, 751–52, 783 (1993) (noting that some environmentalist groups were sufficiently alarmed to ask for reconsideration of trade agreements; Mexico and the United States defused political heat by making a subsequent agreement for dolphin protections).
29. For an extensive study of the theory and practice of the Thatcher-era deregulations, see JOHN VICKERS & GEORGE YARROW, PRIVATIZATION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1988); see also id. at 139–40, 160–69 (for postwar era of nationalization and the radical shift to privatization after 1979); James, supra note 4, at 837, 842–51 (narrating a short history of British privatization). James, supra note 4, at 837, 842–51.
telecommunications systems and municipal waterworks.\(^{31}\) Even China now has been quietly pondering measures that move agriculture at least partly out of state or commune control and into the hands of peasants.\(^{32}\)

*Enablement* refers to the governmental establishment and protection of property rights in resources that would otherwise not easily be turned into property at all. Intellectual property rights—trademark, copyright, and patent—are a well-established example of governmentally enabled property rights. These property rights owe their existence very largely to statutory law. They effectively privatize the uses of inventions and expressions that would otherwise be open to copying by the general public. Intellectual property (IP) is not new; the protection of copyright in the English speaking world is commonly dated back to the Statute of Anne in 1710, and patent rights for inventors followed over the next century.\(^{33}\) In recent decades, however, IP has become particularly important, as global trade has whetted interest in the import and export of expressive materials and technology all over the world, and as new technologies have made it so much easier to copy the ideas of others.\(^{34}\) Indeed, IP in a sense signals how closely privatization is linked to globalization. Questions about IP have become a major focus in debates over world trade, with more developed countries usually pressing for greater IP protection while less developed countries hold out for more relaxed rules.\(^{35}\)


Although this Article will focus on IP as the primary example of privatization through governmental enablement, there are other property rights that have also depended almost wholly on governmental action. Tradeable environmental allowances (TEAs) are another example. Although TEAs are newer, less well-developed, and more experimental than IP rights, they are certainly much-discussed as a means to control pollution and resource depletion. Among the better-known TEA regimes are the United States’ program for tradeable emission rights in the gases that form acid rain and the European Union’s more recent proposals to use tradeable rights to control carbon dioxide emissions. These too are property rights that owe their existence to enabling governmental legislation, generally passed quite overtly to promote ends that would otherwise be served by more direct command regulation.

III. CONTROVERSY, ECONOMY, POLITICS

All of the above types of privatization have proved to be controversial and disruptive in some locations and circumstances. Converting informal titles to formal ones, for example, can encourage squatters to try to displace existing private owners, leading to the kinds of conflicts that sometimes break out in rural Brazil. In the more common case, where squatters settle on public lands rather than private ones, the relevant public spaces may be environmentally sensitive or dangerous to the squatters themselves, for example areas subject to flooding or mudslides. Deregulation of the workplace can disrupt existing labor relations, just as housing deregulation can upend landlord–tenant relations; meanwhile, the loosening of environmental regulations can leave the air, water, and flora and fauna unprotected and vulnerable to degradation. Divestiture of formerly state-run enterprises threatens the jobs of employees in formerly governmentally operated enterprises, and it alarms consumers about the private takeover of what seem to be governmental functions. Enablement


laws, through which governments create property rights in otherwise unowned resources, raise moral issues about the extent to which private individuals should be able to own nature or ideas and profit from them—particularly when, as in the case of pharmaceutical products, the protection of “enabled” property rights seems to come at the cost of sick persons’ health.41

Given the controversial nature of these various forms of privatization, it is important to ask about their purposes. What are governments attempting to accomplish through privatization? Why is private decision-making, made by property owners, thought to be preferable to governmental management, where decisions are made by public servants?

The chief answer to these questions, of course, is an economic one. During the Cold War, many thought that central planning would prove to be economically superior to private property and free contract—that is to say, capitalism. “We will bury you,” Nikita Khrushchev notoriously warned the West.42 But in the end, it was central planning that was buried, unable to compete with the variety, innovation, and nimbleness of market forces.43

Economic thinkers have long had an explanation: private property creates the right incentives for creating value.44 The owner gets the rewards if she plans carefully, works hard, and pays attention to useful innovation; and she takes the punishment if things do not work well because of her carelessness and laziness. Those rewards and punishments are powerful motivations to industry, initiative, and attentive planning. Moreover, property rights identify who has what, and thus they encourage people to negotiate trades instead of wasting time on quarrelling and jockeying for position. In turn, the ability to buy and sell greatly enhances the value of everyone’s property. Free alienability means that an individual owner can specialize in, say, shoemaking, because she can buy her foodstuffs from others who are specializing in raising food. Since the shoemaker can now sell her shoes to a whole array of people who want them, her shoemaking talent and tools become all the more valuable. The same can be said of the farmer who can specialize in raising particular crops.

These crude examples carry through to the enormously sophisticated creations of a modern economy. Take for example intellectual property, a


42. In an interesting later development, Khrushchev’s son Sergei took American citizenship and used the occasion to explain that his father only meant the famous phrase in an economic sense. Francis X. Clines, A Khrushchev Is Pledging New Allegiance, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1999, at A1.


44. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 110 (C.K. Ogden ed., 1931), for the classic statement of this principle.
highly complex form of property: Although some commentators disagree,\textsuperscript{45} one major theory of intellectual property is squarely based on the same kind of rationale: that is, when we allocate property rights to the person who creates expressions or inventions, he or she is encouraged to produce all the more expressive works and inventiveness.\textsuperscript{46} Conversely, on this theory, treating inventions and expressions as free for the taking would much diminish the artist’s or inventor’s willingness to put time and thought into these products. If for some reason they did create anyway, they would hoard their secrets rather than disseminating them through trade. Thus whether the issue is building a fence around the family farm or going through the steps to get a biotech patent, property rights taken together with freedom of contract—the basic building blocks of free enterprise—are thought to make everyone better off, because they encourage labor and innovation, permit specialization, and encourage the free movement of goods and services to those persons who most value them.

These are old arguments, going back to the eighteenth century and before.\textsuperscript{47} It is of course also widely known that capitalism is subject to what are called “market failures,” where property and contract require some constraints.\textsuperscript{48} But even given that caveat, the basic lesson of these arguments has much influenced today’s thinking about economic development, including the push for privatization made by international trade and finance institutions.\textsuperscript{49}

But those are not the only arguments for privatization. Quite aside from these well-known economic arguments, there are additional political arguments for private property—arguments that are also long-standing, and that were developed more or less contemporaneously with the classical Enlightenment case for private property as an economic matter. Putting it succinctly, the classical political brief for property stated that private property supports democracy and liberty. As one eighteenth century American Revolutionary leader put it, “[P]roperty is the guardian of every other right.”\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{48} See, e.g., Mark Klock, \textit{Unconscionability and Price Discrimination}, 69 TENN. L. REV. 317, 354 (explaining that “market failures,” or situations where the market fails to meet expectations, are a requisite condition for unconscionable contracts).
\textsuperscript{49} See, e.g., W. Graeme Donovan, \textit{Investing in Rural Development, in AGRICULTURAL INTENSIFICATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA} 47, 56 (Steven A. Breth ed., 1998).
That is to say, not only is property ownership an important political right, but it is the most important of all.

This assertion may seem strange in a modern context, where so many people would be likely to select free speech as the critical political right, the one right that guards all others. But if one listens more closely, one hears many echoes of this thought about property even now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, and indeed those echoes may be getting louder. This is a subject on which I have written in the past, but the modern controversies over privatization present an opportunity to revisit some of the classic political arguments that property (along with contract) are the central rights, the critical core, of what we would broadly see as democratic liberty, such that the establishment of property and trade form the ground floor for the development and flourishing of democratic institutions. How do these classic arguments map onto the modern contours of privatization?

IV. PRIVATIZATION AND THE CASE FOR PROPERTY’S POLITICAL CENTRALITY

The privatization efforts of the past decades certainly seem to focus on converting public management to private property. How do these efforts reflect on the array of political arguments about property’s centrality to liberty and democracy? In the pages that follow, I will go through some of the arguments for property’s centrality, to look for the light that the new privatization casts on these arguments.

A. The Priority Argument: Property Is the Central Right Because Property Alone Predates, and Justifies, Government

Here the classic treatment is John Locke’s, who famously argued that individuals acquired property before governments were formed, and that when they eventually formed governments, they did so in order to secure their property. Governmental intrusions on property, in this view, undermine the very purposes for which government is formed. Thus human property-formation not only predates government but gives people the normative leverage to critique government: government is only legitimate if it protects people’s property.

51. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) (“The safeguarding of these rights to the ends that men may speak as they think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods may be exposed through the processes of education and discussion is essential to free government.”).


53. See Keystone Right, supra note 11.


55. Id. at 378.
A more modern development of this line of argument comes from a very interesting school of political scientists who have specialized in the study of small-scale common property regimes. A leader in this group is Professor Elinor Ostrom of Indiana University, who has described and analyzed communities all over the world, communities in which local people have created institutions for managing irrigation systems, fisheries, grazing fields, and other activities undertaken in common. Ostrom and her colleagues argue that many of these self-created common property regimes have sprung up and lasted for long periods of time—some for centuries on end—without governmental support. Indeed, she argues that all too often governments unjustly and unwisely disrupt these community institutions, as for example when corrupt or thoughtless bureaucrats in a central government allow their friends to invade a community’s distribution of fishing rights among the local residents. The lesson from Locke to Ostrom seems to be that people can form property regimes without government; that government’s role, if any, is to assist in property formation; and that overly intrusive governments effectively undermine the natural and sustainable economic activity of human beings. Following Ostrom, what some scholars would like to see would be governmental protection of the fishery—or the grazing area or irrigation system—as a common property resource for the relevant community; privatization in that sense would be entirely appropriate.

At least one of the new privatization categories, however, casts a somewhat different light on this set of arguments about the relationship of property to government. That is the “recognition” category, notably the efforts to clarify, simplify, and formalize previously informal or unclear titles. Formal title is not important in the genre of older communities that Ostrom and her colleagues have generally studied, because everyone in the community understands the informal distribution of entitlements. For example, in one Swiss village, the most important property right consists of access to the

56. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action 61–65 (1990) (describing the communal tenure system that has developed in a centuries-old Swiss village).

57. Id. at 58.

58. See, e.g., id. at 154–57 (explaining how central governmental intrusion into fishery weakens local self-management of fishery); Evelyn Pinkerton, Intercepting the State: Dramatic Processes in the Assertion of Local Co-management Rights, in The Question of the Commons 344, 358–63 (Bonnie J. McCoy & James M. Acheson eds., 1987) (citing examples of central governmental policies that encouraged local overfishing).


60. See Ostrom, supra note 56, at 88–91 (describing normative behavior that has developed in ancient communities to control use and transfer of property).
meadows where a resident can graze his livestock. But such grazing access rights belong only to village citizens, and only members of very longstanding resident families can be citizens. These are communities that my colleague Robert Ellickson describes as “close-knit”: the residents all know one another, and they are intimately aware of who has what property claims. If there are transfers of property, everyone knows about that, too. These transfers can be made without written documents and formal recording, and the gestures of transfer may be witnessed and understood only by local people—the handshake, the transfer of a clod of dirt or a set of keys. More modern squatter communities too depend on enforcement of their informal claims through barrio insiders, e.g., the community “bosses” in Ecuador who accept payment for protecting residents’ informal claims.

By contrast, the clarification of formal title is useful precisely because it makes the status of property knowable to outsiders, that is, to strangers to the community. Formal title, managed through central record offices, makes it possible for the owner to borrow from a bank on the security of the property. A lending bank also formally records its own secured interest, and this means that if the borrower fails to repay, the lending bank—perhaps in some distant city—may become the title owner of the property. Indeed, formal title gives assurances to any stranger at all who may want to purchase the property. Thus formal title potentially introduces strangers into the community, through a form of property assurance that is not at all “natural” to a close-knit community.

Formal title, in short, is an assurance of property that does not predate the state. Formal title is a creature of the state, and if anything it tends to dissolve the small-scale communities in which property can be created by “nature.” As an economic matter, formal property rights are effectively available to a global economy, not simply to a local one; thus formal title opens up these small communities to a whole world of potential buyers. This opening-up process may or may not happen, and local residents may or may not see it as a good thing. But as a political matter, this particular “recognizing” mode of

62. Id.
64. Id.
privatization can scarcely be justified on the classic ground that it simply 
reinforces a form of pre-existing property that is somehow natural to humans. 
Formal title, and the economic benefits it brings, introduces property rights 
that potentially engage much wider populations than any that exist in a 
Lockean (or Ostromian) state of nature. Property rights of this sort, rights that 
hold between strangers, cannot easily exist without the political organization of 
state agencies. Thus “privatization” of this sort assumes the active 
participation of government. That fact alone sharply detracts from the easy 
assumption that privatization supports democratic government because 
privatization protects “natural” pre-existing property rights. This is not the 
case. Formal title, like IP rights, gives rise to a form of property that would not 
exist at all without governments. Whatever relationship this kind of 
privatization may have to democratic governance—and it could be a strong 
one—it is distinctly not about governmental recognition of some kind of 
natural property right. Quite the contrary, the property protected by formal 
title tends to erode the kinds of “natural,” community-based property rights 
that can predate government.

Parenthetically, recognition programs are among the most attractive forms 
of privatization; formal titling concentrates on furthering the economic 
advancement of people who otherwise have very limited prospects. But 
because formal titling programs potentially open a community to strangers, 
they give a frisson of the kinds of larger-scale problems generally associated 
with the term “anti-globalization.” When outsiders can freely enter a local 
economy, they may bring needed capital, but only at a cost: the loss of a sense 
of local or national control. This is of course one of the reasons why 
globalization can be so very disturbing to some local populations. Just as 
formal title puts a barrio house into play in an economy that is much larger

67. See Jean O. Lanjouw & Philip Levy, A Difficult Question in Deed: A Cost-Benefit 
general description of formal titling programs and stating that “[registration with the state] helps 
avoid overlapping claims and when done well can give confidence to potential buyers or lenders 
as to who actually owns a piece of land”).

68. See generally id.

69. See, e.g., J. David Stanfield & Steven E. Hendrix, Ownership Insecurity in Nicaragua, 
22 CAP. U. L. REV. 939, 941 (1993) (asserting that the “insecurity in negotiated transfers” in 
Nicaragua is due in part to poor state-run title registries).

70. Cf. Pooja Mehta, Comment, Internally Displaced Persons and the Sardar Sarovar 
Project: A Case for Rehabilitative Reform in Rural India, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 613, 638 
(2005) (noting that holding formal title is a means for Indian tribal populations to gain access to 
remedies allowed under Indian law).

71. See, e.g., Nsongura J. Udombana, How Should We Then Live? Globalization and the 
argument that globalization has had a debilitating effect on African political systems).

72. See id.
than the local community, so do other forms of privatization put a country’s natural resources or banks or telecommunications systems at play in an even larger international economy. At times, this can be a deeply unpopular feature of privatization, and even a ground for civic unrest that shakes democratic institutions.73

B. The Power-Spreading Argument: Property is a Central Right Because It Diffuses Political Power

Perhaps the best-known proponent of this view is Milton Friedman, a libertarian economist who began to espouse his views in the 1950s and 1960s.74 Friedman very much opposed socialism on political grounds as well as economic ones, arguing that socialist states had only a single source of power.75 Because the socialist state could control jobs, education, and indeed advancement on any front, Friedman argued, the socialist state could repress dissent easily.76 Capitalism and private property, on the other hand, offer multiple sources of power, taking the forms of income, prestige, and assets.77 Thus on Friedman’s argument, states that permit private property and free enterprise also foster the proliferation of multiple power sources and, ultimately, diverse political views and movements.78

Interestingly enough, there is an older version of this argument that appeared during the eighteenth century Enlightenment, when the political figures most interested in “privatization” were actually the so-called “enlightened despots,” figures like Frederick II of Prussia, Catherine the Great of Russia, and Joseph II of Austria.79 These monarchs hoped to foster commerce for both economic and political reasons: economic, in that they hoped that commerce would bring more wealth and thus tax revenue to their treasuries; and political, in that they hoped that the “deregulation” of aristocratic and guild monopoly privileges would undermine some of their most entrenched opponents.80 Then, as now, deregulation caused anxiety and fierce opposition among the holders of the numerous exclusive privileges.81

73. See, e.g., COX & MASON, supra note 30, at 79 (describing popular objection to loss of control from privatization and foreign investment in early post-Communist Eastern Europe); Juan Forero, Free Trade Proposal Splits Bolivian City, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2005, at C1 (describing protests, violence, and instability over planned trading agreement with United States to export Bolivian natural gas).
74. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
75. Id. at 15–16.
76. Id. at 16–17.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 9–10.
79. See JOHN G. GAGLIARDO, ENLIGHTENED DESPOTISM 21–22 (1967).
80. See id. at 28–36 (describing the economic policies of the “enlightened monarchs” of Europe).
81. FRIEDMAN, supra note 74, at 43–44.
Town guilds in Germany, for example, very much opposed royal charters for manufacturers to open factories in the countryside outside the guilds’ legal control. But James Steuart, a writer associated with the Scottish Enlightenment, asserted that even though monarchs were chiefly concerned with enlarging their tax revenues when they undermined the older privileged classes and fostered free commerce, in taking such measures they would engender a new class of wealthy entrepreneurs, and these newcomers would demand greater liberty and limitations on arbitrary rule. Hence, economic liberalization would bring about political reform—whether monarchs liked it or not.

How does the power-spreading argument map onto modern privatization measures? Clearly this argument does have some resonance, particularly with respect to the divestiture of state enterprises in favor of private control. Consider China: as China increasingly shifts formerly state-run operations to private enterprise, Western democracies continue to echo the hope that Steuart expressed over 200 years ago: that freer markets make citizens more rights-conscious and ultimately force rulers to open up more breathing room to democratic processes. Indeed, in some measure, this has happened. The Chinese press is not bold by Western standards, but it still is bolder than it was a few years ago, and as property has spread among the citizens, small-scale

82. See Mack Walker, German Home Towns: Community, State, and General Estate 1648–1871, at 120–22, 125–26 (1971) (describing guild conflicts with non-guild large merchants, arguing that royal officials favored the latter).


84. See, e.g., Press Release, White House, President Nominates Rob Portman as United States Trade Representative (Mar. 17, 2005), available at 2005 WLNR 4151089 (describing Portman as a negotiator of the free trade agreement with China and Portman’s belief that “[t]hrough expanded trade, the roots of democracy and freedom are deepened”). For a more systematic presentation, see Pitman B. Potter, Legal Reform in China: Institutions, Culture, and Selective Adaptation, 29 Law & Soc. Inquiry 465, 467–68, 480–81 (2004) (describing the view of author Randall Peerenboom that Chinese economic development makes citizens demand more rights and describing economic development as generating alternative power sources); Erich Weede, The Diffusion of Prosperity and Peace by Globalization, 9 Indep. Rev. 165 (2004) (developing the theme that prosperity promotes democracy, and both lead to peace, using China as an example of a country where greater prosperity brings about more attention to rights and ultimately less bellicosity); Anthony Kuhn, China’s Newly Rich are Getting Political, Wall St. J., Aug. 17, 2004, at A14 (describing increasing political activity of new Chinese entrepreneurs); see also Stiglitz, supra note 5, at 163–64 (attributing to Andrei Shleifer, and sharply criticizing, the view that privatization would lead to a demand for political institutions to reform economy); cf. Ellen Bork, Asian Blues: Why the Problem of China Will Not Go Away, Wkly. Standard, July 19, 2004, at 34 (criticizing what the author describes as the decades-long “driving idea” that democracy in China will follow from economic engagement).
grassroots protests have emerged in a way unthinkable only a decade ago. As yet, of course, this is a transformation still in the making, and China certainly is not yet a case study for the diffusion of political power in the wake of marketization.

In addition, other modern “divestitures” give some reason for caution. The experience of the former Soviet Union suggests that the divestiture of former state-run enterprises may diffuse power, but that this diffusion might not spread very far. Major economic sectors like energy and banking soon became concentrated into the hands of a favored few. Indeed, the popular backlash against the Yeltsin-era “oligarchs” appears to have strengthened the hands of President Putin in re-centralizing governmental control over the press and the electoral machinery.

One type of privatization-by-divestiture may present particular problems as a route to the diffusion of political power: the divestiture and transfer of some former public utilities, enterprises that have been called “natural monopolies.” These types of enterprises generally have infrastructure or other startup costs that are so high that there effectively is only room for one participant. For example, once the electric lines are up, there may not be enough demand for electricity to support a second set of lines. This discrepancy gives the first mover a great advantage. If threatened with competition, the first mover can lower rates to marginal cost until the rival is


86. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & Anna S. Tarassova, Institutional Reform in Transition: A Case Study of Russia, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 211, 218–20 (2003) (describing the acquisition by “oligarchs” of major economic sectors, including natural resources, which resulted in undermining support for democratic and economic reforms). See generally David E. Hoffman, The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia (2002) (providing biographical information, including a description of the rise of “oligarchs”). Interestingly enough, the divestitures of British nationalized enterprises in the 1980s showed some of the same “giveaway” characteristics. See Vickers & Yarrow, supra note 29, at 180–81, 183–85 (describing sharply uneven payoffs from the sale of enterprises); see also Cox & Mason, supra note 30, at 131–33, 201 (describing a greater gap between the rich and poor in poverty in post-Soviet era Eastern Europe, along with the potential for social unrest).


driven out of business. These “natural monopolies” typically exist in power delivery, transportation facilities, water and sewer lines, and to some (now diminishing) degree, telecommunications. Nineteenth century economic theory treated as a matter of indifference whether such “natural monopolies” were state-run (as with the German railroads), or privately run (as with the U.S. railroads), so long as the latter operated under state regulatory supervision to avoid monopolistic prices and practices. In an interesting example, for well over a century, New York City shifted its water supply system back and forth between private and public ownership, beginning with a private company in the late 1700s, then shifting to public control in the 1830s, then trying a private firm again in the early twentieth century, before putting the system firmly in the city’s hands thereafter.

In emerging economies, both private and public management often have difficulty raising the capital needed for major improvements in these major public works. Thus as was the case with New York City’s water supply, public officials may transfer control to private management in the hope that a private enterprise can raise more initial capital. They may hope as well that private management will be more efficient and innovative than bureaucracy, and that private managers can more easily charge consumers to cover the costs of modernizing infrastructure. In some cases, some or all of these hopes for improvement can be realized, particularly since public management of utilities can grow slack—bureaucratized, rudderless, ridden with political meddling, and generally underperforming.

But private management has problems too—notably, that a “natural monopoly” in private hands, unless adequately monitored and regulated, is in principle constrained neither by political accountability nor by economic competition. It is this apparent gap in control that sometimes makes public utilities problematic as candidates for divestiture, not only because of the economic effects of privatization, but also because of the political


90. See Adams, supra note 88, at 71, 111.


92. See, e.g., VICKERS & YARROW, supra note 29, at 130–34, 143–50 (describing weaknesses of British nationalized enterprises).

93. See STIGLITZ, supra note 5, at 56 (criticizing the privatization of utilities prior to the development of effective regulatory structures); VICKERS & YARROW, supra note 29, at 428–29 (concluding that British divestiture was short-sighted in the case of some aspects of utilities and describing other enterprises with natural monopoly characteristics); Li & Xu, supra note 89, at 400 (noting the importance of competition in successful privatization).
consequences. In particular, privatization of public utilities in some instances defies the political argument that private control diffuses power. Instead of spreading power outward, these privatizations of “natural monopolies” would appear to place great power in private hands (and indeed, sometimes, foreign hands) that is unconstrained either by private competition or by public oversight. Citizen outrage at this kind of apparent aggrandizement can be tremendously disruptive politically, as in the electricity crisis in California a few years ago, or in the water supply crisis in Cochabamba, Bolivia, in 1999–2000.

In fact, however, all of these privatizations of “natural monopolies” have involved very complex relationships between government and private entities. While private suppliers have sometimes seemed to grasp too much, it also seems clear that they themselves have sometimes been saddled with unrealistic burdens and expectations, and that they sometimes have to operate in a climate of crosscutting political motivations. In Cochabamba, for example, there were apparently many flaws and mistakes created by the newly created foreign-dominated private water supply consortium, but it was local politicians who insisted that the project cover an expensive new dam. In part to cover this expense, the consortium raised consumers’ water rates dramatically. In turn, the rate hikes led to an outburst of popular opposition and violence that ultimately defeated the entire project and indeed threatened Bolivian political stability.

However the blame is allocated in that case, popular fears are very real that privatization of these enterprises can lead not to the diffusion of power, but rather to the aggrandizement of monopoly power in private hands, and to the victimization of ordinary people. This is not to say that all such charges are true. A 2003 empirical study of privatization in Latin America found that, in fact, privatized firms generally are more efficient than their state-managed predecessors, and that they generally offer better services to all social levels.
This study also found that the failed privatizations are most often attributable to political interference, to corruption and lack of transparency, and in the case of “natural monopolies,” to weak governmental capacity to provide the necessary post-privatization regulatory structure. ¹⁰¹

But there is an important political lesson to be learned from these failures. They show that the full weight of political reform cannot be borne by privatization alone, contrary to the suggestion of such Enlightenment thinkers as Steuart. Instead, success or failure, both economic and political, may depend on the underlying condition of political institutions. Undoubtedly, privatization often can help to reform politics insofar as newly minted private sources of income make people less frightened of government, and insofar as people engaged in trade and commerce are likely to demand access to information, along with some say in predictably enforced laws. But privatization itself often depends to a greater or lesser degree on existing political institutions, and insofar as this is true, politicians still may treat newly privatized enterprises as a splendid new cash cow. In turn, the “cow” may face opprobrium for its association with politicians’ pet projects, undermining confidence in privatization itself. All this suggests that political reform needs to be approached on broader fronts and in a more direct manner, particularly by attending to such matters as competent courts and regulatory institutions, honest elections, and a free press.

C. The Distraction Argument: Private Property and Commerce Can Make Politics Seem Dull and Boring

The Distraction Argument is a conception that may have influenced some of the United States’ founders, particularly given their consciousness of the religious wars that had racked Europe in the previous centuries. The idea behind the Distraction Argument is that if property can be made secure and trade made easy, citizens are likely to become more interested in making money, and correspondingly less interested in killing one another for religious or clan-related or nationalistic reasons. For these reasons, private property and active commerce should make politics as a whole less heated and less deadly.¹⁰² Boring politics are better than overheated and over-exciting politics, according to this view, and the encouragement of commerce is one way to make politics boring. Thus, low voter turnout may not be taken as a problem, but rather as a sign that people have better things to do with their time—

¹⁰¹. López-de-Silanes & Chong, supra note 100, at 4.

If they can busy themselves getting rich, they will stop shooting at one another. The same idea seems to have animated some members of George W. Bush’s administration in their hopes for a new Iraq, though the violence in that country to date has sharply undercut the possibilities for commerce.

How do modern ideas about privatization reflect on this political hope for private property and commerce? The pattern seems to be somewhat mixed. At least in some of the divestiture cases mentioned above, the privatization of major utilities has not defused politics but rather inflamed them, as in Bolivia, where the attempted privatization of Cochabamba’s water supply set off a train of events that united very disparate groups of citizens in violent opposition to the new supply contract.105 More generally, Amy Chua argues that globalization, which often overlaps with privatization, can set off ethnic violence aimed particularly at market-dominant minority groups such as the Chinese in Indonesia.106 Less violent political fights over the deregulation of rent control periodically turn up the heat even in New York politics.107

On the other hand, not all deregulations and divestitures have had this disruptive effect. The privatization of the water systems in some cities in Chile appears to have worked well without political backlash, perhaps in part because the Chileans created a system for subsidizing poor families’ water bills through the social security system.108 This may not accord with the standard understanding of prices and economic incentives, but it undoubtedly relieved public opposition. Subsidies are not a complete answer for every situation, though, because the Cochabamba project aroused force opposition even though it too contemplated somewhat lower rates for lower-income families.109

103. See for example Richard A. Posner, Smooth Sailing?, LEGAL AFF., Jan./Feb. 2004, at 41–42, for Judge Posner’s acid comments on Bruce Ackerman’s and James Fishkin’s idea to have a “deliberation day” to discuss issues at stake in elections (arguing that competition informs voters about candidates, just as it does about toasters; that voter apathy can express rational preference; and that an additional “deliberation day” would take time that citizens would rather spend on other matters as family or business).

104. Jay Solomon et al., As Growth Returns to Pakistan, Hopes Rise on Terror Front, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2004, at A1 (describing the hope that economic improvement would rid Pakistan of “terrorist gridlock”).


106. C HUA, supra note 8, at 7.


households.\textsuperscript{109} India, which has deregulated many aspects of its economy in the last few years and has enjoyed a striking economic boom, may be a test case for the theory that commerce can take the heat out of politics.\textsuperscript{110} Interestingly enough, the strident and confrontational Hindu nationalist party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), was the chief sponsor of India’s deregulation, and presumably it was destined to become the chief political beneficiary of economic good fortune.\textsuperscript{111} Instead, it was the more inclusive Congress Party and its allies that raised issues about privatization and that surprisingly defeated the BJP at the polls in 2004, in large part due to the dissatisfaction of rural citizens who thought that they were left out of the good times.\textsuperscript{112} All the same, the Congress Party also seems unlikely to take a major turn away from its predecessor’s privatization efforts, recognizing their importance for employment and economic prosperity, so in a sense the book is still out on whether commerce in India can soften political divisions.\textsuperscript{113}

Modern privatization measures suggest that a key factor for the Distraction Argument concerns what we might call “baselines.” If a substantial number of people have a stake in current governmental regulation or management, and if they think that privatization causes them to suffer a substantial drop in the current baseline of their well-being (as in the case of tenants who face rent deregulation), then privatization will heat up politics rather than calm politics down, at least over a short run. Issues of relative well-being may matter too. In the 2004 elections, India’s rural poor reacted angrily at seeing themselves bypassed by the newly wealthy urban sectors, but at least they took out their resentments in elections.\textsuperscript{114} Amy Chua recounts much more disastrous responses to unevenly distributed gains from privatization, particularly when angry majority populations have ousted and devastated the “market-dominant minorit[ies]” who had gained the most from free-market policies.\textsuperscript{115} More broadly, the issues of baseline and relative status also suggest that distributional issues may have a very pronounced effect on the possibilities for privatization.\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{109} \textsuperscript{115} Woodhouse, supra note 31, at 318–19; Nickson & Vargas, supra note 105, at 111.
\textsuperscript{111} Id.
\textsuperscript{112} Id. (describing Hindu nationalist party rule’s privatization policies and economic success, and the rural backlash in the election).
\textsuperscript{113} See Amy Waldman, In India, Economic Growth and Democracy Do Mix, N.Y. Times, May 23, 2004, at 4-3 (describing continuing central commitment to free market reforms, including in agriculture, in spite of populist election rhetoric and rural discontent).
\textsuperscript{114} See Waldman, supra note 110.
\textsuperscript{115} CHUA, supra note 8, at 163–75.
\textsuperscript{116} Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 217, 217–20 (1998) (describing potential political backlash from policies that increase total wealth but also increase distributional gap); Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1992) (arguing that behavior
The interplay between distributional issues and economic change is a subject that has much engaged the economist Gary Libecap, who has studied a number of proposals to redefine and sharpen property rights. His view, very crudely stated, is that in contemplating reform, people compare their personal pre- and post-reform situations; those who had done well under a pre-existing but inefficient system must often be mollified or paid off, because otherwise they may be able to mount so much opposition to economic reform that the reform will never take place.\textsuperscript{117} Libecap is primarily interested in economic reform, but his point is basically a political one: that proposed alterations in a system of entitlements can arouse political disturbances that are so great that they undermine any economic change. The Cochabamba experience is again an example. The pre-existing water delivery arrangements were fragmented and grossly inadequate, but water (when and where it was available) was generally relatively cheap.\textsuperscript{118} The newly privatizing consortium, by contrast, roused suspicion among local people—particularly farmers—that they would lose their existing water sources, however inefficient and ultimately unsustainable those sources were.\textsuperscript{119} When the consortium began to raise rates sharply to cover modernization costs and cover investors’ risks, it only confirmed fears of pending loss among already mistrustful local groups, uniting the rural and urban opposition and eventually leading to the riots that brought down the entire project.\textsuperscript{120}

Such failed modern privatization efforts should deliver a warning about the old hope that private property can defuse political explosions. The argument has a certain circularity, and it only works if the shift to private property itself is politically acceptable—or can be made acceptable through greater transparency and public discussion, and possibly through distributional concessions to calm potential opposition. Without these essentially political moves, privatization may simply inflame politics all the more.

\textit{D. The Symbolic Argument: Property Is the Central Right Because It Symbolizes All Other Rights and Thus Educates All in Rights-Consciousness}

It is often hard for people to think without real-world examples. Property has a particular concreteness that makes it especially attractive as an example of rights generally. This is true in modern scholarship, where torts and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{117} Gary D. Libecap, \textit{Contracting for Property Rights} 5 (1989).
\item \textsuperscript{118} Woodhouse, \textit{supra} note 31, at 303–05.
\item \textsuperscript{119} \textit{id.} at 317–21; Nickson & Vargas, \textit{supra} note 105, at 112.
\end{itemize}
contracts scholars often use examples drawn from property to make their theoretical points. But the use of property examples to illustrate other rights is a pattern that goes much further back as well. James Madison wrote a famous public letter describing a whole litany of his rights as property, saying that he had a “property” in his reputation, his religious views, and in a whole series of other entitlements.

Property thus appears to be more available to the imagination than many other rights, and if this is so, one might think, the protection of property rights is especially important. Having property rights can make the owner think of himself or herself as a rights-holding person more generally; if a person owns a tool or a pig or a house, she gets a sense of what it means to have rights. In that sense, holding property is an education in what it means to be a rights-bearer.

Now, there are those who disagree with this view, such as Jennifer Nedelsky, who thinks that property is a poor symbol for other rights. And of course, it is quite hard to measure whether anyone really generalizes from property ownership to other rights. But there do seem to be some hints that the symbolic argument has some force, Nedelsky’s contrary view notwithstanding. Property owners are more likely than tenants to vote and to take part in community affairs, for example. Certainly people with insecure land tenure seem to be anxious to have more firmly fixed property rights, as is the case with farmers in China and squatters in urban areas in many less developed countries. Insofar as property rights give people a sense of security, these rights may act as a kind of emotional platform for greater assertiveness on other fronts.

Some modern privatization measures could add to this assertiveness, particularly the “recognition” privatizations that make land tenure more certain. Privatization in the form of deregulation probably works both for and against the symbolism of secure rights; on the one hand, deregulation could add to owners’ sense of security from governmental intrusion, but on the other, it could diminish the sense of security of, say, tenants who were previously protected by rent control regulations.

There is one area of modern privatization that seems to cut fairly sharply against the Symbolic Argument, however: that is, the “enabling” privatization that protects what are essentially governmentally created property rights, notably intellectual property (IP). The starting point is that most people are not holders of significant IP rights. Instead, most people perceive themselves as obligated by IP rights, since the rights belong to others. Many IP rights are quite counterintuitive. It is a technical violation of copyright, for example, to sing “Happy Birthday to You” in a bar or restaurant without the copyright holder’s permission. There is even an organization in the United States, ASCAP, that makes a practice of ferreting out such public performances of copyrighted songs and demanding payment—as it did from the Girl Scouts a few years ago, for singing copyrighted songs around the campfire. Most people have no intuition that they are not supposed to perform such copyrighted material, and they resent being told that they are in violation. More seriously, many people feel indignant that because of patent laws, even the poor have to pay a monopoly price for pharmaceutical drugs, when the drugs themselves can be manufactured so much more cheaply.

This is not to say that there are not good economic reasons for enforcing IP rights, even in the case of pharmaceuticals. There are. Research and development of drugs is expensive, and aside from direct public subsidy, the only significant way to recoup that expense is to charge a price higher than the manufacturing cost for the product itself. Without the certainty of this recompense, much development and improvement of drugs would undoubtedly dry up, and pharmaceutical companies might increasingly turn away from medicine to such politically safer products as cosmetics and cures for sexual

126. Or, if they are technically holders of IP rights, they don’t know it. For example, many people are technically owners of copyrights on writings or artwork, since copyright attaches as soon as one “fixes” the writing or work of art, and thus one has a copyright in one’s doodles on a page. But most people are unaware of these rights.


129. See id.; see also JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 29 (2001) (noting counterintuitive character of some copyright rules).


dysfunctions. But however compelling those economic arguments may be, as a matter of political symbolism, enforcement of IP rights seems not an education in rights-bearing, but rather an education in having to bear the burden of other people’s rights. If anything, for most people, the symbolism of IP is disempowering: the symbolism of this form of property is all too often that the powerful have rights, while the rest of us have only obligations. Indeed, this disempowering symbolism maps onto larger global tensions: the nations most insistent on IP enforcement are the IP-exporting developed countries, whereas less-developed countries have tended to resist.

The dictatorial edges of IP can be softened. One method is much like the method that Chile used to soften the edges when privatizing some urban water systems—that is, by establishing a subsidy for poor families, which in effect acts like a two-tier pricing system. The controversies over delivering AIDS drugs to less-developed countries have generated a great deal of thinking about tiered systems of payment and about other ways that IP rights and charges might be modified to accommodate overwhelming need. A second method to soften the edges speaks to a quite different concern, namely to make IP law more attentive to the intellectual creativity of non-Western societies. There are many galling stories about Western firms that patent minor variations on plants—plants that non-Western cultivators actually developed over long time periods—and there are other similar stories about Western firms that record folktales and then claim copyright, even against the communities from which these tales arose. In more recent negotiations on international IP, less-developed countries have been able to get some national protection for local knowledge and cultural productions, for example, for folklore. There are certain difficulties with this solution, however, since in some countries, traditional communities have substantial conflicts with their own national governments, so that local communities may not be so happy with national IP

132. See, e.g., James Surowiecki, No Profit, No Cure, NEW YORKER, Nov. 5, 2001, at 46 (suggesting that if patent protection on medicines is weakened, drug companies will divert research efforts to baldness or impotence cures).

133. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.

134. See Jean O. Lanjouw, Intellectual Property and the Availability of Pharmaceuticals in Poor Countries, 3 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 91, 109, 112–14 (2002) (developing the theme of tiered pricing); see also Bailey, supra note 131, at 217–18 (comparing differential pricing to compulsory licensing).


ownership of local creativity. More broadly, special protections for traditional knowledge subtly undermine the chief theoretical justification for any kind of IP, namely the claim that IP incentivizes intellectual creativity. Traditional knowledge has already been “out there” for some time, and this kind of knowledge would seem to need no further incentive for production. On the other hand, understood as a claim of compensation for contribution, some stretching and bending of standard IP categories could mean that in the future, IP protections will not so lopsidedly symbolize the power of more developed countries against less developed ones.

The debate over traditional knowledge is a kind of marker of IP’s symbolic significance more broadly—one striking instance among many in a larger pattern. However economically useful it may be, IP is a highly specialized kind of property. Precisely because its beneficiaries constitute a relatively narrow set of claimants, IP’s symbolism for most people contradicts the idea that property acts as an education in rights-bearing. Instead, for most, IP is simply not personalized or widespread enough to count as a symbol of rights-bearing. Moreover, unlike the ownership of consumer goods or even land, it is unlikely that IP ever will be very personalized or widespread, because IP is an unlikely candidate for broad ownership. It is not hard to imagine even very poor people owning some small space, some tools or domestic animals or personal items; but it is hard to imagine those people holding any meaningful rights under IP. All IP will teach such people is that some have rights, while most do not.

With respect to property’s symbolic significance, then, modern privatization again presents a mixed picture: some aspects of privatization seem to support property’s symbolism of rights, insofar as privatization helps many people to claim ownership. But some other aspects of privatization, notably an expanded IP, serve notice that not all property can function well as a symbol of what it means to bear rights.

137. See generally BROWN, supra note 135.


139. Ghosh, supra note 138, at 832–33 (describing traditional knowledge debates as distributional matter between more developed and less developed nations); Chander & Sunder, supra note 138, at 1354–57, 1363–69 (same; also relating the traditional knowledge debate to treaty-related alteration in the scope of the prior “commons” in intellectual productions); see also Jim Chen, Biodiversity and Biotechnology: A Misunderstood Relation, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 51, 54, 75–76 (2005) (same). However, although sympathetic to compensation claims in other forms, Chen rejects the propertization of traditional knowledge either by traditional communities or first-world developers, because in his view this would diminish the beneficial spread of knowledge. Id. at 78, 83–84.
E. The Civilizing Argument: Property and Commerce Are Central Rights Because They Educate People in the Patterns of Give-and-Take on Which Democracy Depends

The Civilizing Argument also goes back to the classical eighteenth-century thinkers on political economy. But it rings rather strangely in modern ears, accustomed as we are to the Marxist description of the ferocity of capitalist exploitation.\footnote{See Keystone Right, supra note 11, at 351–52.} Earlier thinkers like Montesquieu and Hume, however, compared commercial practice favorably to the even more ferocious practices of aristocratic society, and they argued that commerce “softens” manners.\footnote{ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS 54–62 (1977).} The intuition here is that commercial people cannot afford the pomposity, vainglory, and casual violence of aristocrats. Nor, in a more modern setting, can they afford the rudeness that so plagued customer relations in some socialist states. Merchants have to pay attention to the wants and interests of others because they have to bargain with others to arrive at a mutually satisfactory conclusion. This is as true of modern commerce as it was in earlier times; like it or not, Disney and McDonald’s are exquisitely sensitive to the demands of their customers.\footnote{See Rod Newing, Broader View Wins More Plaudits, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2005, at 5 (calling Disney the fifth strongest company in the world in customer service); Sherri Day & Stuart Elliott, At McDonald’s, An Effort to Restore Lost Luster, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2003, at C1.} They have to be, or their customers will go elsewhere.

One sees this pattern of attentiveness quite markedly in some of the privatizing activity of recent years. For example, when McDonald’s opened its first Moscow restaurant, it had to teach its employees to smile at customers, something that caused astonishment among the customers themselves.\footnote{Francis X. Cline, Upheaval in the East; Moscow McDonald’s Opens, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1990, at A13 (describing training in first Moscow McDonald’s). See generally Adi Ignatius, Russians Who Wear Jungle Ties or Spit Need Not Apply, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1992, at A1.} Similarly, as China began a few years ago to open up some enterprises to a freer commerce, the government had to give elaborate instructions to store clerks on some things that they should not say to customers, e.g., “Stop shouting. Can’t you see I’m eating?”\footnote{Seth Faison, Service with Some Bile, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1995, at 4-4. Among the other banned remarks of clerks to customers were “Didn’t you hear me? What do you have ears for?” and “Why didn’t you choose well when you bought it?” Id.}

There is another socializing factor at work in commercial relations as well. Much commerce consists of repeat dealings, so that, in their business affairs, people try to get to know one another and try to earn the trust of others as potential trading partners. Though the matter is controversial, some historians even attribute the rise of philanthropy in the early nineteenth century to the expansion of world trade, as merchants learned about very distant peoples and
began interested in their well-being. These patterns continue; sometimes commercial relationships can develop into genuine friendships, friendships that would have been inconceivable except through the gateway of initial commercial contacts.

There are undoubtedly untold instances of rudeness, deceit, and self-dealing in commercial relationships, but we think of these examples over against a backdrop of more typical commercial behavior, which on the whole is reasonably polite and respectful of the rights of others. We tend to forget that this “normal” behavior is part of a culture of commerce, and we think it is simply nature. But it is not. It is learned behavior, and commerce helps to teach it.

At the same time, there are cautionary areas in modern privatization. Once again, the divestiture of public utilities is a particularly problematic area for any “civilizing” character of privatization. It is not that privatized utilities’ staffs are more rude and autocratic than state-run ones; but they may not be a great deal better. This comes from the “natural monopoly” character of utilities, which means that they are relatively undisciplined by competition—the very force that drives commercial people to be attentive to customers. Even in more developed countries, there are many complaints of rudeness and unresponsiveness from the gas company, the electric company, or the local telephone company. They do not have to compete for your business, and as a consequence, they may not pay a great deal of attention to your wishes or complaints.

All this is relative, though, and perhaps even the “natural monopolies”—and even bureaucrats—can learn a modicum of politeness if they are surrounded by other more conventional commercial activities. Democracies require some of the same cultural traits that property and commerce do: respect for the rights of others, an appeal to voluntary agreement rather than force, the channeling of self-interest into cooperation for mutual benefit. Indeed, when we think about it, there are rather few circumstances in which we regularly take into account the needs of others and try to cooperate with them and to earn their trust. Those that exist are very intense, of course: friendship, family, and love also do this work. But friendship, family and love do not carry us very far from home. Property and trade, on the other hand, can carry us very far indeed, connecting people to others who are strangers to them; consider, for example, the numbers of persons whom you must trust to take a trip in an airplane. And although the appeal to cooperation in commerce has a thin emotional basis—what used to be called “self-interest rightly understood”—commerce still generates institutions in which we learn to engage peacefully with very distant others, and we learn that we can do well for ourselves by

146. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
respecting rights, avoiding violence, and behaving in trustworthy ways. If there is any really important political capital to be gained for democracies from privatization, surely this culture of commerce must be part of it.

V. CONCLUSION

In all the examples given above, modern privatization efforts suggest a mixed picture, a certain muting of the political arguments for property and free commerce. It is not that the old arguments are flatly or even mostly wrong, but rather that in some arenas, modern privatization efforts illustrate some weak spots in the older political arguments for property. In fact, many of the modern efforts to privatize are themselves state-led, and it would be surprising indeed if privatization could turn around and single-handedly reform the political culture of the very states that initiated privatization.

The take-away lesson is that privatization in a modern context is only one of a whole array of political reforms, though it is an important one. Privatization, for example, can help to increase the demand for governmental accountability and competence, but this is in part because private property depends on accountable and competent government. There is certain circularity here: property requires that a modicum of governmental competence already be in place before property-owners can increase the demand for more competence. That is why democratic reform needs to engage in efforts on many different fronts, not just the economic one.