Cooper’s Quiet Demise (A Short Response to Professor Strauss)

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Change may be what law does best. Law adapts. It adjusts. It “translates.” Its enforcement varies as its enforcers change. Some may still favor less volatile legal features—doctrinal stability, decisional predictability, judicial restraint. Some may even believe that the “whole purpose” of the Constitution is to “prevent” broad legal swings—or at least to make them quite difficult. But change is one of law’s true constants, as common as jealousy and as inevitable as the grave.
Nothing has changed quite so much, David Strauss argues, as *Brown v. Board of Education*.9 This claim may seem surprising. *Brown* is, after all, an icon among icons,10 a (seemingly) “fixed point in American constitutional law.”11

But *Brown’s* “fixed point” has somehow moved. What was once an “unchallengeable”12 triumph of anti-subordination has been turned, ironically and perversely, into an anti-classificationist’s victory.13 *Brown’s* “true legacy” of constitutional adjudication should ideally evolve, even he accepts that constitutional theory must adapt in practice. . . . Justice Scalia acknowledges that courts must develop a theory that accommodates the timeless originalist ideal with respect for stare decisis.”) (citations and emphasis omitted).

8. See Strauss, supra note 1, at 935 (“Gradual innovation . . . has always been a part of the common law tradition, as it has been a part of American constitutionalism.”); Lessig, supra note 2, at 396 (“No theory that ignored these changes, or that presumed that constitutional interpretation could go on without these changes, could be a theory of our Constitution. Change is at its core.”); see also Fallon, supra note 3, at 572 (“Claims such as these may appear to verge on constitutional, or at least constitutional theoretical, nihilism. If the best constitutional theory may vary from era to era, why should it not also vary from case to case?”).


12. Id. at 1065, 1082. In some ways, *Brown* still seems unchallengeable—in outcome, if not in rationale. As Professor Lessig has explained, “[n]o one questions *Brown’s* result (anymore). Indeed, so completely has the legal system reoriented itself after the decision that it may not even be possible to find the legal material with which to mount a serious challenge to its conclusion.” Lawrence Lessig, *Fidelity in Translation*, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1242 (1993) (citations omitted). “In a world where a conservative like Justice Scalia says the correctness of the decision ‘leaves no room for doubt,’” Professor Lessig adds, “it is difficult to reconstruct the world where liberals such as Professor Herbert Wechsler could worry that no principled opinion could be written to support it.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Mark V. Tushnet, *Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses*, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 997, 999 n.4 (1986) (“For a generation, one criterion for an acceptable constitutional theory has been whether that theory explains why [Brown] . . . was correct.”). But see John Harrison, *Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause*, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1463 n.295 (1992) (“I do not think that my theory of the 14th Amendment stands or falls with [its ability to accommodate Brown]. Man is not the measure of all things, as Socrates replied to the Sophists, and neither is [Brown]. . . . An interpretation of the Constitution is not wrong because it would produce a different result in Brown.”). Professor Lessig may well be right—even if, as Professor Strauss counsels, we should take Wechsler’s worries seriously. But true or not, the soundness of *Brown's result* is only part of the matter. *How* the Court reached its outcome is of comparable concern—and no small measure of dispute.

13. Strauss, supra note 11, at 1083–86.
has been “undermine[d].” 14 Professor Strauss tells us; its real meaning has been lost. 15 And this, he says, is “indefensible.” 16

Yet Professor Strauss’s prognosis is not entirely grim. With characteristic precision and elegance, 17 Professor Strauss does more than recount Brown’s lamentable shift. He also sets a course for revival and reclamation. He asks us to look at Brown (and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 18) once more—not through the same tired glasses, but through the prism of 1950s Little Rock and the lens of Cooper v. Aaron. 19

Why Little Rock’s prism? And why Cooper’s lens? Professor Strauss offers an alluring answer: Little Rock and Cooper provide special insight, he says, a unique perspective on Brown’s sacred promise. The “frenzied crowds” outside Central High School, the mobilized National Guard units, the federal paratroopers—these things helped reveal Brown for what it meant, not just for what it said. 20 They helped to expose, that is, Brown’s true anti-caste heart. 21

These things also helped produce an extraordinary Supreme Court opinion in Cooper, a decision that posits the Court at the very center of our constitutional universe. 22 Cooper’s resounding “judicial supremacy” call is

14. Id. at 1086.
15. Id.
16. Strauss, supra note 11, at 1068.
17. Professor Strauss’s excellent lecture also holds a bit of a surprise—not in its conclusion, but in its mode of analysis. Very little of Professor Strauss’s analysis incorporates post-Brown doctrine, looking instead at Brown as a kind of static text. This seems, to me, like a perfectly reasonable approach, but one at least somewhat unexpected from Professor Strauss himself. If Brown is our anchor text, after all, some may say that its meaning is informed not just by its own words, but by the “elaborate body of [Brown] law that has developed, mostly through judicial decisions, over the years.” Strauss, supra note 1, at 877. This is what Chief Justice Roberts seems to suggest, however tacitly, in his opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2751–61 (2007).
20. Professor Strauss writes that “the Little Rock school integration crisis that led to Cooper was a turning point”—a kind of catalyst of cultural change. Strauss, supra note 11, at 1066. On the intricate interplay of law, culture, and civil rights, see especially Michael J. Klaman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality (2004).
21. See Strauss, supra note 11, at 1067 (“Little Rock showed the national audience that segregation was a part of a racial caste system that treated African Americans as an inferior race. That was why Brown was correct . . . .”).
22. See Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18–19 (“[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country. . . . It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land . . . .”); see also Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term—Forward: We the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 5, 6 (2001) (“But here is the striking thing: in the years since Cooper v. Aaron, the idea of judicial supremacy—the
itself totemic—so much so that Professor Fallon uses it as the anchor of his "Pure Judicial Supremacy Model." 23 It is also deeply controversial. 24 Judge Wilkinson deems Cooper "both unrealistic and undesirable." 25 Professor Kurland calls Cooper the Court’s "Louis XIV’s notion of itself, 'l’etat, c’est moi.'" 26 Professor Strauss, with greater reserve, says that Cooper may seem to "go too far," at least with regard to Congress and the President. 27

And about this, Professor Strauss may well be right.

But this short Essay suggests—tentatively and tendentiously—that Cooper is both more and less than all of that. It suggests that Cooper’s emphatic declaration of judicial supremacy is a bluff, a bit of forced and overheated rhetoric informed less by grand notions of Court authority and more by the peculiar facts of Little Rock. Even more, this Essay suggests that significant holes in Cooper’s judicial supremacy armor could be seen well before the Court put pen to paper—and can still be seen today.

To that end, this Essay takes (or attempts to take) four related steps, some more novel than others. It first reconsiders Cooper itself, concentrating on Justice Frankfurter’s instructive—if long-ignored—concurring opinion. 28 This Essay then locates Cooper in slightly broader doctrinal context, calling particular attention to one of Cooper’s odd doctrinal contemporaries: Williams v. Georgia. 29 From there, this Essay examines the lessons we might learn from

23. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Executive Power and the Political Constitution, 2007 Utah L. Rev. 1, 11 (2007). Professor Roosevelt’s thoughtful contribution to this Issue unpacks the idea of “judicial supremacy” more carefully than I do here. See generally Kermit Roosevelt III, Judicial Supremacy, Judicial Activism: Cooper v. Aaron and Parents Involved, 52 St. Louis U. L.J. 1191 (2008). He is surely right that “judicial supremacy” has different foundations and different manifestations—and that these details improve our understanding of the core “judicial supremacy” concept. For the purposes of this Essay, however, even the crudest notion of “judicial supremacy” will do, so I leave the subtler definitions to Professor Roosevelt.


27. Strauss, supra note 11, at 1080.

28. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 20–26 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

I. None of these steps does much good, of course, without a bit of background. So, at the risk of repeating what Professor Strauss and others have already carefully recalled, it makes sense to reset the basic scene.

It is mid-1950s Arkansas. The State’s political-opportunist of a governor, Orval Faubus, has mobilized the State’s National Guard in the hope of blocking integration of Little Rock’s public schools. “[A]ngry white crowds” have descended on the city, “jeer[ing]” black schoolchildren and “attack[ing]” reporters. All involved are uneasy. Serious violence seems assured.

President Eisenhower, at best an ambivalent supporter of Brown, has responded by deploying paratroopers to Little Rock. These troops help avert
massive mob violence, but they do little to soften Faubus’s segregationist stand. By early 1958, in fact, Faubus and the Arkansas legislature have made public school integration effectively impossible; even more, by early 1958, Faubus and the Arkansas legislature have threatened to reinstitute official segregation. Brown v. Board, they have decided, does not apply to them. So they have thumbed their noses at the Court.

And in response the Supreme Court does not flinch. In Cooper, the Court finds against Faubus and the Arkansas legislature. It chides the State’s behavior. And it toes Brown’s line firmly and emphatically—recounting the evils of discrimination, reasserting the rights of African American children, and rejecting the menace of “evasive” segregationist “schemes.”

But Cooper does much more than this—more than was necessary, as the Court candidly admits. Cooper also sounds its familiar “judicial supremacy” call. It recites the (supposedly) “basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution . . . .” It asserts that decisions “enunciated by th[e] Court” are themselves “the supreme law of the

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37. As Professor Farber has explained, the story is a bit more complicated than my brief summary suggests. Before President Eisenhower deployed the troops, he met with Faubus personally—and the meeting left Eisenhower “with the impression” that Faubus would relent. Farber, supra note 24, at 395. But Faubus did no such thing. Instead, he removed the National Guard troops in a manner that “[l]eft no way of controlling the angry crowds [then] surrounding the school.” Id. (citations omitted). Only then did President Eisenhower respond directly, first with a (futile) proclamation and then with federal troops. Id. at 395–96 (adding that President Eisenhower was careful to state that “personal opinions about the [Brown] decision have no bearing on the matter of enforcement”) (citations omitted).

38. Id. at 396 (“Although the federal forces could control crowds . . . they could not control other forms of white resistance.”).

39. Id.

40. See Farber, supra note 24, at 395–96 (“[Faubus] declared that ‘the Supreme Court decision is not the law of the land.’”).

41. Nor could it, as Professor Strauss notes. Had the Court backed down in Cooper, it would have embarrassed more than itself. It would have embarrassed the entirety of the federal government, President Eisenhower included. See Strauss, supra note 11, at 1079 (“Especially after it had finally elicited support from the executive branch, the Court could not possibly have given any sign that it was backing away from Brown, and it did not.”); see also KLARMAN, supra note 20, at 328–29 (“Cooper v. Aaron was easy for the justices . . . . Now that the president had finally provided [political support for Brown], the justices had no choice but to back him up.”); Farber, supra note 24, at 402 (“In retrospect, it is hard to see how the Court could have avoided making such a plea for obedience to Brown . . . .”).


43. See id. at 17 (“What has been said, in the light of the facts developed, is enough to dispose of the case. However, we should answer the premise of the actions of the Governor and Legislature that they are not bound by our holding in the Brown case.”).

44. Id. at 18.
land." And it admonishes all who can hear it that the Supreme Court “must be obeyed.”

These are famous words—now banal to some, still provocative to others. These words will, no doubt, be admired and assailed for years to come. But just how seriously should we take Cooper’s “judicial supremacy” call? Is the Court’s supremacy “rule” as vigorous and categorical as it may seem? Or is it simply a handy dialectical tool, ready to be attacked or supported regardless of its real effect?

Justice Frankfurter suggests surprising answers to these questions. In his revealing—if long-overlooked—concurrence, in fact, Justice Frankfurter subtly hints that Cooper may not mean exactly what it says.

That Justice Frankfurter wrote separately at all was no small matter. Other Justices believed the Court should speak as a single, unified group in Cooper—the better, they thought, to “dramatize the Court’s adherence to Brown.” But Justice Frankfurter wished to write separately. More than that, he wished to address a particular audience: “Southern lawyers and law professors”—those Southern “legal profession[als]” who might, over time, help the Court effect a “gradual thawing of the ice.” So against the forceful urging of his colleagues, Justice Frankfurter penned a rather strange concurrence in Cooper—though he delayed its announcement until days after the majority spoke.

Justice Frankfurter’s strange concurrence begins with an ode to cooperation: “By working together [and] by sharing in a common effort,” Justice Frankfurter writes, “men of different minds and tempers, even if they do not reach agreement, acquire understanding and thereby tolerance of their differences.” Our goal, Justice Frankfurter suggests, is common and laudable, if still imperfect. We all wish, he says, to get along peacefully, even when we never quite agree. But this kind of broad social harmony requires

45. Id.
46. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 24, at 264 (emphasis added).
47. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 22, at 6 (“But here is the striking thing: in the years since Cooper v. Aaron, the idea of judicial supremacy . . . has finally found widespread approbation.”).
49. 358 U.S. at 20–26 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
51. See Farber, supra note 24, at 401 (citation omitted).
52. See Hutchinson, supra note 50, at 84 (citing Letter from Justice Frankfurter, United States Supreme Court Justice, to C.C. Burlingham, at 2 (Nov. 12, 1958)).
53. See Farber, supra note 24, at 401 (“Although Justice Frankfurter had wanted to write a separate opinion, he was dissuaded from announcing it the same day as the main opinion.”) (citation omitted).
54. 358 U.S. at 20 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
more than good intentions and a few pointed Supreme Court declarations. It requires “the constructive use of time”—something, Justice Frankfurter implies, that had been lacking since Brown was decided.55

So Justice Frankfurter offers a kind of apologia to Southern States: Some Supreme Court decisions, he acknowledges, will stir “deep emotions.”56 Some Supreme Court decisions, like Brown, will even involve painful and “drastic alteration[s] in the . . . communities . . . involved.”57 This is an inevitable, if uncomfortable, consequence of our constitutional scheme.58

But it is not an edict for “immediate” or “overnight” change.59 Instead, it is an occasion for discourse, a constitutional dialogue that envisions both give and take.60 States may have their say, Justice Frankfurter intimates. States may even resist Supreme Court edicts on occasion, provided they do so in appropriate ways.61 “[B]rute power,” mass violence, and “forcible interference”62—these things are simply too much, Justice Frankfurter explains; they fall outside the boundaries of permissible constitutional resistance, not least because they threaten anarchy and the untangling of our social fabric.63 But more careful, guarded, and subtle forms of resistance can fall within the bounds of acceptable debate and defiance. Some cautious bouts of state defiance, Justice Frankfurter quietly concedes, can even evade the Court’s supreme rebuke.64

It is an odd concession, to be sure. It is especially peculiar to find this nod to state defiance in Cooper, a case long-thought to be preoccupied with unfettered Court authority. But it is a concession Justice Frankfurter knowingly rendered, and it carries an invitation he was particularly able to make. For Justice Frankfurter was not writing his concurrence in Cooper on a

55. Id. at 25.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. 358 U.S. at 24–25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
60. For this proposition, Justice Frankfurter quotes a rather telling source: President Andrew Jackson’s Message to Congress of January 16, 1833. See 358 U.S. at 24. Students of Supreme Court history know that President Jackson was, at times, a rather vehement critic of notions of “judicial supremacy”—as was President Lincoln, who is quoted near the end of Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence. Id. at 26. It may be too much to suggest that Justice Frankfurter’s quotation selection sends its own powerful message about tolerable defiance. But it is not too much to suggest that Justice Frankfurter chose his sources carefully and intentionally.
61. Id. at 21–22.
62. Id. at 22–25.
63. Id. at 22; see also Norman R. Williams, Executive Review in the Fragmented Executive: State Constitutionalism and Same-Sex Marriage, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 565, 613 (2006) (“Significantly, . . . Cooper did not deny the power of state officials to enforce the Constitution, but rather only to disregard the Supreme Court’s interpretation once made.”).
64. 358 U.S. at 22.
clean slate. He was writing as the author of Williams v. Georgia, a story of successful state defiance decided less than three years before.

II.

Williams v. Georgia is an odd case. It is also a nearly-forgotten case, one best considered by Del Dickson more than a decade ago. And Williams is surely a hard case, though its core story can be quickly retold.

In October 1952, a liquor store clerk named Harry Furst was shot and killed in Atlanta. Local police soon arrested Aubry Lee Williams, a twenty-seven-year-old African American man, and charged him with Furst’s murder. In time, Williams was tried by a state jury, one empanelled through a “colored ticket” system all would come to acknowledge as unconstitutional. But Williams’s attorney failed to object to this selection process—“even though the Georgia Supreme Court had criticized [the] use of colored tickets” in Avery v. State, and even though “the U.S. Supreme Court had granted certiorari in [Avery] only the day before.” Trial lasted less than a day. Williams was convicted and sentenced to death.

66. Del Dickson, State Court Defiance and the Limits of Supreme Court Authority: Williams v. Georgia Revisited, 103 YALE L.J. 1423 (1994).
67. See id. at 1426; see also BARRETT PRETTYMAN, JR., DEATH AND THE SUPREME COURT 258–63 (1961).
68. See Dickson, supra note 66, at 1426 (citing True Bill, Williams v. State, 78 S.E.2d 521 (Ga. 1953) (No. 18348), reprinted in Bill of Exceptions at 1–2, Williams v. State, 82 S.E.2d 217 (Ga. 1954) (No. 18548)).
69. Dickson, supra note 66, at 1427–28; Del Dickson’s summary of this “colored ticket” system is especially helpful:

At the time, jury panels in Fulton County were selected on a weekly basis by a superior court judge, who drew tickets from a wooden box containing the names of all qualified men in the jurisdiction. The wooden container was called a traverse jury box, and those who were selected were called traverse jurors. The drawing was not a random process: white prospective jurors had their names written on white tickets, while everyone else had their names placed on yellow tickets. This allowed state officials to monitor—and presumably limit—the number of racial minorities allowed to serve as jurors in Fulton County. The yellow cards that were drawn were generally assigned to the criminal calendar, at least in part because the state could challenge black jurors more easily in criminal trials than in civil cases.

Id. at 1427 (citations omitted). Professor Dickson also notes that Williams confessed, somewhat reluctantly, to Furst’s murder—though the details of this confession were never confirmed. See id. at 1426–27, 1427 n.11 (citations omitted). Neither the Georgia Supreme Court nor the U.S. Supreme Court devotes much, if any, attention to this confession. Whether it otherwise tacitly informed those courts’ analyses is an open question.

70. Williams’s defense attorney, the somewhat ironically-named Carter Goode, would eventually be named an assistant attorney general for the State of Georgia. See id. at 1471.
71. Id. at 1428 (citing Avery v. State, 70 S.E.2d 716, 722 (Ga. 1952)).
72. Id.
On direct and collateral appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.\(^75\) The state court did recognize the problem of colored tickets;\(^76\) it even acknowledged that the Supreme Court had since declared the colored-ticket method of jury-selection unconstitutional in Avery.\(^77\) But the state court still found against Williams, concluding that he had abandoned his constitutional claims: “When [Williams] failed to raise this question when the [jury] panel was put upon him,” the court wrote, “he waived the question once and for all.”\(^78\)

The Supreme Court granted certiorari five months later.\(^79\) A difficult period of deliberation followed. So divided was the Court, in fact, that Justice Frankfurter “set to writing” his opinion without formal assignment from Chief Justice Warren.\(^80\) But just one week after it issued its (in)famous “all deliberate speed” decision in Brown II,\(^81\) the Court rejected Georgia’s waiver conclusion, vacated Williams’s conviction, and remanded to Georgia’s courts—adding only the gentlest\(^82\) instructions to conduct a new trial.\(^83\)

\(^73\). Id.
\(^74\). Dickson, supra note 66, at 1428 (citation omitted).
\(^75\). For a more complete account of Williams’s unsuccessful walk through Georgia’s appellate process, see id. at 1429–32.
\(^76\). See Williams v. State, 82 S.E.2d 217, 219 (Ga. 1954).
\(^77\). Id.; see also Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953).
\(^78\). Williams, 82 S.E.2d at 218–20 (citations omitted).
\(^79\). See Dickson, supra note 66, at 1432–36 (“This time Justices Douglas, Black, Warren, and Clark voted to grant certiorari . . . .”). It was not an easy or uncontroversial vote. Professor Dickson’s careful review of primary sources helps tell this story best. See id. at 1432–37. For now, it is enough to note that Justices and clerks alike were concerned about the Court’s appellate jurisdiction and the (potentially) adequate and independent state ground for Georgia’s decision.
\(^80\). See id. at 1447.
\(^82\). During the Court’s post-argument conference, Justice Frankfurter stressed the “Court’s duty to guard against undermining a state’s responsibility for enforcing its own criminal laws.” Dickson, supra note 66, at 1445. Justice Frankfurter also cautioned the Court against imposing federal standards of fair play on the states, or . . . let[ting] a hard case bring the federal judiciary into violence with state governments. Not only did the Court have a constitutional duty to respect state autonomy, Frankfurter explained, but the Court could not run roughshod over state law enforcement without damaging its own prestige and authority.

\(^83\). See Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 389, 391 (1955); see also KLARMAN, supra note 20, at 324 (“The Court declined to reverse outright, but it strongly hinted that it might do so if Georgia refused to order a new trial.”).
The Georgia Supreme Court refused. Not three days after it received the Supreme Court’s opinion the Georgia court reaffirmed its initial decision, telling the Supreme Court that it would not “supinely surrender sovereign powers of th[e] State” to an intermeddling federal court. It would order no new trial. Nor would it delay Williams’s execution. Indeed, it would do nothing the Supreme Court asked it or commanded it to do. Georgia simply decided to ignore binding Supreme Court precedent. Or, as Barrett Prettyman pithily summarized some time later, Georgia simply told to the Supreme Court to “go to hell.”

This may surprise us. It may even astonish students of Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, Testa v. Katt, and Cooper itself. Even Georgia’s Chief Justice expected to be called before the Supreme Court on contempt charges—though he was prepared to issue contempt citations to Chief Justice Warren (and other Supreme Court Justices) right back.

But even more surprising is what happened next: the Supreme Court flinched. When Williams filed a second request for Supreme Court review, the Court denied certiorari—unanimously. It allowed the Georgia Supreme Court to flout directly apposite precedent; even more, it allowed the state court to flout the law of that very case. Georgia’s courts defied the Supreme Court and won. Williams was executed on March 30, 1956—just eighteen months before Orval Faubus mobilized the National Guard in Little Rock.

84. See Williams v. State, 88 S.E.2d 376, 377 (Ga. 1955).
85. Though the Supreme Court decided Williams on June 6, the opinion was not filed with the Georgia Supreme Court until July 13, 1955. The Georgia Supreme Court issued its response on July 15. Dickinson, supra note 66, at 1456.
86. Id. at 377. A dismissal of the Supreme Court’s judgment accompanied the state court’s decision. Id.
87. See PRETTYMAN, supra note 67, at 290.
88. It may also have surprised the Court. Professor Burt has argued that, “[w]hatever the Justices might have feared regarding elite or popular reception of any order for immediate school desegregation, they had no remotely comparable reason to anticipate resistance to an order for a new trial for Aubry Williams.” Robert A. Burt, Brown’s Reflection, 103 YALE L.J. 1483, 1484 (1993).
89. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (asserting the Supreme Court’s authority to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments on questions of federal law).
90. 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947) (holding that a state court must enforce federal law—provided it has “jurisdiction adequate and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate”).
91. Dickson, supra note 66, at 1458.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1464 (“All nine Justices voted to deny certiorari.”) (citation omitted).
94. Id. at 1465.
95. See Farber, supra note 24, at 393.
III.

So Williams v. Georgia is an odd, awkward, and unsettling case. It is also a bad fit with Cooper v. Aaron, the Court’s most emphatic assertion of its supposed supremacy. But Williams and Cooper are more than a curious doctrinal mismatch. They are an unexpectedly illuminating pair, and there are real lessons to be learned from juxtaposing the two.

One lesson might be that something—or everything—changed between 1955 and 1958. Perhaps the addition of Justice Brennan between Williams and Cooper dramatically altered the Court’s sense of its own power.96 Perhaps Williams itself induced more aggressive state defiance—for many states did view Williams as evidence of Court cowardice, real proof that they could “stand up to the . . . Court . . . and get away with it.”97 And perhaps Williams embarrassed and emboldened the Supreme Court, teaching it that passivity and moral suasion of the type Justice Frankfurter envisioned would not work with obdurate Southern states.98

A second lesson may be that Brown is simply different—and that Cooper’s “judicial supremacy” rhetoric is more targeted than thoroughgoing. Professor Dickson makes this claim, arguing that the Court wished to sustain Brown specifically—and that it would tolerate “individual injustices” if necessary to do so.99 Professor Strauss hints at this idea as well, noting that the Court could scarcely show “any sign that it was backing away from Brown.”100

97. Dickson, supra note 66, at 1469.
98. Id. at 1472 (“The Justices . . . adopted an informal strategy of seeking to avoid unnecessary confrontations with Southern governments over ancillary racial issues.”).
99. Id. at 1477–78 (“[A] clear pattern emerges here that the Justices sought to protect the Court’s institutional authority and the integrity of Brown from Southern attack, even when their actions resulted in significant individual injustices.”); see also NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 156 (2004) (discussing the Court’s interest in “sidestepp[ing] . . . explosive confrontation[s] . . . rather than risk thwarting or seriously handicapping its decision in Brown . . .”)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
100. Strauss, supra note 11, at 1079. In some ways, of course, Williams and Brown are not especially far apart, so the concentration on one may have implicated the other anyway. See Burt, supra note 88, at 1491 (noting that both cases “attempted to combat the racial caste system while acknowledging uncertainty as to whether such action was permitted by positive law”); see also id. (adding that both cases “proclaimed the racial caste system immoral but did not purport to force this judgment on others; instead, they appealed to others’ legal and moral capacities to reach independent judgments . . .”). But see id. at 1492–93 (claiming that because “Williams’ conviction was not an especially outrageous application of Jim Crow”—since “there was no
And another related lesson may be that Cooper’s “judicial supremacy” language is significantly overstated. At the least, Williams suggests that Cooper does not always mean what it says—and that the Court did not expect it would. Williams suggests, that is, that sometimes the Court will abide, even invite, dissent and defiance, so long as that defiance falls within the field of appropriate constitutional play. 101 If states defy with violence and guns, the Court will push back vigorously, as it did in Cooper. But if states package their defiance more carefully—if they wrap it in more legalistic and proceduralist clothes—the Court may stand aside. Present a superficially compliant but fundamentally evasive “pupil placement” plan, as Birmingham did in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Education,102 and the Court may blink. Mask direct state-court defiance in convoluted questions of waiver and adequate-and-independent-state-grounds doctrine, as Georgia did in Williams,103 and the Court may flinch.

IV.

This is not to suggest, of course, that all legalist or proceduralist defiance will prevail. Far from it, as readers of NAACP v. Alabama’s extended tale well know.104 In the end, there is simply no easy line of defiance to track and no plausible suggestion on the trial record that Williams was innocent”—Williams was only a “garden variety” episode of a racial caste system).


102. 358 U.S. 101 (1958); see also KLARMAN, supra note 20, at 330–31 (“By 1958, pupil placement had become a preferred method of avoiding desegregation; every southern state had adopted such a scheme. . . . Alabama officials were ‘jubilant’ over Shuttlesworth, which Governor Patterson saw ‘as an indication that the Supreme Court is going to let us handle our own affairs.’”) (citation omitted).

103. Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 389 (1955). Professor Burt has rightly noted that Williams was not a jurisdictional slam-dunk. “It is evident from the Justices’ deliberations,” he writes, “that most of them were convinced that the Georgia courts had not invoked their procedural ground as a ruse . . . ; accordingly, the Justices were troubled about the basis for their jurisdiction, in light of the apparently independent, adequate state procedural ground.” See Burt, supra note 88, at 1484–85. But it is likewise true that the Court’s jurisdictional concerns manifested in an unusual way: Rather than vacating their initial, jurisdictionally dubious decision, the Justices simply left it in place for Georgia to defy it outright. This is a significant difference. In the end, of course, the result is generally the same—at least for Aubry Williams. But if Justice Frankfurter is correct that “the fact that [the Court has] jurisdiction does not compel [the Justices] to exercise it,” Williams, 349 U.S. at 389, he elides a critical point: Everything changes once the Justices have “exercise[d]” their jurisdiction. Put slightly differently, the choice to exercise jurisdiction is one thing. See, e.g., DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 99, at 156 (noting that the Court refused to hear a challenge to Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law in 1955, despite the offensiveness of the law, because the Court wished to avoid conflict with potentially obdurate states). The choice to allow defiance of that jurisdiction is quite another.

104. That tale involved four trips to the Supreme Court. After trip four, the state relented. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); NAACP v. Gallion, 368 U.S. 16
simple trend of supremacy to follow. If anything, in fact, the doctrine produces only a “patchwork without pattern”\textsuperscript{105}—not a clear pattern at all.

But that is precisely the point. \textit{Cooper} would have us believe that there is a categorical rule of “judicial supremacy,” a clear pattern of obedience to the Supreme Court. There is no such rule, no such pattern. Instead, the Court has set a more intricate and nuanced field for constitutional debate. Some defiance is outside that field; it is, like the defiance in Little Rock, definitively out-of-bounds. But some defiance is permitted, even invited, however cryptically.\textsuperscript{106} Put slightly differently, some holes exist in the Court’s “judicial supremacy” armor—and some states, like Georgia in \textit{Williams}, occasionally find them.

So Orval Faubus’s mistake in \textit{Cooper} was \textit{not} that he entered the constitutional debate at all, attempting a kind of “popular constitutionalism”—to borrow Dean Kramer’s term.\textsuperscript{107} His mistake was the means and the manner he used: His method of popular constitutionalism was too violent and too combative. His attempt at constitutional debate, that is, was simply too far out-of-bounds.

What’s left, then, is a somewhat surprising claim.\textsuperscript{108} What’s left is the sense that \textit{Cooper}’s “judicial supremacy” rhetoric substantially outstripped the Court’s real vision and the Court’s real plan.\textsuperscript{109} For the Court does indulge,
even invite, some defiance of its decisions. It did then—both in \textit{Williams} and, more quietly, in Justice Frankfurter’s \textit{Cooper} concurrence. And it does now:\textsuperscript{110} in \textit{Roper v. Simmons}, where the Missouri Supreme Court ignored recent, seemingly binding Supreme Court precedent;\textsuperscript{111} in \textit{Lockyer v. Andrade}, where the California courts ignored apposite, seemingly controlling Supreme Court doctrine;\textsuperscript{112} and almost again in Texas quite recently, where the Texas courts flirted with ignoring a Supreme Court stay of execution.\textsuperscript{113}

These are all difficult stories—no easier than \textit{Cooper} and \textit{Williams} themselves. But difficult stories can be revealing, and sometimes they offer the greatest surprise. The stories of \textit{Williams} and \textit{Roper} and \textit{Andrade} and (even) \textit{Cooper} reveal something we might not expect: States can, and sometimes do, disobey binding Supreme Court precedent.\textsuperscript{114} It is a truth that runs directly contrary to \textit{Cooper}’s famous call for state fealty. But it is a truth the Supreme Court allows all the same.

So is Professor Strauss correct that we benefit from reading \textit{Brown} and \textit{Parents Involved} through the prism of Little Rock and the lens of \textit{Cooper v. Aaron}? Of course he is. We would do well to follow his able lead.

But if \textit{Cooper} is our lens, we should also be careful to acknowledge where it is cracked. Orval Faubus deserved all that he got in \textit{Cooper}, but the Supreme Court did not mean all that it said. Beneath \textit{Cooper}’s noisy shouts of “judicial supremacy” are whispers of \textit{Cooper}’s own quiet demise. We would do well to listen to those whispers too.

\textsuperscript{110} See especially Bloom, supra note 101.

\textsuperscript{111} 543 U.S. 551 (2005); see also Bloom, supra note 101.

\textsuperscript{112} 538 U.S. 63 (2003); see also Bloom, supra note 101.


\textsuperscript{114} See generally Bloom, supra note 101.