Not in My Backyard: Turner v. Clayton and the Battle Over Mandatory Open Enrollment

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NOT IN MY BACKYARD: *TURNER v. CLAYTON* AND THE BATTLE OVER MANDATORY OPEN ENROLLMENT

**INTRODUCTION**

In America, education is espoused as the great equalizer, a key foundation of the American Dream. But many have come to realize that the American Dream, in terms of education, is more fiction than fact. Since 1980 when President Ronald Reagan commissioned the Nation at Risk report, Americans have faced the reality that education is not the panacea once imagined. The dismal condition of education in America is best evidenced in its inner cities. Although racial segregation in schools has been outlawed since *Brown v. Board of Education*, de facto segregation still reigns in most of America’s cities. In a recent documentary entitled *Waiting for Superman*, Davis Guggenheim depicts the seemingly hopeless state of students attempting to attain a good education in America’s inner cities.

The film tracks five students through their struggle to attend an excellent school in Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, the Bronx, and Harlem. Most of the students’ neighborhood schools are “dropout factories” meaning attendance at those schools reduces the students’ likelihood of graduating from high school to only 60 percent. In order to avoid this statistical likelihood, these students and their parents turn to public charter schools and private schools that do provide an excellent education. However, the reality depicted in the film is that not every child can afford, gain admission, or win a lottery to attend an excellent school.

In response to the problem of failing inner city schools, many state legislatures have passed open enrollment statutes allowing students in failing

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5. WAITING FOR SUPERMAN (Paramount Pictures 2010).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
or unaccredited schools to attend high performing public schools, either within
their district or in a neighboring district. The recent Missouri Supreme Court
decision in *Turner v. School District of Clayton* controversially enforced
Missouri’s open enrollment statute, Missouri Revised Statute § 167.131
requires school districts surrounding the City of St. Louis to enroll students
from the unaccredited St. Louis Public School (“SLPS”) system if they apply
for admission. Fourteen other states have mandatory open enrollment statutes
with varying degrees of similarity to Missouri’s statute. The courts’
interpretations of open enrollment statutes in those states, and current
education policy, are helpful in analyzing the implications of having a
mandatory, inter-district, open enrollment statute in Missouri.

The controversy surrounding Section 167.131 has elicited a debate among
Missouri state legislators, St. Louis County and City superintendents, and
parents living in both the county and the city, as enforcement of the statute
means a possible hemorrhaging of money and students from the city and an
inconvenient influx of students to the county. This potential reality is not
palatable to most of the stakeholders in the conversation surrounding education
in St. Louis, but one crucial component of the conversation that is often
missing is the effect of failing schools on students. Much like the students in
*Waiting for Superman*, the students trapped in SLPS need a super-human
solution to receive an excellent education. Educators, community leaders,
and politicians in St. Louis must prioritize the needs of students and enact
several changes to the current education system in order to make certain that a
child’s zip code does not determine his or her life prospects. In spite of the

10. See Joint Comm’n on Educ., 95th Mo. Gen. Assembly, A Review of Open
Enrollment States: Policies and Practices iii (2009); Adam M. Herrmann et al., *Open
Enrollment in K-12 Public Education*, 7 Educ. Pol’y Brief 1, 2 (Summer 2009) (describing
open enrollment as “intradistrict” when available within the school district in which the student
resides and as “interdistrict” when the student may choose to attend a school in another school
district; also noting that mandatory open enrollment requires school district participation, while
voluntary open enrollment gives school districts the option of participating).
14. See Dale Singer, *Compromise to Solve School Transfer Suit Couldn’t Make the Grade*,
St. Louis Beacon (June 9, 2011, 6:39 AM), http://www.stlbeacon.org/issues-politics/95-Educa-
tion/110756-compromise-to-solve-school-transfer-suit-couldnt-make-the-grade (noting that one
estimate put the cost for SLPS at $300 million if all nineteen thousand students living within the
city district transfer to county schools); Dale Singer, *If Transfer Law is Upheld, 15,000 Would
issues-politics/95-Education/114573-turner-could-mean-exodus-of-15000-students (citing a
survey conducted by Terry Jones at University of Missouri-St. Louis commissioned by the
Clayton School District).
15. See Waiting for Superman, supra note 5.
debate surrounding the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in *Turner*, the court correctly interpreted Section 167.131. 16 Although the court based its decision on statutory interpretation and analysis, the decision is also consistent with good education policy for St. Louis. 17 In order to realize the benefit of *Turner*, the Missouri legislature should retain Section 167.131 and enact supplemental statutes. The combination will, in the short term, ensure that every student living in an unaccredited district can attain an education, and, in the long term, guarantee that there are quality school choice options in the city.

This Note will first briefly touch on the history behind de facto racial segregation in St. Louis and the current statistics outlining racial and economic segregation in the city schools to provide a context for *Turner*. It will then, in Part II, discuss the legislative background behind Missouri’s mandatory, inter-district open enrollment statute. This Note will, third, discuss the procedural history of *Turner* as well as the opinions of the majority and the dissent. Fourth, this Note will analyze different open enrollment statutes across the country and subsequent case law to gain any available wisdom for applying and interpreting Section 167.131. Finally, this Note will analyze the policy implications of *Turner* and consider possible long-term solutions to the problem that Section 167.131 was enacted to address.

I. PAST AND PRESENT OF EDUCATION IN ST. LOUIS: THE PROBLEM

While a full history and analysis of racial and economic segregation in the City of St. Louis as well as the history of the St. Louis school system is well beyond the scope of this Note, it is instructive to briefly discuss factors that have contributed to the failing school system in the city in order to truly understand the framework of *Turner*. The education system in St. Louis has been drastically affected by white flight from the city beginning in the 1950s. 18 Since then, the city and its schools have become increasingly segregated by race and economic status. 19 To address the segregation of white students in the county and African-American students in the city—in accordance with desegregation litigation—the Voluntary Interdistrict Choice (“VIC”) program was established in 1983 to transport African-American city students out to county school districts, and to send white students from the county into certain

16. *See infra* Parts III.B, IV.
17. *See infra* Part V.B.
18. COLIN GORDON, MAPPING DECLINE: ST. LOUIS AND THE FATE OF THE AMERICAN CITY 11 (Glenda Gilmore et al. eds., 2008) (describing St. Louis as one of the most egregious examples of white flight in the nation).
schools in the city. SLPS continued to struggle for the next twenty years and finally lost its state accreditation in 2007 as a result of “financial, administrative, and student achievement failures.” As of the 2011–2012 school year, 80 percent of students enrolled in SLPS were African-American. In 2011, SLPS had a 62.2 percent graduation rate, with only 31.9 percent of eighth grade students proficient in Math, and 34 percent proficient in Communication Arts. In 2011, SLPS had an average ACT score of 16.6, five points below the state average of 21.6, meaning SLPS has only 10 percent of its students performing at the national average on the ACT. Additionally, 87.4 percent of students in SLPS receive free and reduced lunch. These statistics paint a picture of low-income students trapped in a failing system where just over half will even have the opportunity to go to college.

20. See William H. Freivogel, St. Louis: Desegregation and School Choice in the Land of Dred Scott, in DIVIDED WE FALL: COMING TOGETHER THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 209, 209–10 (2002) (“Missouri had segregated schools for 115 years, much longer than most southern states. For much of that time, blacks weren’t just segregated; the act of teaching them was itself illegal . . . . Missouri prohibited slavery in 1865, but the state constitution explicitly mandated separate schools for ‘white and colored children’ until 1976—a shocking twenty-two years after Brown.”).

21. Malcolm Gay, State Takes Control of Troubled Public Schools in St. Louis, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/23/us/23missouri.html (explaining that SLPS was the largest district, composing thirty-five thousand students, to have been taken over by a state and that in 2006; the debt of the district was almost $25 million; and the district had employed six superintendents since 2003). As of the publication of this Note, SLPS had been granted provisional accreditation by the Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education. Jessica Bock, State Board gives provisional accreditation for St. Louis Public Schools, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/education/state-board-gives-provisional-accreditation-for-st-louis-public-schools/article_27dc696e-596a-5c4f-a5ad-e5c8d224971f.html. Because the Missouri Board of Elementary and Secondary Education’s grant of provisional accreditation to SLPS did not restore full accreditation to the District, the impact of the provisional accreditation on the Turner debate is still unclear. Thus, this Note cannot address whether the grant of provisional accreditation would make Missouri Revised Statute § 167.131 wholly inapplicable to SLPS.


23. Id.


25. DISTRICT REPORT CARD, supra note 22; U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM FACT SHEET 2 (2012), available at http://www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/lunch/ (“Children from families with incomes at or below 130 percent of the poverty level are eligible for free meals.”).

26. DISTRICT REPORT CARD, supra note 22.
tragic reality means that a student living in the City of St. Louis, whose parents likely do not have the means to send him or her to private school, has greatly diminished opportunities in life simply because of where he or she lives.

Almost twenty years ago, the Missouri State Legislature enacted a comprehensive school reform bill that could potentially ensure every student in the state attained an excellent education—even if they resided in an unaccredited district that was racially and economically segregated.27 Analyzing the legislative history behind that bill is helpful in resolving the complicated issues surrounding the Turner suit.

II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF SECTION 167.131

In 1993, the Missouri legislature enacted the Outstanding Schools Act (“Act”).28 The Act included various provisions to reduce class sizes, add an A+ schools program, provide funding for parents as teachers and early childhood development, train teachers, upgrade vocational and technical education, and promote accountability.29 The legislation also created an “Outstanding Schools Trust Fund” to fund the program.30

Concurrently, the Missouri legislature passed Senate Bill 380, codified in Missouri Revised Statute § 143.105,31 which was “by far the most significant policy and tax change of the decade.”32 The revenue from the tax increase was designed to fund the Outstanding Schools Act and was accompanied by stringent accountability provisions in Missouri Revised Statutes §§ 167.241 and 167.131.33 The accountability provision in Section 167.131, the subject of the Turner suit, provides that,

(1) The board of education of each district in this state that does not maintain an accredited school pursuant to the authority of the state board of education to classify schools as established in section 161.092 shall pay the tuition of and provide transportation consistent with the provisions of section 167.241 for each pupil resident therein who attends an accredited school in another district of the same or an adjoining county. (2) The rate of tuition to be charged by the district attended and paid by the sending district is the per pupil cost of maintaining the district’s grade level grouping which includes the school attended . . . . Subject to the limitations of this section, each pupil shall be free to attend the public school of his or her choice.34
This accountability provision, among other provisions, was established to ensure that all of the districts in the state were held accountable for school performance and improvement under the Outstanding Schools Act.\textsuperscript{35} In drafting Section 167.131, the legislature removed a proposed portion after the last sentence in section two stating that, “[n]o school shall be required to admit any pupil.”\textsuperscript{36} Accordingly, the legislature deliberately did not give school districts discretion to refuse admission to students asserting their rights under Section 167.131.\textsuperscript{37} The accountability provisions were put under the umbrella of the Missouri Schools Improvement Program, which was also responsible for reviewing and accrediting the 522 districts in the state.\textsuperscript{38} The School Improvement Program is enforced statewide in order to guarantee all districts in the state are providing students with a certain level of education.\textsuperscript{39}

The Committee on Elementary and Secondary Education voted “do pass” on Senate Bill 380 by a fourteen to eleven vote.\textsuperscript{40} Although there was some opposition to the bill, the challengers of the bill were not concerned about the accountability provision in Section 167.131, but, instead, were concerned that the tax package accompanying the bill was too expensive and placed too great a burden on business.\textsuperscript{41} Additionally, opponents were concerned that the educational reforms in the bill would lead to testing of a “student’s values and attitudes rather than academic performance.”\textsuperscript{42} Proponents of the bill thought it was necessary “to promote adequacy and equity in funding Missouri’s Schools,” and many individuals and organizations testified in support of the bill, including the Missouri State Board of Education, the Cooperating School Districts of Kansas City and St. Louis, and the Missouri State Teacher’s Association.\textsuperscript{43} Therefore, the legislative history seems to indicate that there was no opposition to the specific accountability provision now codified in Section 167.131.\textsuperscript{44} Moreover, some of the very organizations that supported

\begin{itemize}
\item 35. § 160.500.
\item 37. See § 167.131.
\item 41. Id. at 411.
\item 42. Id.
\item 43. Id. at 410–11.
\item 44. See, e.g., id. at 403–11.
\end{itemize}
Senate Bill 380 in 1993 now oppose its enforcement. Those organizations either lacked the foresight to imagine a scenario where whole school districts could become unaccredited, or they have changed their position on Section 167.131 based on the public pressure surrounding *Turner*. In part, this change of position could be due to the fact that at that point in Missouri’s history only individual schools had lost accreditation, never an entire district. The removal of accreditation from SLPS in 2007 meant that Section 167.131 could take effect for the entire district, and students living throughout the City of St. Louis could transfer to adjoining accredited districts at the cost of SLPS. It is this landscape that gave rise to the *Turner* suit.

III. *TURNER v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF CLAYTON*

A. Procedural History

The Plaintiffs in *Turner* are parents who reside within the SLPS district, but whose children attend schools in the Clayton School District (“Clayton”) pursuant to tuition agreements. In June 2007, after the parents had entered into tuition agreements for the 2007-2008 school year, SLPS lost its accreditation from the state. Clayton subsequently declined to seek payment from SLPS for the students’ tuition as the parents requested. The issue on appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court was whether the plain language of Section 167.131 applies as written, requiring unaccredited school districts to pay the tuition costs of its students who choose to attend an accredited school in an adjoining district.


49. Id. at 663.

50. Id.

51. Id. at 662–63.
When the case was initially filed in St. Louis County, the circuit court entered an Amended Judgment concluding that Section 167.131 was not applicable to the issue presented in the case, and that there was no legal basis for Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory judgment. In so concluding, the circuit court granted the Clayton and St. Louis Public School districts’ motions for summary judgment.

Subsequently, the parents and their children raised several points on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri. They first asserted that Section 167.131 should apply to SLPS because a plain reading of the statute cannot support any other interpretation, and, second, that Senate Bill 781 did not preempt Section 167.131 as applied to SLPS because there was no conflict between the two provisions. Third, Appellants contended Section 167.151 did not limit their rights under Section 167.131 because the discretion given to districts to admit students under 167.151 was specifically revoked for students who asserted their rights under 167.131. Lastly, Appellants asserted the trial court misapplied Section 167.131 as the students resided within the unaccredited SLPS district and attended Clayton schools, thereby obligating Clayton to prepare special tuition bills for the students and requiring SLPS to pay those bills.

The Eastern District Court of Appeals held that having contractually obligated themselves to pay their students’ tuition, the Appellants could not rescind the contract. Furthermore, the court reasoned that the contract should be enforced as written because SLPS’ subsequent loss of accreditation did not affect the agreement. Consequently, the court found the case was governed by the contract between the parents and the school district, not Section 167.131, and Clayton was under no obligation to issue “Special Tuition Bills” to SLPS for the students’ tuition.

The court further opined that while SLPS had lost its accreditation, Section 167.131 makes no mention of an entire district losing its accreditation. Rather, the statute only refers to a board of education of each district that does not maintain an accredited school. The court reasoned, in dicta, that Section

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
59. Id. at *3–4.
60. Id. at *4.
61. Id. (‘The affidavit of Dr. Dan Edwards, Assistant Superintendent for St. Louis Public School District, affies that the ‘Saint Louis Public School District maintains, and during the 2007-
167.131 was not relevant as applied to this case because there were still some accredited schools within SLPS. However, the court deferred final decision of the case, “[b]ecause of the general interest and importance of the issues involved” to the Missouri Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 83.02.

1. Majority Opinion

The Missouri Supreme Court decided *Turner v. School District of Clayton* in a per curiam opinion on July 16, 2010. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri and remanded the case to the St. Louis County Circuit Court for implementation of its order. The new trial date was set for March 5, 2012.

The majority of the Missouri Supreme Court found that the plain and unambiguous language of Section 167.131 mandates that adjoining districts accept students from the unaccredited SLPS system should those students choose to enroll. However, in terms of the parents’ tuition agreements with Clayton, the court found that the contracts did not fail for lack of consideration, and the parents were not entitled to restitution of their tuition.

The Court’s analysis focused on statutory construction, district accreditation, the applicability of Senate Bill 781, the applicability of Section 167.020, and finally the meaning of Section 167.131. The court first reviewed its previous jurisprudence on statutory construction, determining the seminal rule of statutory construction is to “ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used and to consider the words used in their plain and ordinary meaning.” Applying this framework of statutory construction, the court resolved that, “Considering only the plain and ordinary language of §
167.131, the uncontested facts show that § 167.131 applies to [SLPS] under the circumstances present in this case.”

In responding to the assertion that Sections 167.020 and 167.131 needed to be reconciled, the court reasoned, “[i]f by any fair interpretation both statutes may stand, there is no repeal by implication and both statutes must be given their effect.” The court declined to further analyze the legislative history in order to glean wisdom for applying Section 167.131 because the chief rule of statutory interpretation is to “give effect to the legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute . . . .” Moreover, the court did not defer to the Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education’s interpretation of the statute because “[c]ourts do not look to agency interpretations when a statute is unambiguous.” Ultimately, the court determined the distinction between unaccreditation of one school versus unaccreditation of an entire district was immaterial under the statute because “[t]he fact that the entire [SLPS] District lost its accreditation in 2007 necessarily means that it no longer maintains any accredited schools.”

Accordingly, the court found the only relevant issue under Section 167.131 was whether the state board of education had classified the district as unaccredited.

Regarding the applicability of Senate Bill 781, Sections 162.1060 and 162.1100 were provisions contained in SB 781 that went into effect after SLPS’ desegregation order. The court determined Senate Bill 781 should not operate to exclude the application of Section 167.131 to SLPS because there is no textual conflict between the two laws; instead, Senate Bill 781 applies concurrently with Section 167.131. The court rejected the argument that the desegregation purpose of Section 162.1060, to create the urban voluntary transfer program, would be undermined by application of Section 167.131.

Additionally, the court rejected Clayton’s request to harmonize Sections 167.020 and 167.131 in order to make the “shall” in 167.131 a “may.” As discussed supra, the court found, “[t]he prior version of §167.131.2 provided ‘but no school shall be required to admit any pupil.’” The legislature

71. Id.
72. Id. at 667 (quoting Silcox v. Silcox, 6 S.W.3d 899, 903 (Mo. 1999) (en banc)).
73. Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 668.
74. Id. at 669 n.9 (citing Blue Springs Bowl v. Spradling, 551 S.W.2d. 596, 599–600 (Mo. 1977) (en banc)).
75. Id. at 665.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 666 n.4.
78. Id. at 667.
79. Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 666 n.6.
80. Id. at 668.
81. Id. at 669.
removed this language specifically taking away any discretion of the receiving school to deny admission under the circumstances of this case.82 Thus, the majority reasoned that if the legislature wanted Section 167.131 to be discretionary they would have left the language of the bill unchanged and not added mandatory language.83 Moreover, the majority found that “to the extent [the two statutes] conflict, the specific statute, [Section 167.131], prevails over the general statute, [Section 167.020].”84 Lastly, the majority found there was no need to look to Section 167.020 because the language of Section 167.131 is clear and unambiguous.85 The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case.86

2. Judge Breckenridge’s Opinion

Judge Breckenridge, joined by Judges Russell and Stith, concurred in part and dissented in part.87 Judge Breckenridge disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that Section 167.131 compelled Clayton to admit the students, and instead, reasoned that Section 167.020 gave Clayton discretion to decide whether to admit students.88 In addition, Judge Breckenridge argued that Sections 167.131 and 167.020 must be harmonized, as they are in conflict.89 If harmonized, Judge Breckenridge determined Section 167.020 does not exempt pupils seeking admission under Section 167.131 from the waiver requirements.90 Requiring a waiver means a school district, like Clayton, has discretion pursuant to Section 167.020 to decide whether to admit students seeking admission under Section 167.131.91 Further justifying this interpretation, Judge Breckenridge cited the Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education’s interpretation that school districts have discretion in admitting students residing in unaccredited schools under Section 167.131.92

82. Id. (citation omitted).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 668.
85. Turner, 318 S.W.3d. at 668–69.
86. Id. at 670; see discussion infra Part III.C.
87. Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 670.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 671.
90. Id. at 672; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 167.020 (2012) (explaining that when a nonresident pupil requests a waiver, the district may grant the request for a waiver of any requirement of subsection two or may reject the request for a waiver in which case the pupil shall not be allowed to register).
91. Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 673.
92. Id. at 674.
Judge Breckenridge expressed concern for the possible implications of enforcing Section 167.131 as a mandatory statute. Specifically, she reasoned that,

Under the majority’s interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions, school districts in St. Louis County would be required to accept pupils from the transitional school district even if the number of pupils seeking admittance exceeded their capacity or if St. Louis County school districts had difficulty collecting tuition payments from the transitional school district.

In this way, Judge Breckenridge indicated that her conclusion, unlike that of the majority, “presumes the legislature did not intend to enact an absurd law and favors a construction that avoids unjust or unreasonable results.” Therefore, the dissenting judges would have affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the Clayton School District.

**B. Turner’s Consistency with Prior Missouri Supreme Court Precedent**

The majority in *Turner* complied with prior Missouri Supreme Court precedent by interpreting Section 167.131 according to its plain and ordinary meaning. The *Turner* majority cited *State ex rel. Unnerstall v. Berkemeyer* as supplying the seminal rule of statutory construction in Missouri. *Berkemeyer* involved an intestate will governed by Missouri Revised Statute § 473.050. In that case, Judge Wolff, writing for a unanimous court, analyzed three main principles of statutory interpretation to arrive at the court’s conclusion. He wrote that, “[t]he primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words used in their plain and ordinary meaning.” Furthermore, the court “may review . . . earlier versions of the law, or examine the whole act to discern its evident purpose, or consider the problem the statute was enacted to remedy.” Lastly, Judge Wolff stated it is presumed “that the legislature did not insert verbiage or superfluous language

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93. *Id.* at 675.
94. *Id.*
95. *Id.* (quoting Care & Treatment of Schottel v. State, 159 S.W.3d. 856, 842 (Mo. 2005) (en banc)).
96. *Id.* at 676.
98. *Id.* at 665 (citing *State ex rel. Unnerstall v. Berkemeyer*, 298 S.W.3d 513, 519 (Mo. 2009) (en banc)).
100. *Id.* at 519.
101. *Id.* (citing *State ex rel. Nixon v. QuikTrip Corp.*, 133 S.W.3d 33, 37 (Mo. 2004) (en banc)).
102. *Id.* (quoting United Pharmacal Co. of Mo. v. Mo. Bd. of Pharmacy, 208 S.W.3d 907, 911-12 (Mo. 2006) (en banc)).
Using these principles, the court compared the precursor statutes to Section 473.050, and analyzed how the statute and its predecessors have historically been applied in order to clear up ambiguities of timing in the statute.

Several recent Missouri Supreme Court decisions also indicate that the court must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature from the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute’s language. Specifically, the court in *MC Development Co., LLC v. Central R-3 School District of St. Francois County* found that absent any ambiguity in a statute the court must read the statute in its “plain, ordinary and usual sense.” Therefore, the court’s recent case law pertaining to statutory construction indicates statutes should be interpreted based on their plain and ordinary meaning if they are unambiguous. *Turner* echoed these precedents in finding that the plain and ordinary language of Section 167.131 and the uncontested facts demonstrated that 167.131 applied to SLPS. Accordingly, the *Turner* majority complied with prior Missouri Supreme Court precedent in finding the unambiguous language of Section 167.131 must be interpreted based on its plain and ordinary meaning.


After the Missouri Supreme Court found Section 167.131 constitutional, the court remanded the case to the St. Louis County Circuit Court to
implement its order. Before trial, Clayton taxpayers joined with the Clayton School District as parties to the lawsuit, allowing a Hancock Amendment challenge to Section 167.131. The taxpayers challenged the constitutionality of Section 167.131 based on the impossibility of compliance defense associated with the Hancock Amendment. The circuit court sent down its order on May 1, 2012, holding that Section 167.131 is unconstitutional because it violates the Hancock Amendment. Breitenfeld appealed directly to the Missouri Supreme Court and oral argument in the case is scheduled for February 27, 2013.

IV. MANDATORY OPEN ENROLLMENT STATUTES ACROSS THE COUNTRY

Despite the current battle over Section 167.131, Missouri is not the only state that has enacted a mandatory, inter-district, open enrollment statute. Fourteen other states have enacted open enrollment statutes with varying degrees of similarity to Section 167.131. Analyzing how a few states have formulated and interpreted open enrollment statutes similar to Missouri’s statute is useful as the Missouri legislature reconsiders Section 167.131 in light of the Turner decision. Other states’ statutes vary in the degree of discretion given to receiving districts to set guidelines for transfer including: capacity, transportation, and funding among others. For example, in ten of the fourteen states the statute requires parents to provide transportation for the student to the border of the receiving district. As this could be an impediment to transfer for many low-income parents, nine states include provisions to reimburse low-income parents for transportation costs. Additionally, nine of the fourteen states allow the receiving district discretion to develop a policy of standards for acceptance of non-resident pupils, including capacity or financial hardship to the district. However, researchers

111. Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 670.
112. King-Willmann v. Webster Groves Sch. Dist., 361 S.W.3d 414, 416–17 (Mo. 2012), rev’d en banc (stating the Hancock Amendment prevents the state legislature from enacting an unfunded mandate, which can only be challenged by taxpayers).
114. Id. at 13.
116. JOINT COMM’N ON EDUC., supra note 10, at 2–9 (summarizing open enrollment statutes in the following states: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin).
117. Id. at 2.
118. Id. at 5–6.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 6–7.
have indicated that when receiving districts are allowed to determine capacity there are often minimal spaces left for open enrollment students—greatly diminishing the efficacy of an open enrollment statute.\textsuperscript{121} Lastly, the statutes vary the most in designating how to fund transfer students.\textsuperscript{122} Some states provide that the sending district must pay the receiving districts, while others provide that students will be counted in the attendance of the receiving district to increase the receiving district’s amount of state aid.\textsuperscript{123}

Minnesota enacted the earliest open enrollment statute in 1988 and Georgia enacted the most recent statute in 2009.\textsuperscript{124} While open enrollment is not a new concept, it is intensely debated as a possible means of education reform for failing schools across the country.\textsuperscript{125} There is still little empirical research regarding open enrollment because the variations in states’ open enrollment laws make comparative research difficult.\textsuperscript{126} The state statutes discussed herein are only those most similar to Missouri’s open enrollment statute, which have been interpreted by a court and can partially elucidate the statutory interpretation issues presented in Turner.

The Colorado Court of Appeals found in \textit{Bradshaw v. Cherry Creek School District} that statutes should be interpreted by giving the statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning.\textsuperscript{127} Thus, if the statute’s meaning is unambiguous the court should not look to legislative intent or other interpretive aids.\textsuperscript{128} Furthermore, the same court, a few years later, interpreted a statute

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{121} Lois André-Bechely, \textit{Public School Choice at the Intersection of Voluntary Integration and Not-So-Good Neighborhood Schools: Lessons from Parents’ Experiences}, 41 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 267, 281 (Apr. 2005) (“Before determining open-enrollment spaces, schools must accommodate resident students, students on continuing permits, magnet programs, all special education needs, and various other nonnegotiable programs. Consequently, some schools had no available space for open enrollment.”); Erin Dillon, \textit{Lost in Transit: Low-Income Students and Massachusetts’ Statewide School Choice Program}, EDUC. SECTOR (Sept. 5, 2008), http://www.educationsector.org/publications/lost-transit (noting that several affluent suburban districts surrounding Boston chose not to accept transfers and finding this consistent with other voluntary open enrollment programs—if it is an option, affluent suburban districts are less likely to participate).

\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Joint Comm’n on Educ., supra} note 10, at 7–9.

\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Id.} at 7–8 (addressing another state statute that provides that the receiving district will obtain the amount of money needed to educate a student in the sending district, unless it is more than the cost of tuition in the receiving district, in which case the extra money goes into a designated “School Choice Fund”).

\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Id.} at 13.

\textsuperscript{125} See Herrmann et al., \textit{supra} note 10, at 1 (“Although choice options are becoming more commonplace in the public education arena, their efficacy continues to be intensely debated.”).

\textsuperscript{126} See André-Bechely, \textit{supra} note 121, at 269; see also Dillon, \textit{supra} note 121, at 9.

\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Bradshaw v. Cherry Creek Sch. Dist. No. 5}, 98 P.3d 886, 889 (Colo. App. 2003) (citing Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30 (Colo. 2000)).

\textsuperscript{128} \textit{Id.}
involving inter-district transfers.\textsuperscript{129} When interpreting the statute the court indicated that, “only when the statute is ambiguous do we consider prior law, legislative history, the consequences of a particular construction, and the fundamental purpose of the statute.”\textsuperscript{130} Like the Missouri Supreme Court in \textit{Turner}, Colorado courts have given deference to legislative construction of an open enrollment statute, and interpreted the words of the statute in accordance with their plain and ordinary meaning.\textsuperscript{131}

In Connecticut, the state legislature enacted a mandatory, inter-district open enrollment statute in order to decrease racial and economic isolation in Connecticut’s inner cities.\textsuperscript{132} In \textit{Sheff v. O’Neil}, the Connecticut Superior Court enforced the open enrollment statute noting, “with the strong demand to attend Hartford public schools as evidenced by the 1,065 suburban students applying . . . the Reverse Choice program will likely be essential in reducing racial, ethnic, and economic isolation in the Hartford schools.”\textsuperscript{133} Thus, the Connecticut Superior Court found that the plain language of the statute gave effect to the legislative intent and the policy behind the statute.\textsuperscript{134}

In Iowa, the legislature enacted a mandatory open enrollment statute requiring sending school districts to pay the receiving districts the cost per pupil of educating a student in that district, including local real estate tax revenues.\textsuperscript{135} In \textit{Exira Community School District v. State}, the appellants challenged the constitutionality of the statute.\textsuperscript{136} In that case, the Iowa Supreme Court found that, “[i]f it chooses . . . the legislature can—without constitutional impediment—terminate a school district’s existence. And when the legislature enacted open enrollment legislation, it knew full well that its ultimate effect might mean the demise of some smaller schools.”\textsuperscript{137} Ultimately, the court found that it should not judge the wisdom of the legislature’s policy decision to create an open enrollment statute, but interpret the statute as it was written.\textsuperscript{138}


\textsuperscript{130} Id. at 481 (citing Branch v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 89 P.3d 496, 498 (Colo. App. 2003)).

\textsuperscript{131} See \textit{Turner v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton}, 318 S.W.3d 660, 670 (Mo. 2010) (en banc); \textit{Bradshaw}, 98 P.3d at 889; \textit{Ridgeview Classical Sch.}, 214 P.3d at 481.


\textsuperscript{133} Id. at *7.

\textsuperscript{134} See id. at *5.

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{Exira Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Iowa}, 512 N.W.2d 787, 792 (Iowa 1994).

\textsuperscript{136} Id.

\textsuperscript{137} Id. at 795.

\textsuperscript{138} Id.
Additionally, in South Dakota the state supreme court reasoned that the findings of the state board of education “reflect over-reliance on open enrollment in the Sioux Falls School District as a cure-all for all of the concerns raised by the Petitioners . . . if open enrollment were a panacea for all such concerns, the legislature would have repealed the boundary change statutes when it passed the open enrollment law. It did not do so.” Thus, the South Dakota Supreme Court found that the open enrollment statute could stand, but that it had to be read in conjunction with subsequent boundary change statutes implemented by the legislature.

Most of the case law in states that have similar open enrollment statutes indicates that the Missouri Supreme Court was correct in looking to the plain and ordinary meaning of Missouri’s open enrollment statute and in giving deference to the legislature’s policy determinations. Only the court in South Dakota reasoned that the open enrollment statute had to be read in conjunction with other statutes, but even this does not conflict with the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in Turner. The Missouri Supreme Court found that older statutes did not conflict with Section 167.131, and if they did then the legislature’s choice to replace a “may” with a “shall” was given deference as purposeful legislative intent. Therefore, the Missouri Supreme Court’s ruling in Turner was consistent with both its prior precedent and relevant case law in other states.

V. THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF TURNER AND POSSIBLE “TURNER FIXES”

Since the Missouri Supreme Court followed its prior precedent and other states’ relevant statutory analyses in interpreting Section 167.131 according to its plain and ordinary meaning in Turner, it properly applied the law in reaching its decision. However, analyzing the merits of the statute as policy is an entirely different and more complicated question. There are no simple solutions to this question, which partially explains why the Missouri state legislature has been unable to come up with a so-called “Turner fix.” With Kansas City Public Schools losing accreditation on January 1, 2012, the

139. Johnson v. Lennox Sch. Dist., 649 N.W.2d 617, 625 (S.D. 2002); see Yankton Ethanol, Inc. v. Vironment, Inc., 592 N.W.2d 596, 599 (S.D. 1999) (“There is a presumption against a construction which would render a statute ineffective or meaningless.”).
140. Johnson, 649 N.W.2d at 625.
141. See supra Part III.
142. See Johnson, 649 N.W.2d at 625; see also Yankton Ethanol Inc., 592 N.W.2d at 599.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 670.
number of unaccredited districts in Missouri rises along with the pressure to come up with a solution to the “Turner problem.” 147 This Section will analyze “Turner fixes” that have been proposed by Missouri legislators, and make recommendations regarding lasting solutions to failing schools and educational inequity in St. Louis.

Once Turner was remanded to the St. Louis County Circuit Court, the trial date for the case was postponed several times. 148 It was commonly understood that the court continued to postpone the trial date hoping the legislature would find a solution, as this is a traditionally legislative issue. 149 Despite extensive discussion regarding the Turner issue during the legislative sessions that ended in May of 2011 and 2012, the legislature has not found a tenable solution. 150 The pressure to produce a solution continues to increase, as parents seeking to enroll their children in county districts turn to the courts—filing two additional cases in Webster Groves 151 and the City of St. Louis 152 regarding enforcement of Section 167.131. Though controversial, the Turner decision has brought issues of educational inequality to the forefront of political discussion in the St. Louis area.

Ultimately, the Missouri legislature should retain Section 167.131 because it will force the entire St. Louis community to unite around the common goal of ensuring that all students have access to a quality education. In addition to retaining Section 167.131, the legislature should enact additional provisions increasing charter schools in the City of St. Louis and providing tax-credit

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147. Crouch, supra note 146.
149. See, e.g., Holland, supra note 46; Dale Singer, Lots of Talk, Little Action by Missouri Lawmakers on Education, ST. LOUIS BEACON (May 17, 2011), http://www.stlbeacon.org/issues-politics/95-Education/110374-lots-of-talk-little-action-by-missouri-lawmakers-on-education (stating that reportedly many of the legislators could not set aside their differences of opinion to come up with a bill that revised or removed Section 167.131).
150. Singer, supra note 149; see also Virginia Young, Ruling Derails Bills on Missouri Schools, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 7, 2012), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/education/ruling-derails-bills-on-missouri-schools/article_a338a4a-0f7d-5ffa-9f53-11e06679576f.html (explaining that when the legislature was close to a compromise regarding a “Turner fix” the St. Louis County Circuit Court handed down a judgment finding Section 167.131 unconstitutional, derailing any further efforts for compromise or reform).
151. Holland, supra note 46 (stating that St. Louis County Judge Wallace issued a writ of mandamus enforcing a city student’s right to attend school in Webster Groves pursuant to the Missouri Supreme Court’s ruling in Turner). The Missouri Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case holding that questions of material fact precluded judgment on the pleadings and the school district did not have standing to raise a Hancock Amendment defense to Section 167.131. King-Willmann v. Webster Groves Sch. Dist., 361 S.W.3d 414, 416–17 (Mo. 2012).
152. Crouch, supra note 146.
scholarships to students below a certain income level living in the SLPS district. In this way, the legislature can ensure every student in St. Louis, regardless of race or economic status, has access to a quality education now and in the future.

A. Proposed Solutions to the “Turner Problem”

Members of the Missouri legislature have proposed several possible solutions to what they have deemed the Turner issue. In spite of the legislature’s inability to compromise on any proposed “Turner fix,” there is a collective fear of an exodus of students from the city who are currently in both public and private schools into the adjoining county districts. The fear is that this potential exodus could bankrupt SLPS and cause a financial ripple effect for the state. Thus, many Missouri legislators seem to agree that an alternative to the current statute is needed, but they are unable to agree on what the alternative ought to entail. Several state representatives and senators from St. Louis County proposed the three bills discussed herein.

Representative Rick Stream from the suburban city of Kirkwood proposed House Bill 763 during a legislative session in 2011. The purpose of the Bill was “to repeal section 167.131, and to enact in lieu thereof one new section relating to school enrollment options for students from unaccredited districts . . . .” Specifically, this Bill would have given more discretion to receiving districts by allowing them to calculate the amount of tuition they should receive, establish criteria for admission of non-resident students, and limit transfers to students whose specific grade level had become unaccredited.

However, House Bill 763 would ultimately be ineffective for students trapped in failing city schools because it comes from a distinctly suburban perspective, and values giving admission discretion to county schools above ensuring that students living in the unaccredited SLPS district can attain a better education. The foundation of a mandatory, inter-district, open enrollment statute is that it is just that: mandatory. While several other states have capacity conditions on mandatory open enrollment, by giving receiving districts discretion to create admissions criteria, including capacity, House Bill

153. Id.
154. Holland, supra note 46.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Singer, supra note 149.
159. Id. at 1–2.
160. JOINT COMM’N ON EDUC., supra note 10, at 6–7.
763 would dramatically decrease the number of students allowed to transfer. Representative Stream likely included a discretionary component in his Bill because he represents the county interest of being able to control what outsiders come into the district and how many are allowed to come. Additionally, this Bill would give discretion to receiving districts, which would limit Hancock Amendment challenges to Section 167.131. Hancock Amendment challenges are based on the argument that if receiving school districts are forced to build more facilities and hire more teachers to accommodate the influx of students from unaccredited districts, the money that accompanies those students under the statute might not be enough to fund the needed changes. However, proponents of Section 167.131 argue that tuition money from the sending district, as required by the statute, would be sufficient to cover such costs. Regardless of the debate over funding, this proposed bill is stymied by the fundamental problem haunting the Turner debate: county districts do not want the burden of educating city children. This viewpoint espoused by county districts is not wholly unfounded, as education has always been a traditionally local concern over which local taxpayers want to keep control. Yet, the entire purpose of Section 167.131 is to make certain that students, even if they have the misfortune of living in an unaccredited district, have access to a good education. House Bill 763 would not help the students Section 167.131 was enacted to protect, and would, therefore, be ineffective.

161. See André-Bechely, supra note 121, at 281; Dillon, supra note 121 (explaining that if open enrollment is optional affluent suburban districts are less likely to participate); JOINT COMM’N ON EDUC., supra note 10, at 7 (citing Dillon).
162. See Singer, supra note 149.
164. See Crouch, supra note 146 (explaining that this fear has been confounded by a recent University of Missouri - St. Louis study speculating that 13,500 city children currently attending private and parochial schools would transfer to suburban schools); Kevin Murphy, Judge Says District Must Enroll City Student, WEBSTER-KIRKWOOD TIMES (July 22, 2011), http://www.websterkirkwoodtimes.com/Articles-i-2011-07-22-176110.114137-Judge-Says-District-Must-Enroll-City-Student.html.
166. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746–47 (1974) (finding it was improper to impose a multidistrict remedy for single-district de jure segregation in the absence of findings that the other included districts had failed to operate unitary school systems or had committed acts affecting segregation); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 101–02 (1995) (finding there were limits to inter-district remedies and to a court’s ability to craft remedies affecting individual school districts).
In addition, Representatives McNary, Dieckhaus, and Stream, among others, proposed House Bill 994, which also attempted to achieve a “Turner fix.” The purpose of this Bill was to repeal Section 167.131 and to add five new statutes in its place. The first alteration to the current form of Section 167.131 would be to accredit individual schools and districts separately. In effect, this would remove the current Turner issue because not every school in SLPS is unaccredited, although the district as a whole is unaccredited. Similar to Senator Cunningham’s proposal discussed infra, this Bill would allow an accredited district or cooperative association of districts to sponsor or operate a charter school in an unaccredited district. The bill would provide buildings for the expansion of charter schools from the pool of vacant buildings that has increased as SLPS’ enrollment has steadily decreased. Moreover, the bill creates a corporation, which would be in charge of coordinating transfers of students from an unaccredited district to an accredited one. The corporation would then be expected to publicize the open enrollment time frame and assign students to schools based on available seats and transportation needs. Finally, this Bill would provide vouchers to students living in an unaccredited district who choose not to attend one of the above types of public schools. Under this Bill, the schools accepting vouchers must not require religious classes or give scholarships based on membership in a religious institution, and the performance of students using a voucher must be measured by a national or state assessment. Despite support for this Bill, it was weighed down by divisive partisan issues such as vouchers.
and charter schools and did not gain widespread acceptance in the legislature.178

Senator Jane Cunningham, Executive Director of the Cooperating School Districts of Greater St. Louis Don Senti, and the Superintendent of the Special School District John Cary, also attempted to create a potential three-part solution to the Turner issue prior to the first legislative session of 2012.179 Cunningham then proposed the plan as Senate Bill 706 in 2012.180 The first component of the plan would give students living in an unaccredited district a tax-credit scholarship, up to the per pupil expenditure in their home district, to attend a private school.181 Senator Cunningham cites City Academy, a high-performing private school on St. Louis’ Northside, as an example of the type of school where the proposed scholarships could be used.182 The second provision of the plan would give county districts the ability to sponsor charter schools in the city, “either individually or under the umbrella of the Cooperating School Districts.”183 Third, county schools would have discretion to decide how many students from unaccredited districts they would accept based on current enrollment and desired class size, subject only to the approval of the Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education.184 Lastly, when Senator Cunningham proposed Senate Bill 706 to the legislature, she added a provision directing the Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education to establish a clearinghouse that would assist “students in unaccredited districts transfer to an accredited district, a charter school, a virtual school or a non-public school using a Passport scholarship.”185


179. See Singer, supra note 149; Young, supra note 45 (explaining that the three-part plan was subsequently proposed to the legislature by Cunningham, but contains all the components suggested by Cunningham, Senti, and Cary).


181. Id. at 2. (Senator Cunningham has titled the tax-credit scholarship the “Passport Scholarship Program”).


183. See Singer, supra note 149.

184. Id.

Senator Cunningham believes this compromise balances a city student’s right to an education and the county districts’ need to maintain control over local schools. The most controversial part of the plan is the tax-credit scholarship component because—to many members of the education establishment—it resembles vouchers that could be used for parochial schools as well as non-sectarian private schools. Secondarily, Senti indicated that school districts across the state feared charter schools would capture enrollment from their districts, and did not want to support that provision of the plan either. These concerns are not wholly unfounded and contribute to why this plan, as a whole, would be ineffective as a “Turner fix.”

Senate Bill 706 would ultimately be ineffective because the tax credit scholarships it outlines are not limited to families at a certain income level and are not limited to students who currently attend an unaccredited school. The bill only stipulates that the student must reside in the unaccredited district in order to receive a scholarship. Consequently, this provision does not target the population most in need of education scholarships because any parents—even those who already send their child to private school and have the means to continue doing so—would be able to take advantage of the tax-credit. However, providing tax credit scholarships specifically to low-income students in the city so they could attend a private school that best meets their needs would help improve access to quality educational options. Additionally, this proposed Bill, like House Bill 763, grants discretion to the receiving county districts to determine admissions criteria for accepting students from unaccredited districts. In making Section 167.131 discretionary, these proposals will dramatically decrease the efficacy of the statute and completely remove its strength as an accountability statute. Finally, the clearinghouse provision that Senator Cunningham added to her proposed bill would be a useful provision in ensuring that all students and parents are well informed about the accredited school choice options available to them. In this way, parents can make enrollment decisions in the best interest of their child with complete knowledge of the available options.

All of these proposals contain useful ideas that could potentially aid in providing quality educational options in the city and equalizing the disparity

186. See id.
187. See id; see also Young, supra note 45.
188. See Singer, supra note 14.
189. S.B. 706, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess., at 1 (Mo. 2012). (Senator Cunningham has dubbed the tax-credit scholarship the “Passport Scholarship Program”).
190. Id. at 2.
191. See id.
192. Id. at 6.
193. See André-Bechely, supra note 121, at 267; see also Dillon, supra note 121.
between city and county schools. However, there has to be enough political will to enact change and there must be solutions that are student-centered. A true solution to the problem of failing city schools will be a combination of some of the reforms being discussed, and a change in attitude from an “Us versus Them” mentality to a collective of county and city leaders acting in the best interest of all students.

B. Possible Lasting Solutions to Educational Inequity in St. Louis

All of the proposed Turner fixes share a common flaw: each proposal acquiesces to a repeal of Section 167.131. All of the proposed solutions began with representatives and senators representing county constituents. Although representing county interests is obviously not inherently negative, it can become negative when it comes at the cost of ensuring that city students, who have been marginalized for so long, have access to an excellent education. An effective way to rid St. Louis of the “Us versus Them” mentality that has existed since white flight began in the 1950s, is to put both the City and the County of St. Louis in an equal position of needing to guarantee all City students have access to an excellent education. Michelle Rhee, an education reform advocate and former Chancellor of Washington D.C. Public Schools, often quotes Warren Buffet’s advice to her about the fastest way to solve educational inequality in America: “Make private schools illegal and assign every child to a public school by random lottery.” By making this very simple and radical change, Buffet wisely reasons that all parents, both high and low-income, would be invested in making sure all schools were excellent because they would not know to which school their child could randomly be assigned. This reality of human nature contributes to the “Not in My Backyard” phenomenon.

So long as wealthy and relatively privileged parents can send their children away from failing schools—either by moving to the county or sending their student to a private school—there will never be an investment in the city schools that serve predominately poor and African-American students with low

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195. See Singer, supra note 149.
196. See Freivogel, supra note 20, at 210; see also DISTRICT REPORT CARD, supra note 22 (exhibiting extremely low achievement statistics indicating that students in SLPS continue to be marginalized).
197. See Kovarik, supra note 18.
199. See Boaz, supra note 198.
social capital. The last thing that parents who have moved to the county, to provide their child with a better education, want is to have the same problems they left in the city follow them to the county. County schools want to control the flow of open enrollment from the city because they do not want the burden of educating city children. The perception, which is not unfounded, is that city students bring with them problems from home, the potential of uninvolved parents, special education needs, poor nutrition, and all the costs associated with educating a child living in poverty. Consequently, county parents and students do not want these problems of the city ending up in their backyards—at their schools.

However, this isolationism comes at a cost. St. Louis was once a vibrant city with a thriving culture and a sizeable population. Now the population has fallen to 319,294 and the total population has decreased by over eight percent since 2000. St. Louis Mayor Francis Slay often cites statistics that young professionals are moving into the city at growing rates, but population leach continues to occur when those same professionals begin to have families with school-aged children. The city continues to lose population chiefly for the reason that it has a failing school system.


201. See Singer, supra note 14.

202. See Crouch, supra note 146 (quoting Education Commissioner Chris Nicastro stating, “[T]he challenges associated with educating the urban core—poverty, socioeconomic factors, family dysfunction, and so forth—will not be addressed simply by dispersing the children.”); see Mark R. Warren, Communities and Schools: A New View of Urban Education Reform, 75 HARV. EDUC. REV. 133, 134 (2005) (arguing it is difficult if not impossible for children to learn well if they “lack adequate housing, healthcare, nutrition, and safe and secure environments, or if their parents are experiencing stress because of their low wages and insecure employment . . . .”).

203. See Susan Saulny, Hopes for a Renaissance After Exodus in St. Louis, N.Y. TIMES (April 17, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/17/us/17stlouis.html?pagewanted=all (“From a peak of nearly 860,000 residents in 1950, St. Louis had lost more than half a million people by 2000, a depopulation not unlike the devastating postwar exodus from Detroit.”).


In the last fifteen years, there has been a movement to rebuild the city, but the vision of what St. Louis could be will never come to fruition if the county and city do not band together with similar initiative to fix the city school system. The “Us versus Them” mentality will not change to a collective mentality until the counties surrounding St. Louis are forced to contend with the problems of the city. Therefore, solving the “Turner problem” by repealing Section 167.131 or making it discretionary will not solve the problem of failing schools in the city, because it will mean that county residents can continue to turn a blind eye to the problems of the city. As the Warren Buffet philosophy indicates, the fastest way to get county residents involved in rebuilding the city schools is to make sure they are faced with the issues of the city in their backyards. Alternatively, the legislature could enact a statute that would unify St. Louis County and the City, solving many of the cities’ problems, including the unaccredited school system. Similar unification efforts between city and county have occurred in other places in America—including, Memphis and Shelby County and Indianapolis and Marion County—with differing degrees of incorporation and success. However, this reform seems to be the most threatening proposal of all, and is only nominally...
being discussed by city and county civic leaders, and is not considered a legitimate Turner solution by legislators.212

Ultimately, Section 167.131 should not be repealed, but supplemented with other statutory provisions that will ensure students in the city have access to an excellent education right now and in the future. No one contends that it is ideal for students to travel far from their homes to get an excellent education, thus, provisions must be enacted to ensure quality school choice options are available in the city.213 However, those options will not come to fruition overnight. Excellent charter school models often add one grade to the school each year to make certain their school model and student enrollment are sustainable.214 Charter schools sponsored by private organizations or the city or county schools districts should be encouraged and given legislative pathways, but they cannot be expected to become well-functioning schools immediately. When discussing an increase in the number of charter schools, it must also be coupled with a discussion of increased accountability.215 Charter schools, by design, have more freedom than public schools to innovate and compete with traditional public schools.216 However, with freedom must come the price of showing academic achievement within a few years after the charter school opens. If charter schools are not held immediately and directly accountable for student achievement by their authorizers and the district, there will be several more low-performing charter schools in the city—like the now defunct Imagine schools.217 There are already some positive examples of flourishing

212. See History of Unification Efforts, supra note 210 (reporting that St. Louis City Mayor Francis Slay and St. Louis County Executive Charlie Dooley are sympathetic to the idea, with Mayor Slay supporting the city being incorporated into the county as the 92nd municipality).

213. See Singer, supra note 149 (quoting then Rep. Tishaura Jones, who was a part of the voluntary transfer program between St. Louis and St. Louis County, stating, “I don’t want my son on a bus for an hour and a half each way. I don’t want city kids to go through what I went through just to get a good education. I know we can try to find solutions for local education in the city . . . .”).

214. See David Hunn, Model St. Louis School Meets its First Real Test, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (April 20, 2010), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/education/model-st-louis-school-meets-its-first-real-test/article_0487b6a4-bbec-54bf-a587-2284215b9741.html; see also JAY MATHEWS, WORK HARD. BE NICE.: HOW TWO INSPIRED TEACHERS CREATED THE MOST PROMISING SCHOOLS IN AMERICA 89, 112 (2009) (outlining the unique and successful Knowledge Is Power Program (KIPP) model, which is composed of a longer school day, longer school year, and building on one grade level a year).


charter schools in the city such as KIPP, St. Louis Charter School, and City Garden Montessori among others. 218 These schools can become a model for new charter schools entering the city.

In addition to increasing the number of available, well-functioning charter schools in the city there should be tax credits available for parents to send their child to a private school. 219 Although tax credits are politically volatile, the United States Supreme Court found that they did not violate the Establishment Clause in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris. 220 The scholarships at issue in Zelman were enacted to provide low-income, minority students who were trapped in the failing Cleveland City School District with access to a quality education. 221 Similar to SLPS, the Cleveland Public Schools have been among the worst performing schools in the nation for several decades. 222 The circumstances involved in Zelman are, thus, similar to the current education landscape in St. Louis, giving the Missouri legislature a precedent for enacting tax-credit scholarships to ensure low-income, minority students in the City of St. Louis have access to a quality education. 223 Moreover, it will take a combination of measures to ensure that every student living in the city has access to a quality education. 224 If city parents have the option to send their child to a county school, a charter school, a St. Louis public school, or a private school they will have many options to choose from to best meet the individual needs of their child. A student who needs the environment that a private school provides should not be foreclosed from attendance simply because his or her parents cannot afford it. There are several private schools in the city that cater to city


219. See S.B. 706, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess., at 2–3 (Mo. 2012) (demonstrating that tax credit scholarships are ultimately a useful portion of Cunningham’s proposed bill).

220. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002) (holding that the Ohio Pilot Scholarship Program, a program enacted for the valid secular purpose of providing educational assistance to poor children in a demonstrably failing public school system, did not violate the Establishment Clause).

221. Id. at 644 (“The majority of [the children in Cleveland Public Schools] are from low-income and minority families. Few of these families enjoy the means to send their children to any school other than an inner-city public school.”).

222. Id; see also supra Part I (discussing the problems facing St. Louis public education both historically and presently).


224. See Dale Singer, supra note 149 (detailing the various efforts across St. Louis relating to improving education).
students and also have impeccable student achievement records such as: City Academy and Crossroads College Preparatory School. Another benefit of combining several measures together is that SLPS will need to become a successful school system that produces high student achievement results or it will be forced out of existence. In the end, this result would not be because all of its students left the city for the county, but because they did not put student achievement first and could not compete for enrollment with a myriad of other entities.

By leaving Section 167.131 in place and enacting supplemental provisions students would have the opportunity to attain an excellent education right now and in the future. Students could immediately assert their rights under Section 167.131 to attend a high-performing school in the county. Additionally, the charter school provision would increase the amount of school choice options in the city and ensure those schools are held directly accountable for performance and given the freedom to innovate in order to directly meet the needs of city students. Lastly, the tax credit provision would guarantee that students who would not otherwise have access to a private education could attain one if it is the best option for their education. Although Turner has been controversial since it was handed down in 2010, the decision has forced city and county leaders to come together and try to create solutions to the education problems in the city. If Section 167.131 were to be repealed, that would no longer be true and the city would be as isolated as ever—facing the challenging problem of what to do for kids trapped in a failing school system. While some other states’ open enrollment statutes gave school districts discretion in admitting students, a discretionary open enrollment statute would not work in St. Louis because of its divided history and the extreme population and social-capital drain that has occurred in the city.

228. See Joseph P. Viteritti, et. al., supra note 216, at 143, 147.
229. See Singer, supra note 149 (summarizing the key aspects of Cunningham’s bill, including the establishment of the Passport Scholarship Program, which provides financial assistance for non-public elementary or secondary schools to students in unaccredited public school districts).
230. See id.
231. See discussion supra Parts I, V.B.
Retaining Section 167.131 also serves the critical function of making sure that all students living in the city can gain a quality education now. While it is unquestionably important to invest in the long-term success and infrastructure of SLPS, that investment does not help students who are getting an inadequate education right now. Although the United States Supreme Court in *San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez* determined that a certain level of education was not a constitutional right,\(^\text{232}\) there is a question of whether a student living in an unaccredited district is gaining an education at all. The Missouri State Constitution provides that every student is entitled to a free, public education.\(^\text{233}\) It is arguable whether students in SLPS, where dropping out is more common than going to college and only 10 percent of students perform at the national average on the ACT, are gaining an education at all.\(^\text{234}\) It is imperative that legislators leave Section 167.131 in place, in addition to enacting long-term solutions, in order to fulfill their constitutional duty to students in SLPS.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in *Turner v. School District of Clayton* has changed the education debate and landscape in St. Louis. St. Louis’ history of racial and economic segregation necessitates a drastic solution to the dismal education system in the city. It is unclear whether the legislature that enacted Section 167.131 in 1993 knew exactly how the statute could function almost twenty years later.\(^\text{235}\) But it is clear that the legislature intended the statute to be an accountability provision guaranteeing that Missouri schools used the large amount of money they received from the state to actually produce student achievement results.\(^\text{236}\) Consequently, the Missouri Supreme Court interpreted Section 167.131 consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute, showing fidelity to its prior precedent, and, as a result, gave effect to the true legislative intent behind the statute.\(^\text{237}\) The court’s interpretation of Section 167.131 was further proven to be correct based on an analysis of open enrollment statutes in other states and subsequent case law interpretation.\(^\text{238}\) As open enrollment statutes vary greatly from state to state, there is no one way for Missouri to enact or enforce an open


\(^{233}\) MO. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a).

\(^{234}\) See *supra* text accompanying notes 22–26.

\(^{235}\) See *supra* Part II.

\(^{236}\) Id.

\(^{237}\) See *supra* Parts II, III.

\(^{238}\) See *supra* Part V.
enrollment statute.\(^{239}\) Thus, Missouri is free to craft and enforce a statute that best meets its unique needs.

Ultimately, the needs of students in SLPS are best met by ensuring that they can attain a quality education right now, no longer being deprived of their right to an education merely by virtue of where they live. In order to make sure every student in St. Louis has access to a quality education, the Missouri legislature should retain Section 167.131 as it is written, allowing students in the city to transfer to adjoining accredited districts.\(^{240}\) Retaining the statute would ensure students in the city are not deprived of their rights now, but it must also be coupled with provisions providing quality education options in the future.\(^{241}\) Therefore, increasing quality charter schools in the city and enacting tax-credit scholarships will provide students with options beyond the traditional public school in the city.\(^{242}\) The traditional public schools in SLPS will then be forced to either compete with the increasing number of quality schools in the city or they will become—as they currently fear—bankrupt.\(^{243}\) Ultimately, the controversy surrounding Turner and the resulting education debate in the city and counties of St. Louis provides a unique opportunity for the city and counties to pool talent, money, time, and political will to solve the education problems that have faced St. Louis for decades. Yet, without a breakdown of the “Not in My Backyard” phenomenon, city students will continue to be isolated and forgotten in a failing school system, and the problems that have plagued St. Louis since the 1950s will continue to haunt its future.

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\(^{239}\) See discussion supra Part V.A.

\(^{240}\) See discussion supra Part V.B.

\(^{241}\) Id.

\(^{242}\) Id.

\(^{243}\) Id.

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