

2014

# The Supreme Court and the Rehabilitative Ideal

Chad W. Flanders

*Saint Louis University School of Law*

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/faculty>



Part of the [Supreme Court of the United States Commons](#)

---

## Recommended Citation

Flanders, Chad, *The Supreme Court and the Rehabilitative Ideal* (2014).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Commons. For more information, please contact [erika.cohn@slu.edu](mailto:erika.cohn@slu.edu), [ingah.daviscrawford@slu.edu](mailto:ingah.daviscrawford@slu.edu).

## THE SUPREME COURT AND THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL

*Chad Flanders*\*

### Abstract

*Graham v. Florida was a watershed decision, not least because of the centrality of the so-called “rehabilitative ideal” to its holding that life in prison for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes was cruel and unusual. The Court’s emphasis on rehabilitation was surprising both in terms of the Court’s previous decisions on punishment, in which rehabilitation was barely included as a “purpose of punishment,” but also in terms of the history of academic and legislative skepticism if not hostility toward the idea of rehabilitation (which includes two recently decided sentencing cases, Tapia and Pepper). Courts and commentators have struggled to make sense of both the meaning and the scope of Graham’s rehabilitative holding. Their struggle is one about defining how (and whether) rehabilitation should play any substantial role in sentencing.*

*My essay places Graham in the context of the recent history of rehabilitation, and views its attempt to “rehabilitate” rehabilitation in light of that history. The rehabilitative ideal encompasses not just one model, but three: the mostly discredited model of rehabilitation as treatment, a more modest model of rehabilitation as training, and an older model of rehabilitation as reform. Both the language and the result of Graham show it to be squarely in the tradition of the third model, where rehabilitation is not something the state provides, but something the offender is supposed to undergo, through a process of reflection, remorse, and atonement. Rehabilitation as reform is notable because it is compatible with a suspicion that prison in general is a bad place for rehabilitation and that it is unlikely that the state can do anything to positively aid the offender in reforming. At best, the state must get out of the way. Whether we want to extend Graham or reject it depends on whether we find its ideal of rehabilitation as reform appealing.*

---

\* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University. Visiting Professor, DePaul University School of Law, 2013-2014. Thanks to Zach Hoskins for references, to William Berry, Will Baude, Eric Miller, John Inazu, and Chris Bradley for comments on an early draft, and to Stephanie Fuller for her usual superb research assistance. A faculty workshop at St. Louis University School of Law provided invaluable insights, and I am especially grateful to Lynn Branham for her wise feedback on that occasion and in conversations afterward.

<b>I. Introduction</b> .....	2
<b>II. Three Models of Rehabilitation</b> .....	5
<b>A. Rehabilitation as Treatment</b> .....	7
<b>B. Rehabilitation as Training</b> .....	12
<b>C. Rehabilitation as Moral Reform</b> .....	14
<b>III. The Rehabilitative Ideal in Practice I: Statutory Interpretation</b> .....	17
<b>A. The Rejection of Rehabilitation: <i>Tapia</i></b> .....	18
<b>B. <i>Pepper</i> and the Reaffirmation of the Ideal</b> .....	20
<b>C. Reconciling <i>Tapia</i> and <i>Pepper</i></b> .....	22
<b>IV. The Rehabilitative Ideal in Practice II: The Constitution</b> .....	24
<b>A. <i>Graham</i>'s Rehabilitative Holding</b> .....	25
<b>B. <i>Graham</i>'s Two Models of Rehabilitation</b> .....	26
<b>C. Applying <i>Graham</i> and Rehabilitation as Moral Reform</b> .....	32
<b>1. Shorter and Lesser Punishments</b> .....	33
<b>2. Prison Conditions</b> .....	35
<b>3. Adults</b> .....	37
<b>V. Conclusion</b> .....	39

## I. INTRODUCTION

*Graham v. Florida*,<sup>1</sup> the Supreme Court's 2010 decision finding a life without parole sentence for a non-homicide crime committed by a juvenile "cruel and unusual" has rightly been recognized as a "watershed."<sup>2</sup> A major focus of the extensive commentary on the case has been on its application of the "evolving standards of decency" test to a punishment outside of the death penalty, and to whether *Graham* might apply also to adults.<sup>3</sup> Equally important in *Graham*, but subject to much less critical

<sup>1</sup> 560 U.S. 48 (2010).

<sup>2</sup> E.g., Richard A Bierschbach, *Proportionality and Parole* 160 PENN L. REV. 1745, 1746 (2012) (noting commentators hailed *Graham* as a "watershed"); *Id.* at n. 2 (collecting articles calling *Graham* a "landmark").

<sup>3</sup> See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, *Graham Lets the Sun Shine In*, 23 FED. SENT. REP. 79-80 (2010) ("Does *Graham* invite reconsideration of the Court's extraordinary defenses embodied in its proportionality review of all noncapital sanctions, including term-of-years sentences short of life imprisonment [?] ....Does *Graham* provide greater protection to adults as well as juveniles?"); Rachel Barkow, *Categorizing Graham* 23 FED. SENT. REP. 49 (2010) (asking how whether and how far the Court will extend *Graham* to non-capital cases); Eva S. Nilson, *From Harmelin to Graham—Justice Kennedy Stakes Out a Path to Proportional Punishment* 23 FED. SENT. REP. 67 (2010) (discussing what *Graham* might mean for the future of proportionality analysis and individualized sentencing).

Other commentators have speculated on whether *Graham* means the Court is abandoning some or all of its "evolving standards of decency" test. See Youngjae Lee, *The*

attention, is the central role that the rehabilitative theory of punishment plays in its holding both as a matter of rhetoric and as a matter of substance. A sentence to imprisonment without the possibility of parole for Graham, the Court explained, would foresear “altogether the rehabilitative ideal,” which was unacceptable.<sup>4</sup> “Life without the possibility of parole,” Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court, “gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no hope.”<sup>5</sup> “This,” he concluded, “the Eighth Amendment does not permit” at least when dealing with those under the age of eighteen.<sup>6</sup> The state must give “defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”<sup>7</sup>

What is rehabilitation, and what does it mean to have it as an ideal? Francis Allen in his major work on the subject, *The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal* (from which Justice Kennedy consciously or unconsciously borrowed the phrase<sup>8</sup>) noted that rehabilitation was an inherently complex term, filled with ambiguities.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, as the title to Allen books reveals, rehabilitation was, as early as the 1970s, being abandoned as primary justification for punishment and viewed with skepticism as *any* part of the justification for punishment.<sup>10</sup> Kennedy’s use of rehabilitation was not merely surprising in the context of a Supreme Court opinion, where more attention is usually paid to retributive and

---

*Purposes of Punishment Test*, 23 FED. SENT. REP. 58 (2010); John Stinneford, *Evolving Away from Evolving Standards of Decency* 23 FED. SENT. REP. 87 (2010); Ian T. Farrell, *Abandoning Objective Indicia*, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 302 (2013).

<sup>4</sup> Graham, at 74.

<sup>5</sup> *Id.* at 79.

<sup>6</sup> *Id.*

<sup>7</sup> *Id.* at 75.

<sup>8</sup> The first use seems to be in Francis Allen, *Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal*, 50 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 226, 230 (1959); see also FRANCIS A. ALLEN, *THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE* 25-41 (1964) and ALLEN, *infra* note 9; see also Fred Cohen, *Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Idea: The View from Mempa v. Rhay*, 47 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1968).

<sup>9</sup> FRANCIS A. ALLEN, *THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL* 2 (1981) (*hereinafter* ALLEN, *DECLINE*) (“The rehabilitative ideal concept requires description and application. It is not surprising to discover that the phrase embraces great complexity and, indeed, encompasses widely different and even conflicting kinds of social policies.”); *id.* at 52 (“Ambiguities afflict the very notion of what rehabilitation consists.”). See more recently, *United States v. Williams*, 793 F.3d 1065-1066 (2d Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.) (“[C]ritically the defendant misses the ambiguity in the term “rehabilitation” [more precisely, “correctional rehabilitation”] as used in discussions of criminal punishment.”).

<sup>10</sup> ALLEN, *DECLINE*, *supra* note 7, at 5-7 (explaining the nearly “unchallenged sway of the rehabilitative ideal” in the mid-twentieth century). *Cp.* FRANCIS T. CULLEN, *REAFFIRMING REHABILITATION* (2d., 2012).

deterrent theories;<sup>11</sup> it was surprising in the context of punishment theory and practice more generally.<sup>12</sup> The punishment literature and the literature on *Graham* has not yet come to grips the full implication of the *Graham* decision because it has incompletely understood the meanings of “rehabilitation.”<sup>13</sup>

My paper gives an overview of the Supreme Court’s engagement with the “rehabilitative ideal” in *Graham* as well as two other recent cases. In the first part, I sketch three broad models of that ideal: *rehabilitation as treatment*, *rehabilitation as training*, and *rehabilitation as reform*. The first (“rehabilitation as treatment”) is, in its most familiar variant, the most ambitious. It suggests nothing less than a complete overhaul of both the theory and practice of criminal justice by redefining crime as a “sickness” and punishment as a “cure.”<sup>14</sup> It is this version that has suffered the greatest decline over the past half century even though it did (at one point) strongly influence Supreme Court doctrine.<sup>15</sup> The second model, rehabilitation as training, is less ambitious, and for perhaps that reason, has endured as a part of sentencing.<sup>16</sup> It too, however, has been the object of vigorous critique. The third model, rehabilitation as reform, has been prominent in philosophical discussions of punishment and less on display in legal doctrine and practice.<sup>17</sup> But it is this model, however, that may best explain the use of rehabilitative theory in *Graham*.<sup>18</sup>

The second and third parts of my essay move from rehabilitative theory to legal practice. In two cases decided in the same year (2011), *United States v. Tapia*<sup>19</sup> and *United States v. Pepper*,<sup>20</sup> the Supreme Court has considered the use of rehabilitation in sentencing under the Sentencing

---

<sup>11</sup> See e.g., *Harmelin v. Michigan*, 501 U.S. 957, 989 (1991) (mentioning rehabilitation only in passing, and dismissively).

<sup>12</sup> Casebooks and treatises by and large treat rehabilitation as at best a failure in practice and at worst a failed ideal. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN GARVEY, *CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW* 37 (6<sup>th</sup> ed., 2012) (“The conventional wisdom is that past efforts to rehabilitate convicted offenders were mostly unsuccessful.”); *Id* at 38 (“Even assuming that rehabilitative measures work, can you think of any moral objection to rehabilitation as a justification for imposing punishment?”).

<sup>13</sup> For early efforts to grasp the meaning of *Graham* which I am indebted to, see Alice Ristroph, *Hope, Imprisonment, and the Constitution*, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 75 (2010); Cara H. Drinan, *Graham on the Ground*, 87 WASH. L. REV. 51 (2012).

<sup>14</sup> See *infra* Part II.A

<sup>15</sup> See e.g., *Williams v. New York*, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).

<sup>16</sup> See *infra* Part II.B.

<sup>17</sup> See *infra* Part II.C

<sup>18</sup> See *infra* Part IV.C

<sup>19</sup> 131 S.Ct. 2382 (2011).

<sup>20</sup> 131 S.Ct. 1229 (2011).

Reform Act.<sup>21</sup> The cases point in superficially opposite directions (*Tapia* opposes rehabilitation as a factor to be used in extending a prison term;<sup>22</sup> *Pepper* allows consideration of rehabilitation in resentencing<sup>23</sup>) but both testify to Court's wrestling with the role (both positive and negative) rehabilitation should have in sentencing. These cases are important, but have been almost universally ignored in the literature on sentencing.<sup>24</sup> Ultimately, they are testament to the prevailing *anti*-rehabilitative trend in both legislative and judicial fora.

The third part of the essay is devoted almost wholly to *Graham*, the first Supreme Court case in decades to rely heavily on rehabilitative theory in its reasoning. It is no exaggeration to say that without depending on rehabilitation, the Court could not have concluded the way it did in *Graham*. Rehabilitation is the key to the *Graham* opinion. But Justice Kennedy's opinion is frustratingly unclear as to what he means by rehabilitation or the rehabilitative ideal.<sup>25</sup> While some elements of Kennedy's opinion imply rehabilitation as treatment, and his concern that juveniles in prison have access to vocational and education programs suggests rehabilitation as training, the best interpretation of rehabilitation in *Graham* is as a case that treats rehabilitation as a kind of moral reform. Understanding better what kind of rehabilitation Kennedy was after in *Graham* helps us better understand how to apply *Graham* in future cases as well as showing us the limitations of that decision. *Graham*'s model of rehabilitation as reform is in many ways a conservative vision (in several senses of that word) but not one without potential to change sentencing in ways small and large.<sup>26</sup>

## II. THREE MODELS OF REHABILITATION

Rehabilitation has a long history as a part of punishment theory but my purpose here is not to recount that history. Others have done it ably, charting rehabilitation's rise in the mid-twentieth century and its rapid

---

<sup>21</sup> *Tapia*, at 2390; *Pepper*, at 1247.

<sup>22</sup> See *Tapia*, at 2391 ("Section 3582(a) precludes sentencing courts from imposing or lengthening a prison term to promote an offender's rehabilitation.").

<sup>23</sup> See *Pepper*, at 1241 ("[A] district court may consider evidence of a defendant's rehabilitation since his prior sentencing.").

<sup>24</sup> The main exception is Professor Paul Berman's posts on *Sentencing Law and Policy*. See, e.g., *The Interesting Issues Raised by Tapia*, SENTENCING LAW & POLICY (Dec. 10, 2010); *Pepper Providing a Bit of Spice to SCOTUS Sentencing Docket*, SENTENCING LAW & POLICY (Aug. 26, 2010).

<sup>25</sup> See Part III, *infra*.

<sup>26</sup> See *infra* Part IV.C

decline into near irrelevance.<sup>27</sup> Early rehabilitationists had high hopes that punishment and prison could change into something different than they were, but those hopes swiftly came crashing down: empiricists questioned whether rehabilitation could ever work (offenders sent to prison seemed not to benefit from vocational and educational programs: when released from prison, they fell back into a life of crime); theorists attacked what it saw as rehabilitation's unappealing presuppositions (that prisoners were not evil, but merely "sick" and needed to be held indefinitely so they could be "cured" by the state). By the 1980s, if not sooner, many were wondering how we could have *ever* thought prison could be a place for rehabilitation rather than purely a place for suffering and punishment. In broad outline, the shape of the story should be familiar and parts of the history will inevitably creep into my analysis.

What I want to do here is to isolate three models of the rehabilitative ideal which have had particular influence over the last hundred or so years in America law. In order to understand why the rehabilitative ideal was in decline, we need to be straight that the rehabilitative ideal was not a single thing; it was plural. Moreover, some of the rehabilitative models were more modest than others and each model came in different varieties as well, which also ran from the modest to the ambitious. The models are not completely discrete, of course, and at points they can blend into one another. Indeed, in some respects, the models are not mutually exclusive. Nonetheless, I believe they are separate enough to be called separate "models" because in rough outline they have distinguishing features and characteristics. I start with the model that, in the minds of many, was almost thoroughly discredited in theory and which never really took hold in practice. At the same time, traces of its influence continue to this day.<sup>28</sup>

---

<sup>27</sup> See generally, ALLEN, DECLINE, *supra* note 7; KATE STITH & JOSE CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998) (*hereinafter* STITH, FEAR), ch. 1 ("Sentencing Reform in Historical Perspective"); Douglas Berman, *Conceptualizing Booker*, 38 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 387 (2006); Meghan Ryan, *Science and the New Rehabilitation*, 5-16 (unpublished manuscript, Aug. 8, 2012); Michael Vitiello, *Reconsidering Rehabilitation*, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 1011 (1991).

A very brief version of the story figures importantly in Justice Roberts' dissent in *Miller*. *Miller v. Alabama*, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2478 (2012). ("In this case, there is little doubt about the direction of society's evolution: For most of the 20th century, American sentencing practices emphasized rehabilitation of the offender and the availability of parole. But by the 1980's, outcry against repeat offenders, broad disaffection with the rehabilitative model, and other factors led many legislatures to reduce or eliminate the possibility of parole, imposing longer sentences in order to punish criminals and prevent them from committing more crimes.")

<sup>28</sup> See *infra* Part III.B (discussion of *Pepper* and its relation to certain tenets of rehabilitation as treatment).

### A. Rehabilitation as Treatment

At its most extreme, the rehabilitative ideal was not merely to supplement or revise punishment, it was to *replace* punishment. “Crime” and “punishment” were crude, primitive ideas<sup>29</sup> and had “no place in the scientific vocabulary.”<sup>30</sup> The more humane and enlightened perspective was to treat crime as an illness that needed to be treated. Jailers and judges were out; doctors and therapists were in.<sup>31</sup> They had the necessary expertise to guide a person away from his criminal, antisocial behavior and to reenter society: they could diagnosis the causes of the illness and recommend a course of action.<sup>32</sup> “The management of such [penal] institutions much be scientific,” one rehabilitation as treatment theorist wrote “and the care of their inmates must be scientific, since a grave crime is always a manifestation of the pathological condition of the individual.”<sup>33</sup>

On the therapeutic version of rehabilitation, crime was a most of all a signal to the criminological “experts” that a person needed not punishment, but treatment. – in the way that a rash or a cold might be a signal to doctors that care was needed.<sup>34</sup> How much treatment, and for how long, was up to the expert. When treatment was completed, he “prisoner, like the doctor’s other patients, should emerge ... a different person, differently equipped, differently functioning, and headed in a different direction from when he began the treatment.”<sup>35</sup> At the limit, if the offender could not successfully reenter society, experts would be able to treat him in a clinical setting to allow him a comfortable and protective (if forever confined) existence.

---

<sup>29</sup> Karl Menninger, *Love Against Hate*, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (Stanely E. Grupp ed. 1971) at 248; *see also id.* at 245.

<sup>30</sup> Karl Menninger, *Therapy, Not Punishment* 47 in PUNISHMENT AND THE DEATH PENALTY, THE CURRENT DEBATE (Robert M. Baird & Stuard E. Rosenbaum, eds., 1995).

<sup>31</sup> *See* President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society* 163 (USGSP0 1967) (analogizing criminal offenders to patients).

<sup>32</sup> *See, e.g.*, Henry Weihofen, *Punishment and Treatment: Rehabilitation* in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (Stanely E. Grupp ed. 1971) at 259 (For the rehabilitative ideal, “Human behavior is the product of antecedent causes. These causes can be identified, and it is the function of the scientists to discover and describe them. Knowledge of the antecedents of human behavior is essential for scientific control of that behavior.”); Herbert Morris, *Persons and Punishment*, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (Stanely E. Grupp ed. 1971) at 82 (discussing rehabilitation as treatment).

<sup>33</sup> Enrico Ferri, *The Positive School of Criminology*, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (Stanely E. Grupp ed. 1971) at 236.

<sup>34</sup> Menninger, *Love Against Hate*, *supra* note 25, at 246 (“I would say that according to the prevalent understanding of the words, crime is *not* a disease. Neither is it an illness, although I think it *should* be! It *should* be treated, and it could be, but mostly isn’t”).

<sup>35</sup> *Id.* at 246-47.



The therapeutic ideal of rehabilitation seemed to many to be naively optimistic in its assumptions: that the causes of crime could be diagnosed, that a cure can be administered, and that we could do away with “punitiveness” of punishment.<sup>36</sup> We are much less sanguine now.<sup>37</sup> But philosophers and policy-makers responding to rehabilitation as treatment at the time (and they were legion) saw something much more sinister; they did not object to rehabilitation as treatment as impractical. They rejected the ideal of rehabilitation as treatment altogether *qua* ideal.<sup>38</sup> They saw a worldview that treated human beings less as agents as more as patients who could be hospitalized or imprisoned and “treated” indefinitely not for the safety of society, but supposedly “for their own good.”

In addition, there was something dehumanizing about being told that your crime was not a free act but instead a sickness. Not only was this factually incorrect (criminals had not “come down” with anything<sup>39</sup>), it was dangerous. Novels such as *Clockwork Orange* and *One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest* described the frightful implications of a society run by experts where one’s freedom depending on convincing doctors and nurses that you had been successfully “cured.”<sup>40</sup> There was something simpler and clearer, if not more ennobling, about saying that one was being punished because one deserved it (it was a matter of justice) or that society needed to lock you up to protect itself.<sup>41</sup> These theories did not carry with them the implication that you were somehow diseased or sick and in need of a doctor’s care. They treated you as a person: rehabilitation as treatment, by contrast, was “not a response to a person who is at fault. We respond to an individual, not because of what he has done, but because of some condition

---

<sup>36</sup> See, e.g., *Shepard v. Taylor*, 556 F.2d 648, 650 (2d Cir. 1977) (“The instant controversy arises out of the recent tendency to reject the so-called ‘rehabilitative ideal’ as a relic of an earlier, more optimistic, era and to return to traditional criteria of retribution and deterrence in punishing juvenile offenders.”).

<sup>37</sup> See the analysis of the optimism of early rehabilitative theories in ALLEN, *DECLINE*, *supra* note 7, ch. 1.

<sup>38</sup> For powerful philosophical criticism about the assumptions and prescriptions of rehabilitation as treatment, see, *inter alia*, Richard Wasserstrom, *Punishment v. Rehabilitation* 51 in *PUNISHMENT AND THE DEATH PENALTY, THE CURRENT DEBATE* (Robert M. Baird & Stuard E. Rosenbaum, eds., 1995); C.S. Lewis, *The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment*, in *THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT* (Stanley E. Grupp ed. 1971) at 301; Herbert Morris, *Persons and Punishment*, in *id.* at 76.

<sup>39</sup> E.g., MARVIN FRANKEL, *CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER* 40 (1973) (“Many convicted criminals ... are not driven by, or ‘acting out,’ neurotic or psychotic impulses. Instead, they have coldly and deliberately figured the odds ...”).

<sup>40</sup> See generally ANTHONY BURGESS, *CLOCKWORK ORANGE* (1962); KEN KESEY, *ONE FLEW OVER THE CUCKOO’S NEST* (1962). For a more philosophical version of this worry, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, *DISCIPLINE & PUNISH* (1975).

<sup>41</sup> Lewis, *supra* note 34, at 307-308.

from which he is suffering.”<sup>42</sup>

However aggressively rehabilitation as treatment was attacked in theory (and it seems clear that in the minds of most people that it has been thoroughly defeated), it left its mark on Supreme Court doctrine. In the 1949 case *Williams v. New York*, the Supreme Court not only agreed with but seemed to embrace the idea that punishment had to be tailored to the criminal offender, or “individualized.”<sup>43</sup> The idea was straight from the literature on rehabilitation as treatment:<sup>44</sup> the effective diagnosis is one that treats the person and his disease; there could be no “one size fits all” prescription, because each person’s need and propensity for rehabilitation differed.<sup>45</sup> The statute at issue in the case, the Court said, “emphasize[d] a prevalent modern philosophy of penology that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime.”<sup>46</sup> “The belief no longer prevails,” the Court announced, as if ringing out an older, less enlightened era “that every offense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past life and habits of a particular offender.”<sup>47</sup>

Moreover, for rehabilitation as treatment, the prescription should be made by an expert, using all the relevant information the expert could gather, taking into consideration “not only static and presently observable factors, but dynamic and historical factors, and factors of environmental interaction and change.”<sup>48</sup> The expert would look into “the future of correction, re-education, and prevention.”<sup>49</sup> For the Supreme Court, the expert were sentencing judges and parole officers,<sup>50</sup> and in *Williams*, the Court maintained that the judge had to have access to a full sentencing report (including, but not limited to, information about the crime the

---

<sup>42</sup> Herbert Morris, *Persons and Punishment*, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (Stanely E. Grupp ed. 1971) at 83.

<sup>43</sup> *Williams v. New York*, 377 U.S. 241; *United States v. Grayson*, 438 U.S. 41 (1978); *Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex*, 442 U.S. 1 (1979). I am indebted to Berman’s account of all these cases in the discussion that follows. Berman, *Conceptualizing Booker*, *supra* note 24, at 388-393.

<sup>44</sup> Henry Weihofen, *Punishment and Treatment: Rehabilitation* in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (Stanely E. Grupp ed. 1971) at 257 (“A rehabilitative approach is necessarily an individual approach”).

<sup>45</sup> *Id.*

<sup>46</sup> *Id.* at 248

<sup>47</sup> *Id.*

<sup>48</sup> Menninger, *Therapy*, *supra* note 26, at 46.

<sup>49</sup> *Id.*

<sup>50</sup> On the pure rehabilitation as treatment model, judges would eventually surrender the sentencing role entirely to experts. Menninger, *Therapy*, *supra* note 26, at 47; STITH, FEAR at 17, 20. Judges with full information (e.g., what was contained in a pre-sentencing report) were a second-best option. Karl Menninger, *Love Against Hate*, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (Stanely E. Grupp ed. 1971) at 244; Sheldon Glueck, *Principles of a Rational Penal Code* in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (Stanely E. Grupp ed. 1971) at 279.

offender was being punished for) in order to make a suitable recommendation as to punishment. The report would include such information about the convicted person's "past life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities."<sup>51</sup>

The Court underlined that the reason why the judge needed this information was so that he could recommend a punishment that would best serve to rehabilitate and reform him. A "strong motivating force" for individualizing punishment, the Court wrote, "has been the belief that, by careful study of the lives and personalities of convicted offenders, many could be less severely punished and restored sooner to complete freedom and useful citizenship."<sup>52</sup> In a note, the Court favorably cited a prominent rehabilitation as treatment proponent<sup>53</sup> and declared in the text of the opinion that "Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence."<sup>54</sup> In order to serve the goals of rehabilitation and reform, judges needed to have the freedom to range beyond facts about the offense, in order to individually tailor sentences.<sup>55</sup> The Supreme Court in *Williams* was signing on, at least in part, to the rehabilitation as treatment program.<sup>56</sup> It would reaffirm its support again over the years.<sup>57</sup>

The fact that *Williams* tied individualization in sentencing to rehabilitative goals is important, because individualization is not intrinsically tied to rehabilitation. Individual tailoring can be backward-looking and retributive or forward-looking and rehabilitative. If the judge is

---

<sup>51</sup> 337 U.S. at 245.

<sup>52</sup> *Id.* at 249.

<sup>53</sup> *See id.* at n.13 ("It should be obvious that a proper [sentencing] . . . involves a study of each case upon an individual basis . . . Is the criminal a man so constituted and so habituated to war upon society that there is little or no real hope that he ever can be anything other than a menace to society – or is he obviously amenable to reformation?") (quoting SHELDON GLUECK, *PROBATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE* 133 (1933)).

<sup>54</sup> *Id.* at 248.

<sup>55</sup> *See also* Grayson, at 46-47 (addressing need for "informed judgment" concerning potential for rehabilitation); Greenholtz. It seems somewhat ironic that the Court in *Williams* was affirming a *death* sentence, justified along rehabilitative lines. But it may be that some are beyond rehabilitation, and so deserve death. It may also be that death *could* induce some to reform, at least in the short time that they have left.

<sup>56</sup> Berman, *Conceptualizing Booker*, *supra* note 24, at 389 ("In 1949, the Supreme Court constitutionalized [the rehabilitative] approach to sentencing in *Williams*..."); TAMASAK WICHARAYA, *SIMPLE THEORY, HARD REALITY: THE IMPACT OF SENTENCING REFORM ON COURTS, PRISONS, AND CRIME* 30 (1995) ("Penal policy in the therapeutic state was even endorsed by the United States Supreme Court").

<sup>57</sup> *See e.g.*, Grayson, 438 U.S. at 41; Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 1; *see generally* Berman, *supra* note 56, at 392 (describing later opinions in which the Supreme Court reaffirmed the connection between individualization and rehabilitation).

looking at details the offender (details which even may be beyond the crime he was convicted of) about to find out what he *deserves* as his punishment, then the judge's individualizing is backward-looking: he is trying to fit the offender to the right amount of deserved retributive punishment. The Court has used this model in recent cases, including one involving juvenile sentencing.<sup>58</sup>

But if the judge is using those same details to determine how much rehabilitation the offender needs – as well as his fitness for rehabilitation – the judge's individualizing is forward looking. He is trying to fit the offender to the right kind of “cure,” given the offender's situation. It was with this kind of ideal in mind that the *Williams* Court favorably cited rehabilitation as a goal of punishment. It is evident, too, in the Court's emphasis on the judge not just finding a just punishment, but also an “enlightened one,” and why the judge needed information that went beyond the information supplied by the guilty verdict.<sup>59</sup>

Individual tailoring for rehabilitation lies somewhere on a continuum between individualization for retribution (individualization that is backward looking) and the rehabilitation as treatment model's ideal, which is fully indefinite sentences and not merely indeterminate ones.<sup>60</sup> On the rehabilitation as treatment model, it is not enough to simply make a prospective judgment about someone's ability to be cured, but an ongoing one. No, the sentence must be continually reevaluated, and “the convicted offender would be detained indefinitely pending a decision as to whether and how and when to reintroduce him successfully into society.”<sup>61</sup> Those who are cured can be released; for those who do not respond to treatment, we must provide for their “indefinitely continued confinement.”<sup>62</sup> The experts in the rehabilitation as treatment model could not be chained to any guidelines or other limitations as to how long sentences could be.

---

<sup>58</sup> See *infra* Part IV.C at note 162.

<sup>59</sup> *Id.* at 390-91.

<sup>60</sup> By indefinite sentencing, I mean to indicate an in principle indefinite sentence; an indeterminate sentence can be confined within a specific range, or be subject to a maximum. See Sheldon Glueck, *Principles of a Rational Penal Code* in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (Stanely E. Grupp ed. 1971) at 291; *United States v. Watts*, 519 U.S. 148, 165 (1997) (Stevens J., dissenting) (*Williams* was a case that dealt with “the exercise of the sentencing judge's discretion within the range authorized by law, rather than with rules defining the range within which discretion may be exercised.”).

<sup>61</sup> Menninger, *Therapy*, *supra* note 26, at 44; Ferri, *The Positive School*, *supra* note 29, at 236 (“We maintain that congenital or pathological criminals cannot be locked up for a definite term in any institution, but should remain there until they are adapted for the normal life of society.”).

<sup>62</sup> Menninger, *Therapy*, *supra* note 26, at 45.

### *B. Rehabilitation as Training*

Rehabilitation as treatment wanted a paradigm shift in how we thought of crime and punishment, a shift that the Supreme Court at least partially endorsed in *Williams* and its progeny.<sup>63</sup> At the limit, the shift led some to wonder whether rehabilitation as treatment was a theory of punishment at all, and instead was a theory of what to put *in place* of punishment.<sup>64</sup> But rehabilitation has over the years also taken on a more hum-drum connotation, which is far from the radical ambitious of rehabilitation as treatment. What I will call “rehabilitation as training” emphasized not a cure for crime, but rather piecemeal efforts at the betterment of inmates through vocational training and education or by drug treatment. The goal was not that the inmate be totally healed of his criminological tendencies (whatever that would mean) but that he become more fit to reenter society as a productive and contributing member. He would be prepared to find a job upon release, or be able to enter and maintain a stable relationship, or simply be more equipped to cope with day-to-day life. For juvenile offenders, such programs could include “trade training in metal and woodwork . . . summer camp with work and recreational programs which keep the boys out of doors . . . [and] agriculture and stock raising.”<sup>65</sup>

Sentences on the rehabilitation as training view would (like those made according to the rehabilitation as treatment view) still would need to be individualized, to an extent. We would need to discover what training programs would be appropriate for the offender, and this required having a particularized knowledge of his background and his capacities. The rehabilitation as training model, in short, kept the focus on individualized punishment for the benefit of the offender but shifted the *form* of rehabilitation from therapy and treatment to training. The training might be expected to make the defendant a productive member of society, or at least get him to stop committing crimes (or, preferably both).<sup>66</sup> It did not involve

---

<sup>63</sup> See *infra* I.B.

<sup>64</sup> WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW (5<sup>th</sup> ed., 2010) (“It is perhaps not entirely correct to call this treatment “punishment,” as the emphasis is away from making him suffer and in the direction of making his life better and more pleasant.”).

<sup>65</sup> *United States v. Won Cho*, 730 F.2d 1260, 1275-76 (9th Cir. 1984) (“In enacting the Youth Corrections Act of 1950, Congress envisioned a rehabilitative program that included ‘trade training in metal and woodwork . . . summer camp with work and recreational programs which keep the boys out of doors . . . [and] agriculture and stock raising.’”) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., *reprinted in* 1950 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 3983, 3987).

<sup>66</sup> *United States v. Williams*, 793 F.3d at 1065-1066 (Rehabilitation “often has rather utopian overtones—easing the defendant’s transition to community life, making him a

treating him as a patient in any sustained way: even the person in drug treatment was not “sick,” but just needed help getting off his feet.<sup>67</sup>

Nearly all versions of rehabilitation as training had their wings clipped in the second half of the twentieth Century. In a hugely influential essay,<sup>68</sup> Robert Martinson surveyed over 200 studies regarding the effects of various training programs in prison. What he found was that, in the phrase that was to become famous “nothing worked”: *no* training program seemed to be effective in decreasing recidivism rates.<sup>69</sup> “With few and isolated exceptions,” Martinson wrote, “the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism.”<sup>70</sup> If the goal of training was to get inmates to be able to deal successfully in the real world, then the failure to prevent recidivism was a serious indictment of rehabilitation as training. It meant that time in training programs was doing nothing to curb the behavior that got offenders in trouble in the first place. Prison with rehabilitation thrown in was not making anyone better and prison might have even been making them *worse*.<sup>71</sup>

The model of rehabilitation as training subsequently became even more modest. It did not hold out the purpose of punishment was training, as in: we send people to prison so that they can enroll in vocational and educational training. Instead, it became the idea that *if* offenders were going to be in prison anyway, then it could not hurt to also give them training. It might not help, either, but it was an acceptable alternative to doing nothing. The purpose of punishment may not be rehabilitation (as the rehabilitation as treatment people believed, and as some of the more

---

productive, law-abiding member of society. ... A more modest conception of rehabilitation, however, is that a defendant is rehabilitated when he ceases committing crimes, at least crimes of the gravity of the crime for which he was convicted, whether or not he becomes a productive member of society.”).

<sup>67</sup> An assumption that provides the background for the *Tapia* decision. See *infra* Part III.B. See also *Powell v. Texas* 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (rejecting idea of alcoholism as a “disease”).

<sup>68</sup> There is considerable debate over whether the influence of this essay is justified, and whether the essay truly did conclude what people said it did; that it *did* have an influence, and that influence contributed to the decline of the rehabilitative ideal, is nearly undisputed.

<sup>69</sup> See also ALLEN, *DECLINE*, *supra* note 7, at 57.

<sup>70</sup> Robert Martinson, *What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform*, PUB. INT. 22, 25 (Spring 1973) (emphasis omitted).

<sup>71</sup> *But see* *United States v. Hopkins*, 531 F.2d 576 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“The conclusions of those who have critically examined programs implemented during the rise of the era of the ‘rehabilitative ideal’ with regard to their efficacy in reducing recidivism and tendency to be used to justify substantial encroachments on liberty should be carefully considered in our rethinking of the intended goals of our system of criminal justice. Although one cannot help but be disillusioned by such failures, it is important not to give up all hope. These failures may be attributable, at least in part, to the dearth of resources committed to making rehabilitative programs in institutions work, and the often haphazard manner by which such programs are implemented.”).

optimistic rehabilitation as training advocates proposed), but it could be a place where some rehabilitation might occur. The fact that rehabilitation doesn't work all that well shouldn't be a deterrent to having rehabilitation at all. As the Court put it in *Greenholtz*, "The fact that anticipations and hopes for rehabilitation programs have fallen far short of expectations of a generation ago need not lead states to abandon hopes for those objectives."<sup>72</sup> Maybe rehabilitation programs worked, even if they didn't work "spectacularly."<sup>73</sup>

In his classic opinion in *Bergman v. United States*, Judge Marvin Frankel gave clear form to the emerging wisdom about rehabilitation as training. "[T]his Court," Frankel wrote, "shares the growing understanding that no one should ever be sent to prison *for rehabilitation*."<sup>74</sup> Nonetheless, "[i]f someone must be imprisoned – for other, valid reasons – we should seek to make rehabilitative resources available to him or her."<sup>75</sup> Rehabilitation could remain a goal and a resource for those already in prison, but it could no longer be *the* goal of punishment,<sup>76</sup> a position that would later become codified.<sup>77</sup>

### C. Rehabilitation as Moral Reform

There is a third model of rehabilitation that is important to point out, and its ambitions lie somewhere in between rehabilitation as treatment and rehabilitation as training. Rehabilitation as reform, as I shall call it, can be helpfully compared and contrasted with rehabilitation as treatment. Like rehabilitation as treatment, rehabilitation as reform emphasizes not just making the offender a fitter, more productive member of society, but in fundamentally changing him. Unlike rehabilitation as treatment, however, this change is not along the lines of a medical paradigm where the offender is sick and needs to be cured. Rather, the offender needs moral education: he needs to learn that what he has done was wrong, and to (at least) feel

<sup>72</sup> 442 U.S., at 13.

<sup>73</sup> See JOEL SAMAHA, *CRIMINAL JUSTICE* 500 (7th ed. 2006).

<sup>74</sup> *United States v. Bergman*, 416 F.Supp. 496, 499 (S.D.N.Y.1976).

<sup>75</sup> *Id.*

<sup>76</sup> *See id.* ("[T]he goal of rehabilitation cannot fairly serve in itself as grounds for the sentence to confinement."). *See also* *Greenholtz*, at 13-14 ("The objective of rehabilitating convicted persons to be useful, law-abiding members of society can remain a goal no matter how disappointing the progress. But it will not contribute to these desirable objectives to invite or encourage a continuing state of adversary relations between society and the inmate.").

<sup>77</sup> *See, e.g.*, 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (2006) ("The Commission shall insure that the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or providing the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.").

remorse over it. The offender is not supposed just to “fit in,” he is supposed to become almost a different person, a “reformed” person through a process of moral reflection. The idea of rehabilitation as reform has not figured much in recent jurisprudence (the exception to this, I will argue, is *Graham*) although it has recently enjoyed a renewed vogue in moral and political theory.<sup>78</sup>

The idea of rehabilitation as moral reform is in fact a very old idea, if not the oldest, association between punishment and rehabilitation.<sup>79</sup> It is at least as old as the penitentiary, where convicts were meant to go and, in solitude, reflect on their wrongs and show penance for them.<sup>80</sup> We punish with the hope that this will induce the offender to reform; but punishment is only the necessary condition for this moral reform, it is not a sufficient one. In the phrasing of Walter Moberly, rehabilitation as reform is not about reform *while* punishment, but reform *by* punishing. “Many thinkers who speak of the State’s duty to reform *by punishing* really mean a duty to reform *as well as* to punish. ... But such improvement is not due to the penal aspects of prison life. On the contrary, it is achieved in spite of them, if at all.”<sup>81</sup> Rehabilitation as training might view rehabilitation as something that goes on *during* punishment, but this is not the vision of rehabilitation as reform. Reform is supposed to come about *by being punished*. “Only the latter idea,” writes Hastings Rashdall, “should be thought as accepting reform as a goal of punishment.”<sup>82</sup>

It is not obvious how this reform was supposed to happen. Perhaps being punished was enough to induce in the offender feelings of remorse

---

<sup>78</sup> For good recent statements see Zachary Hoskins, *Punishment, Contempt, and the Prospect of Moral Reform*, CRIM. J. ETHICS (March 2013); Steven Sverdlik, *Punishment and Reform* (2012), available at

[http://digitalrepository.smu.edu/hum\\_sci\\_philosophy\\_research/1](http://digitalrepository.smu.edu/hum_sci_philosophy_research/1). See also WALTER MOBERLY, THE ETHICS OF PUNISHMENT (1968); Jean Hampton, *The Moral Education Theory of Punishment*, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 208 (1984) and ANTONY DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY (2001); Herbert Morris, *A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment* in WHY PUNISH? HOW MUCH? 179 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011).

<sup>79</sup> It arguably is present in Plato. Plato, *Punishment as Cure*, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT (Gertrud Ezorsky ed. 1977) at 37; J.E. McTaggart, *Hegel’s Theory of Punishment* in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT (Gertrud Ezorsky ed. 1977) at 40.

<sup>80</sup> See the discussion by Stith and Cabranes of the “civic ideal of reformation through punishment” in STITH, FEAR at 15 (“Associated most prominently with the Pennsylvania Quaker physician Benjamin Rush and his friend Benjamin Franklin, the ideal of personal reformation was at the heart of the movement to transform existing penal institutions into more humane institutions of treatment and reform.”); see also DAVID ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM (1971).

<sup>81</sup> WALTER MOBERLY, THE ETHICS OF PUNISHMENT 123 (1968).

<sup>82</sup> HASTINGS RASHDALL, 1 THE THEORY OF GOOD AND EVIL 292 (1924).



and repentance.<sup>83</sup> Perhaps it was through being isolated from outside, corrupting influences.<sup>84</sup> Or perhaps it was a little of both. As de Beaumont and de Toqueville explained in their survey of American prisons:

Thrown into solitude [the prisoner] reflects. Placed alone, in view of this crime, he learns to hate it; and if his soul be not yet surfeited with crime, and thus have lost all taste for anything better, it is in solitude, where remorse will come to assail him. ... Can there be a combination more powerful for reform than that of a prison which hands over the prisoner to all the trials of solitude, leads him through reflection to remorse, through religion to hope?<sup>85</sup>

For rehabilitation as reform, other people (judges, jailors) cannot themselves directly cause moral reform. Doctors and experts cannot do it, nor can vocational counselors or psychologists, although perhaps they can help at the margins. Training may be a good way to show you have reformed, but it is possible to be well-trained but not morally reformed. You could be an excellent worker or student, but a bad person. Only your own efforts, the hard work of reflection, can lead you to remorse, repentance, and hope.

The model of rehabilitation as reform in its expectation of what the prisoner was supposed to achieve rivals rehabilitation as treatment in its ambition. Your time in prison was meant to *cure* you, not in the sense that you were sick and now you are well, but in the sense that you were morally corrupt and now you are morally pure (or more pure). In some more aggressive versions, the very purpose of punishment is that it can induce this reform: we punish you so that you will reform yourself. In a less ambitious version, rehabilitation as moral reform requires that prison should not hinder the goal of moral reform (where punishment might be justified on other grounds).<sup>86</sup> At minimum, prison could not be a place where you came out brutalized and degraded.<sup>87</sup>

In either its more or less ambitious versions, however, the goal of moral reform is fundamentally incompatible with rehabilitation as treatment. The therapeutic model dispenses with remorse and regret (do we feel guilty for having a cold or for having gout?) and places the prisoner in

---

<sup>83</sup> As emphasized by McTaggart, *supra* note 68, at 51.

<sup>84</sup> See generally D. ROTHMAN, *THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM* 71 (1971).

<sup>85</sup> Gustave de Beaumont & Alexis de Tocqueville, *ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE* 55, 84 (1883).

<sup>86</sup> See Hoskins, *supra* note 67, at 11 (punishment should not undermine prospects for reform).

<sup>87</sup> Morris, *A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment*, *supra* note 78, at 158.

the hands of a doctor. Moral reform, by contrast, requires that the offender accept his responsibility and to strive to atone for it; he undergoes a kind of “secular penance.”<sup>88</sup> In this respect, moral reform is often tied to retributivism, but it is, I believe, distinct from it. Retribution at its core says that people deserve to be punished.<sup>89</sup> It says nothing about whether those who are punished believe that they are responsible or that they should show remorse for what they have done.<sup>90</sup> Moral reform, by contrast, requires these things, and indeed may require that punishment should cease after moral reform has been achieved.<sup>91</sup>

### III. THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL IN PRACTICE I: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

I have already mentioned how rehabilitation in some of its guises has appeared in older federal and Supreme Court cases. But discussions about the meaning of rehabilitation have played a significant role in two recent cases besides *Graham*, although the focus in these cases was on the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) and its interpretation and use of rehabilitation.<sup>92</sup> Nonetheless, in *Tapia v. United States* and *United States v. Pepper* (both decided in 2012), the Supreme Court made more general, almost philosophical, statements about the meaning of rehabilitation. Interestingly, the statements in the two cases seem to directly be at odds with one another (*Tapia* seems anti- the rehabilitative ideal; *Pepper* pro-). Whether the competing statements can be reconciled in terms of a larger principle is the focus of the last section of this part.

The two cases also form an important backdrop for my reading of *Graham* despite the fact that they were decided after *Graham*. Indeed, they form a bridge between the history of the rehabilitative ideal and its present reality. Parts of that ideal continue to be in play in the Court’s

---

<sup>88</sup> R.A. Duff, *Penance, Punishment, and the Limits of Community* in WHY PUNISH? HOW MUCH? 179 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011).

<sup>89</sup> E.g., MICHAEL MOORE, *PLACING BLAME* (1991).

<sup>90</sup> Characterizing punishment is a “reformatory enterprise,” Duff, *supra* note 89 at 179, seems fundamentally different than viewing it as a way of giving out “just deserts.” At best, it may be a condition of punishment being “reformatory” that it is only given to those who deserve it.

<sup>91</sup> *Contra* Duff, *supra* note 67. It may be thought that so-called shaming punishments might induce a type of moral reform; I am not sure this is correct. At least, it is an open question whether shaming serves more to degrade the offender than to inspire him to reform himself. It is, however, also an open question whether *prison* is all in all less degrading than shaming punishments. For my reflections on this, see Flanders, *Shame and the Meanings of Punishment*, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 609 (2006).

<sup>92</sup> For background on the SRA, see STITH, *FEAR*, ch. 2 (“The Invention of the Sentencing Guidelines”).

jurisprudence, but mostly the Court is acting against a background of pronounced hostility to rehabilitation: a hostility that was codified in the SRA, but that the Court also seems to share. How *Graham* could emphasize the ideal of rehabilitation in this context is addressed in the next Part.

### A. *The Rejection of Rehabilitation: Tapia*

*Tapia* concerned the sentencing of Alexander Tapia, who was convicted by a jury for being an illegal immigrant into the United States for financial gain.<sup>93</sup> At sentencing, the judge gave Tapia 51 months in prison, but was ambiguous as to the reasons *why* she was being sentenced to that particular term. According to the sentencing judge, the sentence for Tapia had “to be sufficient to provided needed correctional treatment, and here I think the needed correction treatment is the 500 Drug Program.” The judge went on: “Here I have to say that one of the factors that—I am going to impose a 51-month sentence ... and one of the factors that affects this is the need to provide treatment. In other words so she is in long enough to get the 500 Hour Drug Program, number one.”<sup>94</sup> In other words, the sentencing judge seemed to be indicating that one of the main reasons (if not the main reason) that Tapia was being given 51 months was so that she would be eligible for drug treatment.<sup>95</sup> If drug treatment had not been possible, or not available, Tapia would have gotten a lesser sentence. The Court found that the trial judge had erred in extending Tapia’s sentence in order that she be able to receive drug treatment, and remanded her case to the 9th Circuit to determine whether Tapia’s failure to object to her punishment at sentencing meant she was without any remedy.

Read narrowly, *Tapia* is an opinion about statutory construction, in particular whether Section 3582(a) of the Sentencing Reform Act made a punishment that was imposed, in part or in whole, for the sake of a prisoner’s rehabilitation permissible. That section, in relevant part, provided that the court, “in determining whether to impose a term of imprisonment, and, if a term of imprisonment is to be imposed, in determining the length of the term” should recognize that “imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.”<sup>96</sup> Justice Kagan, writing for the Court, interpreted this to mean that a sentencing judge could not impose *or* increase a convicted person’s

---

<sup>93</sup> *Tapia*, at 2383.

<sup>94</sup> *Id.* at 2386.

<sup>95</sup> The concurrence disagreed with this assessment. *See id.* (Sotomayor, J., and Alito, J., concurring).

<sup>96</sup> *Id.*

sentence in order to advance the goal of rehabilitation. Much like Judge Frankel's position in the *Bergman* case, the Sentencing Reform Act allowed consideration of rehabilitation once a punishment of imprisonment had been determined on other grounds, but not in the formulation of the length of imprisonment or even whether imprisonment was appropriate.<sup>97</sup>

Rehabilitation might be appropriate in choosing a punishment other than imprisonment, that is, in rejecting prison as an option.<sup>98</sup> But it could not be the basis of choosing imprisonment over other alternatives or (more importantly for the *Tapia* case) deciding on a longer term of imprisonment.

But the Court sweeps more broadly in construing the Sentencing Reform Act, construing it as wholly rejecting almost *any* except the most modest version of the rehabilitative ideal. Again, the Court is only interpreting a statute not giving its own independent judgment of rehabilitation, but the emphasis on the SRA's repudiation of rehabilitation is instructive. Quoting from and relying on its decision in *Mistretta*, the Court noted that sentencing prior to the SRA was "premised on a faith in rehabilitation."<sup>99</sup> That faith required that judges and other correctional officers be permitted to base "their respective sentencing and release decisions upon their own assessments of the offender's amenability to rehabilitation."<sup>100</sup> A prisoner was to stay in prison until he had shown that he could be safely reenter society, that is, that he had been rehabilitated. Accordingly, release "often coincided with 'the successful completing of certain vocation, educational, and counseling programs within the prisons.'"<sup>101</sup> But this model "fell into disfavor" not only because it resulting in sentencing disparities, but more fundamentally, because many began to doubt that prison and prison programs could reliably rehabilitate offenders (and that officials could tell when prisoners had been successfully rehabilitated).<sup>102</sup>

In other words, according to the *Tapia* Court, the SRA effectively repudiated *Williams*, at least when it came to imprisoning offenders, and by doing so pushed courts to move beyond rehabilitation as treatment (and its reliance on expert judgment and indeterminate sentencing) and even rehabilitation as training (at least on any strong version of that model). Determinate sentencing, and not individualized sentences, was now the

---

<sup>97</sup> *United States v. Mogel*, 956 F.2d 1555, 1563 (11th Cir.) ("Rehabilitative considerations have been declared irrelevant for purposes of deciding whether or not to impose a prison sentence and, if so, what prison sentence to impose."), *cert. denied*, 506 U.S. 857 (1992).

<sup>98</sup> Indeed, the statute could be read as positively *encouraging* options other than prison if one had rehabilitation in mind as a goal.

<sup>99</sup> *Tapia*, at 2386 (citing *Mistretta v. United States*, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989)).

<sup>100</sup> *Id.* (quoting *Mistretta*, 488 U.S. at 363).

<sup>101</sup> *Id.* at 2386-87 (quoting S.Rep. No. 98-225, p. 40 (1983)).

<sup>102</sup> *Id.* at 2387.

order of the day: judges were constrained in picking and choosing punishment based on facts about the offender, and about his capacity for rehabilitation. Rehabilitative training and treatment could go on in prison but it could not be treated as a goal of punishment; they were things that could occur only *after* an appropriate punishment had been fixed. Even then, there was little guarantee that any “vocational, educational, and counseling programs” within prison would be successful. If Congress wanted courts to be able to mandate rehabilitation as training in prison, the Court noted, it would have given them the power to *impose* training or drug treatment on offenders in prison but it notably did not give them that power. Courts can only “recommend” training and treatment for offenders who are to be imprisoned, and Justice Kagan, in an aside, encouraged them to do so.<sup>103</sup> But they cannot require it.<sup>104</sup>

### B. *Pepper and the Reaffirmation of the Ideal*

Surprisingly, in the same term as *Tapia*, the Court reaffirmed its holding in *Williams* in terms that were almost as sweeping as *Tapia*’s rejection of the rehabilitative ideal. *Pepper v. United States* involved a unique set of facts: Jason Pepper had pled guilty to a conspiracy to distribute more than 500 grams of methamphetamine.<sup>105</sup> He was sentenced to a 24 month term in prison, an almost 75 percent departure from the normal sentencing range, and five years of supervised release.<sup>106</sup> The Government appealed the sentence,<sup>107</sup> and two years after the original sentencing decision, Pepper’s original sentence was reversed and remanded by the Eighth Circuit for resentencing.<sup>108</sup> In the meantime, Pepper served his 24 month prison term and began a period of supervised release.<sup>109</sup> At his resentencing hearing in 2006, Pepper and several witnesses testified that he had, *inter alia*, completed a 500 hour drug program,<sup>110</sup> no longer was abusing drugs, had enrolled in college (and was getting straight As), had a part-time job, and had reconciled with his family.

The district court again sentenced Pepper to 24 months, relying on

---

<sup>103</sup> *Id.* (“So the sentencing court here did nothing wrong—and probably something very right—in trying to get *Tapia* into an effective drug treatment program.”).

<sup>104</sup> After *Tapia* was decided, a circuit split quickly developed on its meaning regarding a revocation of supervised release. See Paul Berman, *Quick Circuit Split on Tapia’s Impact For Supervised Release*, SENTENCING LAW & POLICY (July 20, 2011).

<sup>105</sup> *Pepper*, at 1236.

<sup>106</sup> *Id.* at 1242.

<sup>107</sup> *Id.* at 1237.

<sup>108</sup> *Id.*

<sup>109</sup> *Id.* at 1232.

<sup>110</sup> *Id.* Interestingly, this seems to be the same program that was at issue in *Tapia*.

Pepper's postsentencing rehabilitation and explaining it would not advance "any purpose of federal sentencing policy or any other policy behind the federal sentencing guidelines to send [Pepper] back to prison."<sup>111</sup> The government appealed and Pepper's sentence was once more reversed and remanded to the district court.<sup>112</sup> In its ruling, the Eighth Circuit explained that the district court had abused its discretion in considering postsentencing rehabilitation as a sentencing factor, both because it was not "relevant" and "would create unwarranted sentencing disparities and inject blatant inequities into the sentencing process."<sup>113</sup> At Pepper's second resentencing hearing in 2008 (and third sentencing hearing overall), Pepper and others again testified to Pepper's continuing rehabilitation (he was still attending school and still working, but also had recently married). This time, the district court rejected Pepper's request for a downward variance, and Pepper was sentenced to 65 months.<sup>114</sup> After losing at the Court of Appeals, Pepper appealed to the Supreme Court.<sup>115</sup> He won.

The Court defended the right of judges at sentencing to consider *all* factors in sentencing, even evidence that was not available to the original sentencing judge. In favoring broad discretion, the Court found its most germane precedent in *Williams*, the case in which the Court had most blatantly adopted aspects of the rehabilitative ideal. "We have emphasized," the *Pepper* Court said, quoting *Williams*, that "highly relevant—if not essential—to [the] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics."<sup>116</sup>

The language the *Pepper* Court quoted from *Williams* is the language that the rehabilitation as treatment model bequeathed to the Court: experts and judges need to have full information and wide latitude when sentencing, because the idea behind sentencing is not to give a "one size fits all punishment but to tailor or "individualize" a punishment based on the particularities of each offender. As the Court also quoted from *Williams*, "the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime."<sup>117</sup> The best sentence is the right prescription based on an individualized diagnosis that will lead to the offender's rehabilitation.<sup>118</sup> Indeed, *Pepper* goes even

---

<sup>111</sup> *Id.* at 1237.

<sup>112</sup> *Id.*

<sup>113</sup> *Id.* at 1237-38.

<sup>114</sup> *Id.* at 1238.

<sup>115</sup> *Id.* at 1239.

<sup>116</sup> *Id.* at 1235 (quoting *Williams*, at 246-47).

<sup>117</sup> *Id.* at 1240 (quoting *Williams*, at 247).

<sup>118</sup> See *Williams*, at 247 ("The belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past life and habits of a particular offender.").

further than *Williams* did, emphasizing the need to consider evidence of the offender's character not only *before* but even well *after* the moment of conviction.

Of course, the *Pepper* Court did not connect individualized punishments to the need for rehabilitation as treatment; then again, neither did the *Williams* Court. But recall that rehabilitation as training also required that sentences be individually tailored. In this regard it is revealing what additional facts the district court in *Pepper*'s resentencing thought especially relevant, viz., the fact that he was attending college, held a steady job, that he had reconciled in his family. In short, *Pepper* had *rehabilitated* himself, not in the sense that he was sick and getting better (the rehabilitation as treatment model) but in the sense that he was well on his way to becoming a fit and productive member of society (the rehabilitation as training model).

The inference is almost impossible to miss: *Pepper* was getting a lower sentence because he was getting rehabilitated *outside* of prison and so would need fewer years of rehabilitation *inside* prison. The *Pepper* Court held as much. Evidence of *Pepper*'s rehabilitation prior to his sentencing was relevant because it was "highly relevant to several" of the statutorily mandated factors judges were to consider at sentencing, including the purpose of "provid[ing] the defendant with needed educational or vocational training."<sup>119</sup> Sentences should be individualized, *Pepper* held, and one of the things that matters to individualization is whether the offender needs (or in *Pepper*'s case, *doesn't* need) rehabilitation. Rehabilitation, in short, is a sentencing factor.

### C. Reconciling *Tapia* and *Pepper*

Can the two cases – decided in the same Supreme Court term – be reconciled? At a high enough level of abstraction, *Tapia* and *Pepper* go in strikingly different directions. *Tapia* repudiates *Williams*; *Pepper* embraces it. As far as the interpretation of the Sentencing Reform Act, *Tapia* seems to have the better story. Indeed, Alito picked out the majority's reliance on *Williams* in *Pepper* for special ridicule. "Anyone familiar with the history of criminal sentencing in this country cannot fail to see the irony in the Court's praise for the sentencing scheme exemplified by *Williams*," Alito wrote.<sup>120</sup> But, he continued, "[b]y the time of the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act in 1984, this scheme had fallen into widespread

---

<sup>119</sup> *Pepper*, at 1242.

<sup>120</sup> *Pepper*, at 1256 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing *Williams*, at 241).

disrepute.”<sup>121</sup> He rejected the Court’s opinion in *Pepper* as an ill-advised “paean” to the “old regime.”<sup>122</sup>

More substantively, the two decisions are at odds in whether rehabilitation is a sentencing factor. *Tapia* reads the SRA and particular provisions of it as positively removing rehabilitation as a factor for judges to consider. *Pepper* favors judges considering an offender’s past rehabilitation as relevant to whether he needs further rehabilitation. Trying to find a distinction between the two uses of rehabilitation seems formalistic. We could say that *Tapia* is about using rehabilitation to *increase* a sentence, whereas *Pepper* is about using rehabilitation to *decrease* a sentence. But then both are still ways of using rehabilitation as a sentencing factor. If prison is not an appropriate means for promoting rehabilitation *at all* (as the statute at issue in *Tapia* suggests) then it should not have been a relevant factor in *Pepper*’s case. But it seems obvious that rehabilitation *was* a driving factor in at least one of *Pepper*’s sentencing decisions: *because* *Pepper* was already rehabilitated, he needed less rehabilitation in prison. If *Tapia* is correct about rehabilitation as a sentencing factor, then *Pepper* seems wrongly decided and *vice versa*.<sup>123</sup>

But there may be a way we can give more substance to the seeming formalism. Suppose we take *Tapia*’s rule *not* to be the blanket one that sentencing cannot be used as a factor when sentencing someone to prison; suppose, instead, we take it to be that, because prison is bad for rehabilitation. If prison is bad for rehabilitation, then judges should never factor in someone’s need for rehabilitation when considering whether to *increase* his term in prison. But by the same token, if prison is bad for rehabilitation, then judges should factor in someone’s need for rehabilitation when considering whether to *decrease* his term in prison (or not to sentence him to prison at all). In short, the SRA doesn’t dictate that judges should never consider someone’s need for rehabilitation. It dictates that judges should consider someone’s need for rehabilitation only when it means that they should get *less time* in prison. The principle that emerges out of the cases then is: prison is bad for rehabilitation. Under this principle, both *Tapia* and *Pepper* were correctly decided because they both did not use rehabilitation as a factor that might *increase* prison time, *Tapia*

<sup>121</sup> *Id.* at 1256 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

<sup>122</sup> *Id.* at 1257 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

<sup>123</sup> If we extend the logic of *Pepper* further, its tension with *Tapia* becomes even more manifest. Suppose *Pepper* had done bad things prior to his conviction (he had lost his job, or gotten a divorce, or flunked out of school), then presumably these facts would be relevant, but relevant because they showed *the need for further rehabilitation*. If *Pepper*’s good acts are relevant to decreasing his sentence because he has already been rehabilitated, then his bad acts would seem to be relevant for the same reason: because they show the need for more rehabilitation.



because it rejected a longer sentence and *Pepper* because it licensed a lower sentence.

Viewed in this light, *Pepper* is as anti-rehabilitative as *Tapia*. Both opinions are aware that rehabilitation programs are available in prison. But such programs are only relevant, *if they are relevant at all*, if prison time is going to be imposed anyway. If punishment is to be imposed, it is probably a good thing to commend them. The model at play here is mostly rehabilitation as training but in the modest way Judge Frankel endorsed it.<sup>124</sup> Judges should be aware that rehabilitative programs are there for prisoners, just don't operate under the idea that prison is being imposed *for* rehabilitation -- whether by itself or in conjunction with educational, vocational, or treatment programs. At best, rehabilitation is something that should be pursued *outside* of prison (including while supervised by the criminal justice system), but never *in* prison.<sup>125</sup>

#### IV. THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL IN PRACTICE II: THE CONSTITUTION

*Graham* was a Constitutional decision and not a statutory one, and it was decided before both *Tapia* or *Pepper*. Nonetheless, its emphasis on rehabilitation is striking. Both *Tapia* and *Pepper* show an awareness of the doubt about rehabilitation that resulted in Congress passing the SRA, an awareness that predates those cases.<sup>126</sup> And when set against other constitutional cases discussing punishment, *Graham's* focus on rehabilitation is an outlier. In *Roper*, the case that prior to *Graham* and which *Graham* most closely resembles, the focus was on retribution and deterrence, and whether the death penalty was a proportional punishment for children who are found guilty of murder.<sup>127</sup> It barely mentioned rehabilitation, which given *Graham*, seems odd. Death forecloses rehabilitation at least as much life without parole does (if not more).<sup>128</sup>

<sup>124</sup> For a reading of *Tapia* along these lines see William Peacock, *Prison is for Punishment, Not Rehabilitation?* FINDLAW:: U.S. FOURTH CIRCUIT (Oct. 31, 2012) at [http://blogs.findlaw.com/fourth\\_circuit/2012/10/prison-is-for-punishment-not-rehabilitation.html](http://blogs.findlaw.com/fourth_circuit/2012/10/prison-is-for-punishment-not-rehabilitation.html).

<sup>125</sup> Thanks to Eric Miller for helping me to see this point more clearly.

<sup>126</sup> See *Mistretta v. United States* 488 U.S. 361 at 366 ("Serious disparities in sentences, however, were common. Rehabilitation as a sound penological theory came to be questioned and, in any event, was regarded by some as an unattainable goal for most cases. See N. Morris, *The Future of Imprisonment* 24-43 (1974); F. Allen, *The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal* (1981).").

<sup>127</sup> *Roper v. Simmons*, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005).

<sup>128</sup> Although cf. Meghan Ryan, *Death and Rehabilitation*, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1231 (2013) (death sentence not incompatible with rehabilitation); Chad Flanders, *The Case Against the Case Against the Death Penalty*, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 595 (2013) (same). Perhaps the Court thought it went without saying that death cannot rehabilitate. But in

Why was rehabilitation so important in *Graham*, and equally as important, *what did* *Graham* mean by rehabilitation?

### A. *Graham's Rehabilitative Holding*

The early response to *Graham* understandably focused on its extension of the “evolving standards of decency” test beyond the death penalty to sentences to life without parole.<sup>129</sup> Whether the Court’s reasoning will be extended to other sentences and other groups (besides juveniles) still remains to be seen, and is the focus of much good work in the area.<sup>130</sup> But *Graham*’s more lasting impact may be its renewed emphasis on rehabilitation. Indeed, the fact that life in prison without parole foreclosed “the rehabilitative ideal” (as the Court put it)<sup>131</sup> is central to its holding. Indeed, it is perhaps the *theme* of the opinion, as well the basis of some of its more moving passages.

Consider in this regard how the *Graham* Court treats incapacitation as one of the legitimate goals of punishment, which is illustrative.<sup>132</sup> Even here, prior to the Court’s explicit discussion of rehabilitation as a purposes of punishment, rehabilitation creeps in. Incapacitation is a valid rationale for punishment, Justice Kennedy writes, but not here, because “[t]o justify life without parole for juveniles” requires a judgment that the juvenile will be a danger to society forever, which is to say, a judgment that the juvenile is incorrigible.<sup>133</sup> Kennedy goes on that a judgment of incorrigibility will be very difficult to make. It will be hard to decide whether a juvenile’s crime is the result of “transient immaturity” or the result of “irreparable corruption.”<sup>134</sup>

So far, Kennedy’s point is relatively modest, and for that reason also vulnerable. The fact that it may be hard to find those who are irreparably corrupt does not mean that *no* juveniles might be irreparably corrupt, and that a legislature might rationally target those who are. At least at this point, the argument only suggests stricter standards or closer analysis for

---

*Graham*, that fact alone – *that a punishment may foreclose rehabilitation* – does real work in showing that the punishment is unconstitutional. My question is: why was that work not done in *Roper*, or at least hinted at?

<sup>129</sup> See *supra* note 2.

<sup>130</sup> See *supra* note 1.

<sup>131</sup> *Graham*, at 74.

<sup>132</sup> Lynn Branham (in conversation) has stressed how rehabilitation plays multiple roles in *Graham*: as part of its proportionality analysis, as part of its analysis of the purposes of punishment, and in its discussion of a case-by-case approach to sentencing. I agree. My analysis here (as the text says) is illustrative, not exhaustive.

<sup>133</sup> *Id.* at 74.

<sup>134</sup> *Id.* at 68.

deciding who gets life without parole, a point emphasized by Justice Roberts in his concurring opinion.<sup>135</sup> We don't need a categorical ban on life without parole, just a more carefully targeted limit. Some juveniles may really be incorrigible, and so we might want to incapacitate *them*.

But what Kennedy says next in his opinion rules this out. For, he writes, “[e]ven if a State’s judgment that Graham was incorrigible were later corroborated by prison misbehavior or failure to mature, the sentence was still disproportionate because the judgement was made at the outset.”<sup>136</sup> That is to say, even if incapacitation is fully warranted (and so a rational and just punishment), the state cannot engage in it by imprisoning juveniles in life without parole. Why? The answer, which becomes clearer in the Court’s explicit discussion of rehabilitation, is that the state cannot foreclose the possibility *at the outset* that the offender could be rehabilitated. Incapacitation is not an acceptable rationale for punishment because it rules out the offender ever changing for the better. In short, rehabilitation as a purpose of punishment trumps incapacitation, *even when incapacitation is justified*.

Rehabilitation is the last purpose of punishment Kennedy discusses, although (as we just saw) shapes the discussion of the purposes of punishment that went before it.<sup>137</sup> Again, as with incapacitation, a sentence to life without parole passes a judgment on the juvenile and his “value and place in society,” viz., that he is “incorrigible” and can never “reenter the community.”<sup>138</sup> It is cruel to say to a juvenile offender that he is “irredeemable” and that he will never mature enough or be rehabilitated enough to earn release. As the Court eloquently puts it later in the opinion, “[l]ife in prison without the possibility of parole gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no hope.”<sup>139</sup> This, the Court says, is cruel and unusual. The Constitution requires giving juveniles the opportunity to show that they can be rehabilitated, “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”<sup>140</sup>

### ***B. Graham’s Two Models of Rehabilitation***

*Graham’s* rhetoric is sweeping, which we might expect from Justice

<sup>135</sup> *Graham* at XX (Roberts, J., concurring).

<sup>136</sup> *Id.* at 73.

<sup>137</sup> Rehabilitation figures in the proportionality analysis, too: life without parole is disproportionate to the juvenile’s offense precisely because it expresses a judgment of incorrigibility. *See id.* (judgment of incorrigibility at the outset is “disproportionate”).

<sup>138</sup> *Graham*, at 74.

<sup>139</sup> *Id.* at 79.

<sup>140</sup> *Id.* at 75.

Kennedy. But what does the rhetoric mean?<sup>141</sup> What in particular does Kennedy mean by not giving up on the “rehabilitative ideal”? Two models of rehabilitation seem to be working in *Graham*, with one ultimately more important than the other. *Graham* occasionally alludes to, and twice makes explicit, the ideal of rehabilitation as training. But the rhetoric, and the overall thrust of *Graham* fit more comfortably within the ideal of rehabilitation as moral reform.

The initial reference *Graham* makes to the model of rehabilitation as training comes in its discussion of the rehabilitative purpose of punishment. The Court cites an amicus brief noting that those sentenced of life without parole “are often denied access to vocational training and other rehabilitative services.”<sup>142</sup> Juveniles, the Court adds, are most in need of these services. A little later, the court hits the point again: “it is the policy in some prisons to withhold counseling, education, and rehabilitation programs for those” who are ineligible for parole.<sup>143</sup> In other words, life without parole means not only no hope of release, but a *denial* of opportunities for rehabilitation in the form of vocational and educational programs. When these passages are combined with idea that juveniles must be able to have a “meaningful opportunity” to obtain release, the rehabilitation as training model’s influence is patent: prison is a place where juveniles, if they work at it and have the right kind of support, can become fit and productive members of society and so can be released into society. Denying them these services “reinforces” the judgment that the juvenile is irredeemable, what Kennedy calls a “perverse consequence.”<sup>144</sup>

But if the rehabilitation as training model were the only model the Court had in mind, then the Court’s opinion, I believe, would have a very different shape and tenor. It would not just mention that programs should not be closed off to juveniles, it would positively *require* those programs be available to them. After all, it would be cruel to say that juveniles should be given the hope of release while denying them the tools they need to achieve that release (in this way, as the Court says in a striking passage, the prison system comes “complicit” in the denial of opportunity<sup>145</sup>). But the Court does not entirely go this way. Instead, it explicitly leaves it open to the “State, in the first instance, to explore the means and mechanism for compliance” with the Court’s instruction that juveniles must be given a

---

<sup>141</sup> For a philosophical look at Kennedy’s rhetoric of hope see Ristroph, *Hope*, *supra* note 23.

<sup>142</sup> *Id.* at 74.

<sup>143</sup> *Id.* at 79.

<sup>144</sup> *Id.*

<sup>145</sup> *See id.* (“In some prisons, moreover, the system itself becomes complicit in the lack of development.”).

“meaningful opportunity” to obtain release. “It is for legislatures,” the Court says, “to determine what rehabilitative techniques are appropriate and effective.”<sup>146</sup>

Note three things about the Court’s phrasing here. First, it is a matter for the *State* in particular the *legislature*, and not the Court, to find ways to comply with the Court’s mandate. In other words, there is no particular form or type of specifically rehabilitative “opportunity” that is required. Second, and more revealingly, the State need in the end only *explore* means and mechanisms for compliance. It need not, that is, actually *implement* any of these means and mechanisms, at least not yet. Indeed, one could imagine that legislatures might determine, and even *reasonably* determine, that “nothing works,” so that no rehabilitative programs are offered.<sup>147</sup> Third, and most important, what the Court is referring to is not means and mechanisms of rehabilitation, at least not directly: the Court is referring to *means and mechanisms of release*. This is not the language of a Court that is requiring states adopt the model of rehabilitation as training. It implies at most that the inmate must have at least an opportunity to prove he has matured; this is his “opportunity,” not the opportunity for educational and vocational programs *per se*. In fact, the Court’s language here may just be a long way around to saying that the longest permissible sentence for juveniles is life in prison with the possibility of parole.<sup>148</sup>

If this is all *Graham* requires, then we might worry about the gap between *Graham*’s rehabilitative rhetoric and its remedy; the rhetoric of rehabilitation as training is mostly hortatory. States post-*Graham* will have to give juveniles like Graham an opportunity, eventually, for release. But then do not have to make it any more possible in reality for juveniles to rehabilitate themselves and so win release. “Meaningful opportunity for release” becomes more about the preconditions of *release* than the conditions of confinement, and the implementation of *Graham* becomes (merely) about specifying those conditions.<sup>149</sup> All the same, states *may*

---

<sup>146</sup> *Id.* at 73-74.

<sup>147</sup> Again, Kennedy’s opinion is careful (almost too careful): he rejects the idea that life in prison without parole for juveniles might lock them out from rehabilitative programs. This is bad, Kennedy says. But nothing in his opinion holds that states have an obligation, in the first place, to institute those programs.

<sup>148</sup> Thus *Graham* does not lead in any straightforward way to creating a “right to rehabilitation.” Aaron Sussman, *The Paradox of Graham v. Florida and the Juvenile Justice System*, 37 VT. L. REV. 381, 385 (2012) (collecting citations on the “right to rehabilitative treatment”). See also Sally Terry Green, *Realistic Opportunity for Release Equals Rehabilitation*, 16 BERKLEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 13 (2011) (*Graham* “empowered the States to formulate appropriate and effective rehabilitative techniques”).

<sup>149</sup> See Drinan, *supra* note 13; Sarah French Russell, *Review for Release*, 89 IND. L. J. 373 (2014) (*Graham* about conditions for release, not right to rehabilitation).

make rehabilitative programs available to juveniles, but this is not required of them.<sup>150</sup> What is required is the possibility of release, not rehabilitation and not even the possibility of rehabilitation.

Is the rhetoric of rehabilitation in *Graham* empty then? Not entirely, and not if we keep in mind that rehabilitation as training is only one possible mode of the rehabilitative ideal. There is second strain in the Court's opinion, one that does not focus so much on rehabilitative programs that the state has to offer, than on the possibility of the offender himself undertake *his own* moral reform. Recall that in the model of rehabilitation as moral reform that reform is not so much the result of prison vocational or educational programs; instead, the reform comes about from the individual's own reflection and remorse. What the state has to do is hold out hope for the maturation and moral reform, even if (and perhaps *especially* if) it cannot compel it.

Justice Kennedy's rhetoric echoes the principles of the older reform model of rehabilitation almost precisely. The state does not have to give Graham access to any rehabilitative programs (although it should not deny them to him when he is in prison). Rather, the goal is ultimately Graham's rehabilitation of himself. In one passage, Justice Kennedy writes, that "[m]aturity" – not prison, not training – "can lead to that considered reflection which is the foundation for remorse, renewal, and rehabilitation."<sup>151</sup> And, in an especially vivid paragraph, Kennedy writes that with a sentence of life without parole, Terrence Graham has no meaningful opportunity to obtain release "no matter what he might do to demonstrate that the bad acts he committed as a teenager are not representative of his true character, even if he spends the next half century attempting to atone for his crimes and learn from his mistakes."<sup>152</sup> Training programs may help Graham at the margins become a more productive society, but it is only his own reflection and remorse that can lead to his atonement.

What the rehabilitation as reform model positively prohibits are punishments that say to the offender he *cannot* reform. If punishment is to aim at reform, it cannot at the same time make the "expressive judgment"<sup>153</sup> that a person will never reform and be able to reenter society. In other words, if the intent behind punishment is that the person reform, the punishment cannot simultaneously convey the judgment that the person *cannot* reform. But this judgment is what (by Kennedy's light) juvenile life

---

<sup>150</sup> In the language of the *Tapia* opinion, *Graham* seems to say that probably a lot of good can come from rehabilitation as training, but there is no constitutional mandate for it.

<sup>151</sup> *Id.* at 79.

<sup>152</sup> *Id.*

<sup>153</sup> *Id.* at 74.

without parole expresses: that the juvenile is incorrigible.<sup>154</sup> Indeed, it is this disqualifying aspect of life without parole that is the basis of the opinion's most eloquent passage: "[l]ife in prison without the possibility of parole gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no hope."<sup>155</sup> Note what disqualifies the punishment *in the first instance*: the judgment that the punishment makes, viz., that the offender is without hope of reform. The punishment is not wrong for what it *does* to the offender, but for what it *says* to him, at the outset, about his possibility for moral reform.

This rhetoric matches precisely rhetoric of rehabilitation as moral reform. As Jean Hampton puts it in her article on punishment as moral education the state must never "regard any one it punishes as hopeless, insofar as it is assuming that each of these persons still has the ability to choose to be moral."<sup>156</sup> Or consider also Antony Duff's statement of the moral reform view as one which believes that "we can never have *morally* adequate grounds—nothing could count as *morally* adequate grounds—for treating a person as being beyond redemption."<sup>157</sup> Because life without parole regards juveniles as "hopeless" and treats them as "beyond redemption," it is prohibited as a punishment. It is one thing if a punishment denies juveniles training. It is quite another thing if it denies juveniles hope, to "imply that those subject to [life without parole] are to be permanently and irrevocably expelled from ordinary community with their fellow citizens."<sup>158</sup>

Thus *Graham*'s basic rehabilitative holding: the State cannot discourage a person from reforming by how it sentences. And if the state does not discourage reform, reform may happen, perhaps just by dint of juveniles growing older and maturing. "Maturity" is another key word in *Graham*, and it too fits with the model of rehabilitation as moral reform. The state cannot make you "mature"; it is process one undergoes, more or less actively, by slowly taking responsibility for yourself. In fact, too much interference can end up hindering one's moral growth.

But now we may have a worry about the logic of this argument and about the model of rehabilitation as reform more generally. According to that model, nothing stops reform from happening in prison (through reflection and maturity) and indeed, one might be reformed in prison and

---

<sup>154</sup> See *id.* ("Maturity can lead to that considered reflection which is the foundation for remorse, renewal, and rehabilitation. A young person who knows that he or she has no chance to leave prison before life's end has little incentive to become a responsible individual.").

<sup>155</sup> *Graham*, at 79.

<sup>156</sup> Hampton, *supra* note 67, at 231.

<sup>157</sup> Duff, *supra* note 67, at 266.

<sup>158</sup> Duff, *supra* note 78, at 185.

yet never be released. Moral reform, in other words, is a good in itself, even if it does not have release as its eventual reward. Indeed, if offenders reform only for the sake of being released, we may wonder whether this might corrupt their efforts at moral reform not only by encouraging the pretense of reform when none has occurred, but more generally by giving offenders the wrong incentives to reform: offenders should show remorse because they are remorseful, not because they want to get out of jail.

On purely moral reform grounds, there does not seem to be any disjunct between remaining in prison and being reformed (nor for that matter, need there be any disjunct between being sentenced to death and being morally reformed<sup>159</sup>). But again, what is important in *Graham* may be less about release *per se* and more about the message the impossibility of release sends: the state saying that it will never release you seems to entail that you *will not* and *cannot* be reformed. By the same token, saying that the state must give you a chance of being released strongly suggests that you *can* be morally reformed. What is important is that the state give you hope, rather than a firm guarantee of release.<sup>160</sup> Some juveniles may not, in fact, ever be released and so their hopes will remain just that; but they cannot be denied hope at the outset. Indeed, *the judgment at the outset* is the main wrong of life without parole and constitutive of that judgment is disallowing any meaningful opportunity for release.

That this is a rather constrained vision of rehabilitation can be shown by the fact that rehabilitation as moral reform is compatible with the “prison is bad for rehabilitation” that was the principle of *Tapia* and *Pepper*. *Tapia* and *Pepper* could be reconciled because they both said that one could never sentence someone to *more* prison time because that person needed more rehabilitation. Prison just couldn’t (reliably) be counted on to rehabilitate people. Note, though, Justice Kennedy doesn’t require that prison rehabilitate juveniles. Rehabilitation programs in prison are nice, but not required by the Constitution. Nor does prison in general have to be a place where people usually get better. Nothing in *Graham* entails that prison is good for rehabilitation, and that juveniles should be incarcerated because incarceration will rehabilitate them. *Graham* is not a departure from *Tapia* and *Graham* in the end; it accepts their skepticism about the desirability of prison as a place for rehabilitation. It only says that a sentence to prison cannot be one that denies any hope that they will reform. Whether the odds of reform are high or (more probably) low is in a way beside the point. The state can’t by its sentencing *rule out* moral reform and release; this the model of rehabilitation as reform forbids. The rest, which

---

<sup>159</sup> See *supra* note 128 (death penalty not incompatible with rehabilitation).

<sup>160</sup> Note that the state does not deny hope by failing to provide rehabilitative programs.



is a lot (which is almost everything), is on the offender.<sup>161</sup>

### C. Applying *Graham and Rehabilitation as Moral Reform*

*Miller v. Alabama*, the follow-up case to *Graham* that required individualized sentencing for juveniles convicted of homicide did not extend *Graham* very far. It did not strike down life without parole for juveniles altogether, as perhaps the logic of *Graham* dictated.<sup>162</sup> If states cannot make the judgment “at the outset” that juveniles convicted of gruesome and terrible nonhomicide crimes are “incorrigible” and “beyond redemption” how does this change for homicide crimes? Instead, *Graham* focused on the possible disproportion between the culpability of juvenile murderers and life in prison without parole.

In this regard, *Miller* is a case about the individualization of punishments in the (old) retrospective, retributive sense, and not in the prospective, rehabilitative sense.<sup>163</sup> Youth is relevant in figuring out what the offender deserves for what he or she *did*, not because it may be relevant in predicting what he or she might *become*. Justice Kagan in *Miller* says almost nothing about the possible future rehabilitation of offenders in *Miller*. She is not worried about expressing the judgment that some juveniles will be beyond redemption, because someone of them will be; that is, some of them will really deserve to be in prison for the rest of their lives, and die in prison. She is worried, rather, that the state be certain that those who are sentenced to die in prison will be the right ones.<sup>164</sup>

Does *Graham* then lack any bite, any promise for real change? *Miller* suggests that it may and that even extending *Graham* to categorically prohibit life in prison without parole for juveniles convicted of homicide is

---

<sup>161</sup> Pushed to its limit, the logic of *Graham* leads to a kind of paradox. *Graham* says we have to leave open the possibility of reform in prison. At the same time, prison is a place where reform is very difficult. I return to this paradox in my conclusion.

<sup>162</sup> *Miller v. Alabama*, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2463-64 (2012).

<sup>163</sup> Perhaps not surprisingly, both *Tapia* and *Miller* were written by Justice Kagan. *Tapia* is hostile to extending punishment for rehabilitation; *Miller* hardly makes use of rehabilitation, mentioning it only in passing. *Miller* at 2468.

<sup>164</sup> Comparing *Graham* to *Miller* suggest a final way in which *Graham* subscribes to yet a third rehabilitative ideal, this time, rehabilitation as treatment. *Graham*'s ultimate prescription for juveniles is not only an individualized sentence: it is an indefinite sentence subject to proof of rehabilitation. Of course, the rehabilitation *Graham* is interested in is the moral reform of the offender (his maturity, his remorse, and his atonement from reflection), and to a lesser extent, proof that the juvenile can reenter society as a productive and contributing member. It is not proof that the offender has been “cured” of his antisocial “sickness,” as the rehabilitation as treatment model held. Still, *Graham* says that it is only through rehabilitation that the juvenile offender can be released. Until then, he or she must remain in jail indefinitely and possibly until death.

not in the cards.<sup>165</sup> Those juveniles who kill may indeed be fairly judged to be incorrigible *at the outset*, and be *denied* hope, although this will require an individualized finding. Nonetheless, we might speculate on some areas where *Graham* might have some influence even if (or because) rehabilitation means “rehabilitation as reform.”

### 1. Shorter and Lesser Punishments

If *Miller* suggests that the rehabilitative ideal will not travel all the way upward to eliminate all punishments that impose life in prison without parole, there is still a possibility that it might affect some lesser sentences, including non-prison sentences. These sentences would be ones in which a judgment was made that the offender would *never* reform, no matter the remorse he felt or the efforts at atonement he made. *Graham* said that life without the possibility of parole entailed this judgment, but there may be other punishments that also imply incorrigibility. Based on *Graham*, these cases might also be candidates for cruel and unusual punishment, because they too would give up the rehabilitative ideal.

One possible extension of *Graham* (which may hardly seem an extension at all) is to apply it to sentences that are *de facto* life sentences. *Graham* read very narrowly would apply only to sentences of life without parole and not to sentences of years (and Justice Alito cautioned that this is all *Graham* should have been taken to mean<sup>166</sup>). But what of a sentence of one hundred years without the possibility to parole to a sixteen year old; isn't that the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence? Or, to put it in terms of moral reform: doesn't such a sentence also make the judgment that the person is beyond reform? A California court in 2012 was the first to rule that a sentence that allowed a 16 year old a parole hearing only after 100 years was unconstitutional, finding that *Graham* applied to both “life without parole or equivalent *de facto* sentences.”<sup>167</sup> Other courts have followed; some have found even shorter sentences to be *de facto* life without parole sentences.<sup>168</sup> How to fix exactly how long is too long,

---

<sup>165</sup> At least, in the short term. The logic of *Graham* on rehabilitation, I think, leads inevitably to the conclusion that *all* life without parole punishments for juveniles are unacceptable. That *Miller* does not embrace this conclusion shows that the Court is not ready to extend *Graham*'s logic.

<sup>166</sup> *Id.* at 124 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in the Court's opinion affects the imposition of a sentence to a term of years without the possibility of parole.”).

<sup>167</sup> *People v. Caballero*, 282 P.3d 291 (2012).

<sup>168</sup> *Floyd v. State*, 87 So.3d 45, 45–47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (eighty-year sentence and first opportunity for release at age eighty-five); and *Adams v. State*, — So.3d —, —, 2012 WL 3193932, at \*2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. No. 1D11–3225, Aug. 8, 2012) (sixty-year sentence and first opportunity for release around age seventy-six); *but cf. Bunch*, 685 F.3d

however, remains an area of contention among state courts.<sup>169</sup>

Another, related extension of *Graham* involves lifetime punishments that do not involve incarceration. Consider a juvenile sex offender who is required to register for the rest of his life and that no showing of rehabilitation could ever be sufficient to remove the registration requirement. If sex offender registration is properly considered part of a punishment,<sup>170</sup> then could a lifetime registration requirement also give up on the “rehabilitative ideal”? A court in Ohio found that a lifetime registration requirement did exactly this, although it focused more on how registries might make it harder for people to find work, or to integrate into the community.<sup>171</sup> A clearer route might have been how the fact that the ban could never be lifted, nor matter proof of moral reform, was in fact a judgment that the offender would never reform, that the state would always have to keep an eye on him. The problem with emphasizing the practical difficulties of reintegration is that it could plausibly be said that the original conviction was the problem, not the registration.<sup>172</sup> Better to hold that the state could not rule out *ex ante* the possibility of moral reform by such a sentence, however difficult it might be in practice. In other words, the problem on the rehabilitation as reform reading of *Graham* is not so much the obstacles to rehabilitation but the judgment the state makes at the outset that moral reform can never happen. Such an analysis might be extended to

---

at 546 (declining to apply *Graham* to consecutive, fixed-term sentences); *State v. Kasic*, 228 Ariz. 228, 265 P.3d 410 (App.2011) (same); *Henry v. State*, 82 So.3d 1084, 1086–89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) ( *review granted* 107 So.3d 405)(same); and *Angel v. Commonwealth*, 281 Va. 248, 704 S.E.2d 386 (2011) (state statute permitting prisoners at age sixty or older who have served at least ten years of their sentence to petition for conditional release provides the “meaningful opportunity for release” required by *Graham* ).

<sup>169</sup>*See* *People v. Lucero*, 2013 WL 1459477, 4 (Colo. App.) (“Defendant argues on appeal that, statistically, ‘serving 20 years in prison takes 16 years off life expectancy,’ thereby decreasing his natural life expectancy ‘by about 32 years’ before he becomes eligible for parole. According to his calculation, his life expectancy is only forty-two years, and therefore the point at which he obtains his first opportunity for parole exceeds that expectancy.”).

<sup>170</sup>*See, e.g., Doe v. State*, 189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008) (sex offender registry “punishment” for purposes of *ex post facto* clause analysis).

<sup>171</sup>*In re C.P.*, 967 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio 2012); *id.* at 527 (“Finally, as to the final penological goal—rehabilitation—we have already discussed the effect of forcing a juvenile to wear a statutorily imposed scarlet letter as he embarks on his adult life. ‘Community notification may particularly hamper the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders because the public stigma and rejection they suffer will prevent them from developing normal social and interpersonal skills—the lack of those traits [has] been found to contribute to future sexual offenses.’”) (citation omitted).

<sup>172</sup>*See, e.g., Doe* at 1011 (considering argument that deleterious effects of registry are attributable not to registry, but to conviction for sex offense).

other, permanent disabilities offenders might face even after they are released: bans that prevent ex-felons from voting, for instance.<sup>173</sup>

## 2. Prison Conditions

Above, I said that *Graham* does not require that states provide rehabilitative training to juveniles; the most it requires is an opportunity for release. There is a gap between the requirement of a “meaningful opportunity” for parole and any possible means to achieve that goal. This gap is problematic only if we think of rehabilitation as training; it is not as problematic if we think of rehabilitation as moral reform. Moral reform is in the end something the offender has to do on his own, by reflection and by atonement. Moral reform is nothing that a vocational or educational program can bring him *to* if does not want to be brought to it. In terms of actual, positive requirements, *Graham* and the moral reform model may allow states to get off the hook to a significant degree.

What rehabilitation as moral reform may require is that prison conditions *not* be so degrading and dehumanizing that they also “send a message” that moral reform is impossible. What *Graham* prohibited was, at bottom, the “expressive judgment” by society that a juvenile was incorrigible.<sup>174</sup> This message is sent by a sentence of life in prison without parole: it says, no matter how much you change, you are still irredeemable in society’s eyes. But a life without parole sentence might not be the only way society might send such a message. Degrading or dehumanizing prison conditions might also express that judgment; they also might express to the offender that no matter how much he changes, society will nonetheless treat him as incorrigible and beyond redemption. Bad conditions, too, can deprive an offender of hope just as certainly as a lifetime prison sentence may. Here, we can give a deeper meaning to Justice Kennedy’s statement that the prison system “itself becomes complicit in the lack [of the offender’s] development”<sup>175</sup> – not by depriving him of rehabilitative training, but by removing *any* possibility that prison is a place where he can be reformed, and where the judgment of incorrigibility is “reinforced by the

---

<sup>173</sup> Cf. *Richardson v. Ramirez*, 418 U.S. 54, 57 (1974), where the respondents raised the rehabilitative ideal as part of his argument (“Pressed upon us by the respondents, and by *amici curiae*, are contentions that these notions are outmoded, and that the *more modern view is that it is essential to the process of rehabilitating the ex-felon* that he be returned to his role in society as a fully participating citizen when he has completed the serving of his term.”) (emphasis added).

<sup>174</sup> The message may be reinforced by a lack of rehabilitative programs for the offender; but the message is, in the first instance, conveyed by the punishment itself.

<sup>175</sup> *Graham* at 79.

prison term.”<sup>176</sup> As one moral reform theorist put it, a punishment cannot aim at “degrading or brutalizing a person” because this is “not conducive to moral awakening but only to bitterness and resentment.”<sup>177</sup>

In this way, *Graham* may connect up to litigation against cruel and unusual prison conditions, and not just to litigation against other cruel and unusual sentences.<sup>178</sup> Prisoners may not have a constitutional right to rehabilitation,<sup>179</sup> but they may have a right not to be prevented from ever achieving moral reform by conditions which treat them as “incorrigible” and “beyond redemption.”<sup>180</sup> As Alice Ristroph has written, this “negative” holding of *Graham* “could lead to greater scrutiny of solitary confinement, security classifications, and other dimensions of prison conditions that render a sentence more severe without necessarily extending its duration.” This is especially true if we treat rehabilitation as on a par with retribution as a purpose for punishment.<sup>181</sup> For retribution, harsh conditions may be part of the punishment.<sup>182</sup> But rehabilitation as moral reform may put a constraint on *how* harsh conditions can be: they cannot be so harsh that they in effect judge the offender to be beyond reform, because they make it impossible that he could ever reform.<sup>183</sup>

Here, however, we should be mindful of the Court’s jurisprudence. In *Beard v. Banks*,<sup>184</sup> for example, the Court seemed to endorse (or at least refused to condemn) a prison plan of “rehabilitation through deprivation,”<sup>185</sup> in which misbehaving prisoners were deprived of magazines and other reading material. “Any deprivation of something a prisoner desires,” according to the broader theory, “gives him an added incentive to improve his behavior.”<sup>186</sup> Such crude efforts at behavior control come close to themselves being dehumanizing, to say nothing of

---

<sup>176</sup> *Id.*

<sup>177</sup> Morris, *A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment*, *supra* note xx, at 158; *see also* “By the Light of Virtue: Prison Rape and the Corruption of Character,” 91 IOWA L. REV. 561 (2006).

<sup>178</sup> *See generally* LYNN BRANHAM, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SENTENCING LAW & POLICY, ch. 17.

<sup>179</sup> *See Padgett v. Stein*, 406 F.Supp. 287, 296 (1975); *see also* JOHN W. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 222 (2010).

<sup>180</sup> *Graham* at xx.

<sup>181</sup> Ristroph, *supra* note xx, at xx.

<sup>182</sup> *See, e.g.*, *Rhodes v. Chapman*, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1991).

<sup>183</sup> *See* IAN CRUM, A VIRTUE LESS CLOISTERED: COURTS, SPEECH, AND CONSTITUTIONS 154 (2002) (describing conditions in overcrowded juvenile detention centers where children were “handcuffed to iron pipes for extended periods” and concluding “[i]n short, the rehabilitative ideal was not realized in practice”).

<sup>184</sup> 548 U.S. 521 (2006).

<sup>185</sup> *Id.* at 541 (Stevens. J., dissenting).

<sup>186</sup> *Id.*

their limited “rehabilitative” potential. And yet this is only the tip of the iceberg of harsh prison conditions which make surviving, let alone reforming, in prison barely possible.<sup>187</sup> Indeed, under the guide of rehabilitation, prison may become *harsher* rather than more humane.<sup>188</sup> In the abstract, the ideal of moral reform may prohibit this; practice may be something entirely different.<sup>189</sup>

### 3. Adults

In *Roper*, the Court emphasized how different juveniles were from adults: in terms of their brain development, their susceptibility to influence by others, and most ambiguously, their lack of a fully formed “character.”<sup>190</sup> On the one hand, all of these things made juveniles less culpable for their crimes, a theme that also is present in *Graham*.<sup>191</sup> On the other hand, and this is a theme present in *Graham* but not in *Roper*, this state of undevelopedness might make juveniles more and not less capable of rehabilitation: they are not yet who they will be; they can mature, and by maturing, show that they are not inevitably what their crime might indicate them to be.<sup>192</sup> They are better than that, or rather who “they” *are* is not yet who they might *be* over time, and through rehabilitation. By comparison, adults are who they are and so may be more culpable and by the same token less capable of future rehabilitation. Adults are to be punished; children are to be rehabilitated.<sup>193</sup> Juveniles, in the language of *Graham*, have a greater “capacity to change.”<sup>194</sup>

---

<sup>187</sup> It also shows the dangers of leaving it to legislatures to determine what rehabilitative programs work, for nothing in *Graham* prevents legislatures from presenting “rehabilitation through deprivation” as one of the means or modes of realizing the “rehabilitative ideal.”

<sup>188</sup> *Cf.* *Wolff v. McDonnell*, 418 U.S. 539, 563 (1974) (“With some, rehabilitation may be best achieved by simulating procedures of a free society to the maximum possible extent; but with others, it may be essential that discipline be swift and sure”).

<sup>189</sup> See also Part V *infra*.

<sup>190</sup> *Roper* at xx.

<sup>191</sup> *Graham* at xx.

<sup>192</sup> *Id.*

<sup>193</sup> This seems to be a fundamental premise of the juvenile justice system. See, e.g., Carrissa Hessick & Judith Stinton, *Juveniles, Sex Offenses, and the Scope of Substantive Law*, 46 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 5, 10 (2013) (“The juvenile justice system was created over a century ago. The goal was to provide children, who were understood to be different from adults, with an opportunity for rehabilitation, rather than punishment. When a juvenile commits what would be classified as a crime if committed by an adult, that conduct is labeled ‘delinquent,’ and the juvenile justice system responds.”) (citations omitted). See, e.g., *In re: Gault*, 387 U.S. 15-16 (Black, J., concurring) (belief that child is essentially “good” means that child is to be “treated” and “rehabilitated” rather than punished).

<sup>194</sup> *Graham* at xx.

On either the model of rehabilitation as treatment or rehabilitation as training, the contrast between adults and children holds. Children can be more easily treated, perhaps. Their sickness, if that's what it is, has not yet taken root. The older a person is, the more it takes to recover and be well. It may, in fact, be too late to treat some adults. Children are also easier to educate: their minds are still growing. Not so with adults, who can be trained, if they can be trained at all, with greater difficulty. They are old dogs trying to learn new tricks. On the first two models of rehabilitation, children *really are* different from adults. In a word, adults are harder to rehabilitate, if indeed they can be rehabilitated at all. Of course, some adults will find they can be rehabilitated and some children will resist any efforts at rehabilitation. But if rehabilitation is treatment or if rehabilitation is training, the generalization holds for the most part.

It is less clear that the contrast stands if we use the model of rehabilitation as moral reform, viz., that it will be easier for children to reform themselves, to reflect, and to show remorse for what they have done and harder for adults. Couldn't moral reform be equally possible for both of them? To be sure, it may be easier for some children and harder for some adults. But as a generalization, it seems wrong to judge children *always* more capable of moral reform and adults *always* as less capable. Some kinds of sophisticated moral reform may even be impossible for children, that is, a certain level of maturity may be necessary even to start the process of moral reflection.<sup>195</sup> Even a type of moral conversion seems possible even for the most hardened of adults. More generally, contemporary moral reform theorists tend to insist that we should not treat *any* person "beyond civic redemption."<sup>196</sup> If this is right, the rehabilitation as a purpose of punishment cannot be limited to sentences that involve juveniles. Whether a punishment leaves open the possibility of moral reform should be a constraint on *all* punishments: we should not give up on anybody. Again, what this entails may be very limited, at least in terms of the sentences it applies to. It may only apply to life in prison without parole sentences for juveniles or adults, because only that particular sentence expresses the judgment that the person is irredeemable.<sup>197</sup>

---

<sup>195</sup> As *Graham* seems to acknowledge; *id.* at 79 ("Maturity can lead to that considered reflection which is the foundation for remorse, renewal, and rehabilitation.").

<sup>196</sup> Duff, *supra* note 78, at 186.

<sup>197</sup> See William Berry, *More Different Than Death, Less Different Than Life*, 71 OHIO ST. L. J. 1139 (2010). For one court's rejection of *Graham's* application to adults, see *Commonwealth v. Batts*, 66 A.3d 286, 291 (Pa. 2013) (children are different for purposes of sentencing in *Miller* and *Graham*).

## V. CONCLUSION

*Graham* was decided long after the rehabilitative ideal had fallen out of favor. It had stopped, for the most part, acting as an ideal and became more of a side consideration to other, more “weighty” purposes of punishment such as retribution and deterrence. *Graham* does not, and cannot, by itself revive the rehabilitative ideal, and I have argued anyway that *Graham*’s version of rehabilitation is rather modest. It does not entail any positive obligation on the state’s part to rehabilitate the offender; it does not mandate any vocational or educational programs. It was decided against a backdrop of legislative and judicial hostility to the idea of prison as a place for rehabilitation, and it does not directly repudiate that hostility. Rather, it only says that society cannot pass the judgment that people will not rehabilitate him or herself in prison. It has to hold out the hope, at least for juveniles, that they will be able to reform themselves while they are in prison.

But *Graham* has, if only by the centrality of the concept of rehabilitation in its holding, put rehabilitation back on the agenda. It was, at the least, a relatively surprising development, although it remains to be seen what actual impact its emphasis on the hope of rehabilitation will have. There are some stirrings in the lower courts, but they are just that: stirrings. Nor has the decision led much in the way of sustained academic reflection on the “rehabilitative ideal.”<sup>198</sup> Moreover, we should not, I think, dispense with skepticism about the two problems that led many to discard the rehabilitative ideal. Identifying rehabilitation as reform is one thing, and a necessary step; but *endorsing* it is quite another thing.

First, we should consider whether rehabilitation as moral reform is a worthy ideal in itself. Should the state *aim* to have offender pursue remorse, reflection and atonement? Is this even a valid goal for a liberal state?<sup>199</sup> Or should the state only imprison with a view towards deterring criminals and protecting society.<sup>200</sup> Worries about manipulating offenders, to get them to believe the right things, plagued the model of rehabilitation as treatment. Similar worries might be raised about rehabilitation as moral reform, which displays an intense interest in molding the attitudes, emotions, and beliefs of the offender; in short, in shaping the offender’s

---

<sup>198</sup> *But cf.*, Ristroph, *supra* note 13.

<sup>199</sup> I raised such a worry about Duff’s philosophy of punishment in a review of one of his books. See Flanders, R. A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY, ETHICS (October 2002).

<sup>200</sup> See generally Flanders, *Can Retributivism Be Saved?*, BYU L. REV. (forthcoming, 2014).



*soul*.<sup>201</sup> Moral reform is something we might take up *qua* members of a religious community or a family; it may be less appropriate as a goal that the *state* pursues.

Second, and perhaps more profoundly, we might still worry whether prison can work as a place for rehabilitation at all. Rehabilitation as reform removes the burden on the state to supply offenders with rehabilitative services; at least, it does not mandate them, although if they are present, the state cannot deny them to juveniles. I have suggested that rehabilitation as moral reform also should not condone brutalizing and degrading prison conditions: these, too, can express a judgment that an offender is “irredeemable.” But is even this sufficient? *Tapia*, especially, displayed a profound skepticism--both legislative and judicial-- that prison could be at all compatible with rehabilitation.<sup>202</sup> Prison was not to be used for rehabilitation, period. *Graham*, by contrast, seems to depend on the idea that at least rehabilitation is generally possible in prison. This is not inconsistent with thinking prison is not the best place for reform, but it is in some tension with it.

Suppose that we have good reason to doubt that even the best prison could be a place for rehabilitation as moral reform; suppose we even thought that most of the time prison positively *hinders* a person’s project of moral reform. We would then be simply repudiating the vision of those who founded the penitentiary, and who thought that confinement and meditation could be a path to moral development and maturity, and who thought more generally that prison and punishment could cause one to reform. If we depart with the vision of prison as a place for moral reform, then we might think that the best thing for juveniles (and for everybody) is to find ways to keep them out of prison altogether except when this was needed to protect society. Giving up on this might mean giving up on the hope of moral reform in prison. But if prison is a bad place for reform in general, that was a false hope anyway. Deciding whether to extend *Graham* means, first, deciding whether we should hold out that hope.

---

<sup>201</sup> See, e.g., R.A. Duff, *Penance, Punishment, and the Limits of Community* in WHY PUNISH? HOW MUCH? 174 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011) (contrasting liberal values with values that “[t]o put it crudely ... have to do with the soul, with our inner spiritual or moral condition”).

<sup>202</sup> See *supra* Part III.A